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Trading Behaviour, Price Discovery and Volatility in Competing 
Market Microstructures
Thesis Abstract
The first chapter investigates the price and volatility impacts produced by block 
trades in an inter-market environment with different microstructures. A sample of 
European cross-traded securities is employed to investigate whether large trades 
executed on the foreign market (London Stock Exchange's SEAQ-I market) produce 
any impacts on the securities' home markets and analyse whether different market 
microstructures matter. The price impact in the home markets is detected before the 
large trade is~executed on SEAQ-I and proceeds in a protracted fashion, implying 
that substantial pre- and post-positioning is undertaken by London market makers 
through the home markets. The new equilibrium price on the home market is 
reached before the trade information is published on SEAQ-I. Large trades are also 
found to cause higher price volatility in auction trading systems than in a hybrid 
market microstructure.
The second and third chapters analyse the formation of quoted and effective spreads 
and their components in three different market microstructures. The results show 
that quoted and effective spreads generated by a hybrid system (Deutsche Bdrse's 
IBIS system) are lower than those generated by both the pure auction system (Paris 
Bourse's CAC system) and the dealership system (London Stock Exchange SEAQ 
market). Traders on a hybrid mechanism face the lowest costs and this result holds 
even when we control for (a) the level of market concentration in liquidity provision, 
and (b) company-specific news. However, the adverse selection component of the 
spread is significantly higher in an auction trading system compared to both the 
dealership and the hybrid trading system.
This fifth chapter investigates (a) whether, in a hybrid trading mechanism, voluntary 
market makers provide a higher level of price stabilisation than limit order traders 
even if they do not have any obligation to keep orderly markets, (b) the strategic 
interactions between the limit order book and market makers, and (c) the behaviour 
of the order flow at times of price uncertainty. We analyse these issues using high 
frequency data from the London Stock Exchange which has adopted a hybrid market 
microstructure. We find that prices on the dealership system track the security's true 
value more efficiently. The dealership system can transact higher volumes with 
lower price volatility. This evidence suggests that market makers provide price 
stabilisation, even if they have no binding obligation to do so, thus improving the 
market's quality. In terms of trading behaviour, we find that in a hybrid trading 
mechanism, traders are not encouraged to provide liquidity on the order book 
through limit orders as price uncertainty increases. Instead orders migrate to the 
dealership system for execution.
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C hapter 1. Introduction
Competition between Exchanges for order flow and listings has intensified 
over the last few years. Major Exchanges have gone through reforms aimed at 
improving the efficiency and the attractiveness of their trading systems. We 
have witnessed rounds after rounds of reforms in market designs. Nowhere 
have such reforms been as wide-ranging as in the case of European Exchanges. 
The different market microstructures adopted by the major Exchanges have 
provided an important laboratory allowing us to investigate how different 
trading systems impact on markets’ quality. Price discovery processes, liq­
uidity provision, short term price volatility, order migration, trading costs 
and spread formation are some of the issues that can be fruitfully addressed 
by investigating the different trading environments.
These reforms have brought to the fore the old debate of fragmenta­
tion against centralisation of trading. The general principle has always been 
that, like any other market, centralisation of trading and trade information 
should lead to a comprehensive improvement in markets’ quality. Liquidity- 
motivated and informed-motivated traders would like to participate in a mar­
ket where they can obtain the best execution under prevalent market con­
ditions. Arguably, this can be obtained through a centralised market where 
information from different investors is pooled together to obtain the best 
prices possible. But is a centralised market necessarily better than a frag­
mented market? Can a centralised market cater for all the different types 
of investors participating in the trading process? Is a centralised market an 
equilibrium outcome when Exchanges compete for order flow?
Evidence shows that the ideal of a centralised market has frequently been 
tempered, slowly but surely, across the different Exchanges through their 
efforts to attract order flow and the competition that results to attract a
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whole gamut of heterogenous traders. These different trading requirements 
are leading to different market set-ups and different trading platforms that 
need to be fully investigated.
On one hand, this has entailed some modifications to trading rules that, 
for example, temper transparency rules for large traders (one such exam­
ple is the Paris Bourse where hidden orders are allowed). On the other 
hand, there has been the creation of alternative markets competing under 
one roof, creating de facto a hybrid trading system. The example of the 
London Stock Exchange (the “LSE”), where an order book system competes 
with a dealership-based system, is explicitly used in this work to analyse 
liquidity provision under the two microstructures.
The issue of the optimal trading system, between a quote-driven (dealer­
ship) and an order-driven (auction-based), in terms of liquidity provision and 
social welfare has yet to be conclusively answered. This remains a controver­
sial issue even though in the last decade many Exchanges started adopting 
auction-based trading modes. The main difficulty lies in the fact that liq­
uidity characteristics, such as depth, breadth and resilience, are not only 
influenced by the trading mechanisms employed but also by (a) the level of 
competition between dealers and other liquidity providers allowed in the mar­
ket place (which is largely a decision adopted by a single Exchange and could 
be independent of the microstructure chosen), and (b) by the self-reinforcing 
beliefs (appearing in the models of Pagano, 1989, and Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1988) where liquidity begets more liquidity. Furthermore, empirical work un­
dertaken in this field has suffered from the well-known cross-market liquidity 
comparison problems: are the results being driven by the trading mechanism 
or are they the product of concentration in the market of liquidity provision?
The wide-ranging debate among market practitioners, regulators and aca­
11
demies regarding the benefits of screen-based trading systems and automated 
order execution systems, together with the appropriate role of mandatory (or 
voluntary) dealers is still going on. While major markets have introduced or 
enhanced screen-based trading, there has been a re-appraisal of the contri­
butions that dealers can make in terms of improving market quality.
Most of the work on screen-based trading (for example by Glosten, 1994, 
Domowitz and Wang, 1994, Bollerslev, Domowitz and Wang, 1997) shows 
that, under normal market conditions, these systems incorporate information 
into prices more rapidly than dealership-based system and the quality of 
these markets (measured by liquidity and transaction costs) is not worse 
that dealership markets. However, these results do not seem to hold when 
considering adverse market conditions (when return volatility increases) or 
at times when information arrival is very intense.
The debate that has taken place in the mid 1990s over the reforms in 
both the LSE and NASDAQ testifies for this process of ongoing interactions 
between different market stakeholders in their search for a trading platform 
that generates the optimal execution package.
Another important development has been the emergence of cross-listing 
and cross-quoting of large capitalisation firms in different markets creating 
a trading process that fragments in different parallel markets: (a) the home 
market, and (b) the foreign market. These parallel markets can influence 
the equilibrium in various ways: (i) there are various sources, rather than 
just one, of price formation; (ii) liquidity fragments in different markets 
(and whether this fragmentation increases or lowers liquidity must be in­
vestigated); and (iii) there is a competing market place that can be used by 
informed and liquidity traders to execute their orders. As a result, one major 
question that arises in a parallel market set-up is whether the fragmentation
12
of trading leads also to informational fragmentation where one market leads 
the other(s) in terms of impounding of price-sensitive information.
One can say that academia has provided a significant impetus to these 
debates through various theoretical and empirical models. However, it has to 
be said that a great deal remains to be done in terms of testing the myriad of 
theoretical models that have been proposed over the last two decades. One 
major criticism directed at these models has been the limited use that policy 
makers can make of these models in order to understand, explain and predict 
market behaviour under, for example, a fragmented vs. centralised set-up. 
These models can become somewhat more complex when (a) competition 
between Exchanges is taken into account, or (b) when the same security 
trades on parallel markets.
Arguably, the issue of trading on parallel markets and their interaction has 
become a pressing need since (a) many Exchanges are introducing multiple 
trading platforms within their organisation, and (b) many securities are being 
traded on two or more Exchanges leading to questions of market integration 
and institutional trading across the different markets.
One of the major objectives of this work is to empirically investigate 
traders’ behaviour, liquidity provision and price discovery processes when 
the same security trades on two different trading platforms. Indeed, the the­
oretical and empirical contributions made in the past to investigate traders’ 
behaviour and price discovery processes within a single Exchange is substan­
tial. With the availability of high frequency data, empirical work has been 
carried out in various aspects of the trading process. However, work that con­
centrates on multiple markets has not been fully developed and a substantial 
number of areas remain to be addressed.
This work investigates the trading mechanisms used by different European
13
Exchanges, namely the Paris Bourse, Deutsche Borse, LSE, and the Italian 
Exchange. These four markets have different market microstructures which 
will be extensively used for the analysis. Prior to October 1997, the LSE 
was purely a dealership market. After the reforms enacted in October 1997, 
the LSE has a combination of order book-based trading and dealership-based 
trading. The Paris Bourse and Italian Exchange are considered to be pure 
order book-based systems.
The Integriertes Borsenhandels- und Informations-System - the IBIS sys­
tem - the electronic trading system which was used by the Deutsche Borse 
and has now been replaced by the XETRA system is considered to be a hy­
brid trading system, combining both auction and dealership characteristics.1
In view of the different market microstructures explained above, a number 
of questions are asked. They range from liquidity provision and competition 
between Exchanges when the same security trades on different markets, to 
the cost of trading in different market microstructure to the comparative 
advantage of different liquidity providers and price efficiency under a hybrid 
trading system. The securities considered in these different markets axe, in 
general, the biggest firms by market capitalisation and the most liquid by 
number of trades and volume transacted.
This effort is important because it considers a number of issues in various
1 The following are the most important IBIS features which made it a hybrid mechanism: 
(a) most of the entries were quotes, implying that most market participants (with the 
exception of public traders) acted as market makers even if there was no obligation for 
them to provide two-way quotes throughout the trading day; (b) up to six quotes on 
each side were allowed and, based on these entries, the system maintained an open book; 
(c) proprietary trading by bank traders, kursmakler, and freimakler was allowed; (d) the 
platform provided an algorithm for trades bigger than the size of the best bid or ask to 
be executed by electronically accepting lower ranking bids or offers; (e) the system, unlike 
the screen-based platform used by the Paris Bourse, was not able to automatically execute 
matched orders. Given this trading architecture, execution risk on IBIS was minimised 
since there was limited uncertainty regarding the transaction price, the volume or the 
execution time.
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market microstructure set-ups, using very rich datasets from different (Eu­
ropean) Exchanges, leading to comparative results that are of interest from 
the academic, regulatory and market participants viewpoints.
This thesis consists of four self-contained research projects which share a 
common theme and a subject matter, although such issues are investigated 
in different markets and employing different empirical methodologies. The 
main theme that runs throughout the work presented in this thesis focuses 
on the organisation of financial markets and how their market microstructure 
influences the way trading occurs and the relationships between the different 
traders, the price discovery process, spread formation, liquidity provision, 
traders’ strategies, trade location, etc.
This Chapter provides a brief outline of the research questions and a 
summary of the main results obtained in each Chapters. It also provides the 
major contributions made to the literature.
1.1 Large Trades’ Im pacts Across M arkets
Chapter 2 considers institutional investors’ trading by focusing on the price 
and volatility impacts generated by large trades in an inter-market set-up.
Orders submitted by institutional traders are attracting widespread at­
tention because of their potential market impact. We analyse the impact of 
such trades in the context of cross-quoted securities, where the same security 
is traded on two separate markets with different order types migrating to 
different markets.
The emerging practice of cross quoting securities has provided traders 
with the possibility of trading the same security on different markets with 
different trading mechanisms. Theoretical models (Pagano, 1989 and Pagano 
and Roell, 1992) have demonstrated that different types of traders tend to
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concentrate their trades in different markets. This implies that trading sys­
tems, rather than innocuous features of the price discovery process, can bear 
substantial influence on that same process.
Related to the analysis of how different market microstructures attract 
heterogenous traders with different trading needs, there is the issue of how 
block trades axe transacted in such a trading set-up. Large trades represent 
an important part of the institutional investors’ business and account for a 
substantial part of the total volume transacted on equity Exchanges.
A fundamental question raised by large trades is the trade information 
contained in these trades. Existing literature (Burdett and O’Hara, 1987) has 
shown that trade size can be interpreted as a signal for the information held 
by the trader. In view of this, even the information related to the existence 
of a large trade to be executed can be valuable for the trading community.
There are a number of empirical studies dealing with large trades executed 
both on the LSE and the New York Stock Exchange. One of the first studies 
of large trades on the LSE was carried out by Gemmill (1996) who found that 
block purchases and sales produce a statistically significant permanent price 
impact although the sales’ impacts were almost statistically insignificant. 
These results imply that large trades do have an information content and 
this provides an information advantage to those aware of such trades.
There are a number of questions related to the execution of large trades, 
such as the trading behaviour of informed traders, the price impact that they 
generate in the market, the optimal trade size that will minimize the price 
impact, the type of market microstructure that can handle large trades with­
out disrupting “orderly” markets and the transparency regime that should 
be adopted by an Exchange.
The issue of how large trades are executed and their impact on price and
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volatility levels become somewhat more interesting when trading in cross­
quoted securities is considered. The first question that needs to be asked in 
this case is which market attracts large trades and why.
If it is the case that it is only one market that attracts such trades, then 
it is pertinent to ask whether the large trade’s impacts are confined to one 
single market or whether they are likely to spill over from one market to 
another. If it is the latter, then we have a richer set of investigations to 
undertake.
European equity markets are in several aspects ideal for such an analysis. 
European cross-quoted securities, listed on their home market and quoted 
on LSE’s SEAQ-I market, form a sizeable group. These companies provide 
an ideal scenario since the trading mechanisms used in the home markets 
differ than those used in the foreign market. A sample of French, German 
and Italian cross-quoted securities that are listed in their home market and 
quoted on the LSE is used in this analysis.
1.1.1 Major Results
The most significant results obtained from analysing the way large trades are 
worked by SEAQ-I market makers are the following:
(a) large trades executed on SEAQ-I produce a permanent impact on the 
price levels in the home markets with the impact being larger in the case of 
order books (continuous auction systems) and lower in a trading system that 
combines auction and dealership characteristics.
This implies that there are some information leakages that occur before 
the trade is executed, possibly due to market makers’ pre-positioning behav­
iour in the home markets. Another result worth noticing is that there is 
sufficient time after the trade’s execution over which trading profits (before 
transaction costs) can still be earned by those market participants who know
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about the existence of the large trade before it is published by the LSE;
(b) evidence on the relationship between trade size and price impact in­
dicates that very large trades are actually liquidity-motivated, rather than 
information-motivated. The permanent price impacts demonstrate that the 
price impacts are not necessarily increasing in trade size;
(c) generally speaking, the price impact is implemented or almost finished 
by the time the LSE publishes the trade information, implying that any 
asymmetric information that arises from a large trade is fully utilised by 
market participants, at least those who are aware of the large trade, before 
the LSE publishes the relevant trading information;
(d) finally, volatility tests computed for the three home markets indicate 
that return volatility around the time when a block trade is executed is higher 
in home markets that use continuous auction trading systems compared to 
what takes place in a hybrid system that contains substantial dealership char­
acteristics. This result can imply that, as hypothesized by Madhavan (1992), 
the strategic behaviour of market participants which is present in the con­
tinuous auction markets produces a higher level of return volatility following 
the news of a large order compared to the volatility actually generated in a 
trading system that provides dealership liquidity.
1.1.2 Contribution to Literature
This chapter contributes to the market microstructure literature in a number 
of ways. A number of empirical studies (Holthausen et a l, 1987 and 1990, 
Board and Sutcliffe, 1995, Gemmill, 1996, Madhavan and Cheng, 1997) have 
dealt with the impact of large trades in a one-market set-up, but there ap­
pears to be no study of the inter-market effects of the execution of large 
trades. The possibility of market segmentation, where large trades migrate 
to the foreign market, raises the question as to the impacts of large trades (in
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this study, these trades are executed on SEAQ-I) on the price and volatility 
levels in home markets. Since different market mechanisms are considered, 
the nature and extent of such inter-market impacts allow us to infer some 
conclusions on whether microstructure difference do matter.
This work sheds light on the impact of market participants’ behaviour in 
one equity market on the price and volatility levels in a different market. An 
interesting feature is that a substantial number of London market makers in 
European cross-quoted securities are major Continental banks (for example, 
Paribas, Deutsche Bank and IMI) having simultaneous access to both the 
home market and SEAQ-I which means that they can combine these different 
markets in their trading strategies.
A related issue is the provision of liquidity for these large trades. Although 
institutional investors do not go to the home markets for the execution of their 
trades, the market makers providing liquidity in London are re-balancing 
their positions using the home market through a protracted trading strategy 
aimed at minimising the price impacts.
Issues of financial regulation are closely related to the analysis carried out 
in this Chapter. In particular, analysing the evolution of price impacts pat­
tern around the time when the large trade is executed can contribute towards 
a critical evaluation of the effects of the LSE’s one-hour publication delay, 
introduced to protect market-makers who provide liquidity and immediacy 
for large trades, on the price adjustment process in the home markets.
1.2 M arket Frictions
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the measure of market frictions - the bid-ask 
spread - and its formation in three different market microstructures. A very 
important issue related to the debate on the best trading mechanism revolves
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around the level and evolution of trading costs in different market microstruc­
tures. These trading costs directly reflect the level of frictions in financial 
markets.
“Friction could be measured by how long it takes optimally to trade a 
given amount of an asset. Alternatively, it can be measured by the price 
concession needed for an immediate transaction. The two approaches con­
verge because the immediate price concession can be viewed as the payment 
required by another trader, such as a dealer, to buy (or sell) the asset im­
mediately and then dispose of (acquire) the asset according to the optimal 
policy.” (Stoll, 2000)
All types of traders are interested in minimising their trading costs. Al­
though financial regulators have mainly focused on trading costs for small 
investors, it is evident that they are becoming increasingly more aware of 
the impact of such costs on the performance of pension funds, mutual funds, 
etc., since these institutional investors are becoming increasingly important 
to policy makers.
Trading costs measure frictions in markets and it is important to inves­
tigate the sources of these frictions. As Stoll (2000) states, “understanding 
the sources of the spread is important for policy. If the source of the spread 
is real friction, improvements in trading systems can narrow the spread. If 
the source is monopoly rents, increased competition will narrow the spread. 
If the source is differential information delays for some traders vis-a-vis oth­
ers, improvements in speed and greater parity of traders will reduce spreads. 
If the source is private information, improvements in disclosure will reduce 
spreads.” (Stoll, 2000)
The major purpose of this Chapter is to explore the possible links between 
the mark-up charged by the suppliers of liquidity in different markets - the
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bid-ask spread - and market structures. This analysis is carried out through 
an empirical investigation of the trading costs (both quoted and effective 
spreads) in a multiple dealer market set-up (London Stock Exchange’s SEAQ 
system), a pure limit order book market set-up (Paris Bourse’s CAC system) 
and a screen-based hybrid trading system (Deutsche Borse’s IBIS platform).
These three systems differ in terms of information dissemination (pre- 
and post-trade transparency), level of competition, cost structure and insti­
tutional design.
But should different market microstructures influence the levels and for­
mation of the spreads? Existing literature, making use of the differences 
between the “traditional” dealership versus auction systems, provides a pos­
itive answer. Hybrid trading systems are getting more attention and their 
attributes, in terms of liquidity provision, price formation and spread levels, 
are being investigated. One such paper is the Viswanathan and Wang (1998) 
where they reach the conclusion that “when the cutoff point (in terms of trade 
size) is chosen appropriately, the hybrid limit-order book/dealership market 
generates higher trading profits for the customer than the pure dealership 
market” (Viswanathan and Wang, 1998).
The issue relating to the level of execution costs is receiving substantial 
attention from both academics and regulators. NASDAQ has undergone a 
number of reforms, aimed at increasing competition and reducing transaction 
costs. Barclay et al. (1997) find that trading costs on NASDAQ fell after 
the reforms. The same appears to have happened on the LSE since the 
introduction of the limit order book in October 1997, although spreads at 
the open have widened (Naik and Yadav, 1999).
These studies show that different trading architectures are likely to in­
fluence the behaviour of liquidity suppliers, whether market makers in a
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dealership market or limit order traders in an order driven system. The 
different behaviour is likely to impact the bidding strategy in different trad­
ing systems, influencing (a) the gross profits of liquidity suppliers, and (b) 
components of the bid ask spreads due to adverse selection, employing the 
various methodologies (Huang and Stoll, 1996, George et al., 1991, Booth et 
al., 1995, Madhavan et al., 1997 and Huang and Stoll, 1997) which have been 
proposed so far.
In view of these developments, this Chapter analyses the absolute levels 
of the spread and its components developing in different systems, consider­
ing, for the first time, two screen-based systems that differ in terms of the 
interaction between public traders and designated dealers.
Another interesting issue considered here is whether the level of dealer 
competition and dealers’ market power can contribute towards our under­
standing of trading costs. Indeed, the major difficulty in such type of work 
lies with the fact that liquidity characteristics are not only influenced by the 
trading mechanisms adopted by single Exchanges but also through (a) the 
level of competition between dealers and other liquidity providers allowed 
in the market place, and (b) traders’ self-reinforcing beliefs (captured by 
Pagano, 1989) where liquidity begets more liquidity. Furthermore, empirical 
work undertaken in this field has suffered from the well-known cross-market 
liquidity comparison problems: are the results being driven by the trading 
mechanism or are they the product of concentration in the market of liquidity 
provision?
1.2.1 Major Results
The results obtained in this Chapter show that SEAQ market makers post 
spreads that are much wider than those posted by CAC and IBIS dealers. 
When effective spreads are investigated, we find that these are also wider on
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SEAQ compared with the other two markets. In addition, both the quoted 
spreads and the effective spreads on IBIS, for most trade locations, are the 
tightest when compared to all the other systems, implying that a hybrid 
system produces spreads that are narrower than both a dealership and an 
auction system. A closer analysis of trading shows that competition between 
different liquidity providers is highest on the hybrid system. We find that the 
hybrid type of trading appears to generate the lowest effective spreads and 
such result holds even after controlling for (public) news arrival and mar­
ket competition. This means that market microstructure effects do matter 
in terms of explaining the levels of the effective spreads generated by the 
different markets.
But what are the sources of these different spreads? The presence of 
private information held by some traders has been argued to be an impor­
tant source of such trading frictions. But can the difference in spreads be 
attributed to the presence of private information? And how do different liq­
uidity providers behave when they fear that they might lose against superior 
informed traders?
To answer these questions, Chapter 3 investigates the components of the 
bid-ask spread, with a particular focus on the adverse selection segment. 
It is found that the adverse selection component of the spread is highest 
for order book systems (CAC-traded securities) and lowest on a dealership 
system (SEAQ-traded securities). This result implies that, in the first place, 
it is not higher adverse selection in dealership markets that are responsible 
for wider spreads in such markets. Secondly, it confirms that a number of 
trading practices, such as preferencing and internalisation of the order flow, 
allow liquidity suppliers on dealership systems to get “to know the order flow” 
better and hence to protect themselves better against adverse selection.
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1.2.2 Contribution to Literature
Chapters 3 and 4 contribute to our knowledge of the sources of the spread. 
Understanding the sources of the spread is an important issue not only for 
traders, who would like to strategically time their trades in order to get the 
best prices, but also for policymakers in terms of choosing the optimal market 
design that can generate the lowest trading costs.
The empirical results found in Chapters 3 and 4 provide a confirmation of 
the Viswanathan and Wang (1998) hypothesis that a well-calibrated hybrid 
trading system dominates both dealership and order book systems.
The surprising result from this Chapter is that the hybrid system, IBIS, 
adopted by the German Borse and predecessor of XETRA, generated spreads 
which are generally lower than those on the order book-based system. This 
result is important for policy makers and regulators because it shows that 
interacting the order book with designated dealers can actually improve liq­
uidity and markets’ quality. The main issue then becomes finding the right 
balance between the order book and the role of dealers and fine-tuning this 
balance is likely to be an arduous task.
1.3 Price Efficiency in a Hybrid Market
Chapter 5 analyses the trading behaviour of liquidity providers in the or­
der book and voluntary market makers in a dealership system when both 
these platforms interact together in a hybrid market mechanism. It is be­
coming increasingly common for Exchanges to give traders a choice between 
alternative trading mechanisms, with Exchanges adopting a hybrid type of 
trading platform, where auction-based and dealership-based systems interact 
together.
These developments raise a number of fundamental questions regarding
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the strategic interaction between traders and the subsequent impacts on mar­
kets’ quality. The provision of liquidity in different market microstructures 
is carried out by different dealers - limit order traders in order book-based 
systems and market makers (mandatory or voluntary) in dealership-based 
systems.
It is evident that investigating price efficiency and volatility is impor­
tant since risk averse traders are assumed to caxe about price and execution 
uncertainty.
It is expected that strategic behaviour between traders differ across differ­
ent market microstructures which would, in turn, generate different volatil­
ities in the systems. Recent developments in market microstructure have 
analysed the interaction of different traders in the market, such as informed 
traders and liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, Easley and O’Hara, 
1992, Lyons, 1995), traders with heterogeneous beliefs (Morris, 1994), and 
traders that herd on specific types of information (Froot et al., 1992). Such 
considerations are important for the analysis of the order flow, its size, fre­
quency and direction and impact on price stability.2
Price stability is considered to be an externality closely related to the 
provision of liquidity. The question as to whether public traders alone, acting 
through the order book, can supply the optimal amount of price stabilisation 
or whether dealers can “do the job” better has yet to be resolved.
Furthermore, one has to consider the impact of liquidity provision on price 
stability. If the presence of a market maker is found to dampen excessive 
price volatility, then this will improve the market’s quality (generating less 
inefficient prices) and will, in turn, increase traders’ participation in the
2 The analysis of intradaily volatilities has already received a substantial level of atten­
tion through theoretical and empirical research (See Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whit­
comb, 1978, Goldman and Beja, 1979, Roll, 1984, Kyle, 1985, Hasbrouck, 1988, Hasbrouck 
and Ho, 1987, Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, Foster and Viswanathan, 1988, Stoll, 1978).
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market, leading to higher volumes transacted.
We plan to investigate these issues by considering order flow dynamics 
taking place on LSE which, in October 1997, changed its trading environ­
ment (for the most liquid securities) from a pure dealership mechanism to 
a hybrid trading system based on an order book arid voluntary dealers pro­
viding liquidity off the book. The trading regime change was expected to 
improve transparency in the market and enhance the bargaining power of 
investors vis-a-vis dealers, leading to lower trading costs of public investors. 
One major consequence resulting from these changes was that the manda­
tory obligations of market makers, enforced prior to the reform, ceased to 
exist. After the reform, dealers for the FTSE 100 index securities are entirely 
voluntary in terms of liquidity provision.
This Chapter investigates (a) which type of liquidity provision set-up, 
in a hybrid trading system, generates the highest price efficiency, taking 
into consideration market depth and breadth, (b) the strategic interactions 
between the limit order book and the dealers, and (c) how the order flow 
behaves at times of price uncertainty.
Such analysis has been hampered by the fact that Exchanges have, until 
recently, adopted one trading system and hence the price discovery process 
for a particular security could not be compared across different trading mech­
anisms. To investigate these issues,we use the FTSE 100 index’s securities 
listed on the LSE, which are now traded on two parallel trading systems - an 
order driven system and a dealership system. This environment provides an 
ideal place for the analysis of transaction price efficiency, trading behaviour 
on the two systems and the strategic interaction between them.
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1.3.1 Major Results
The results contained in this Chapter show that prices on the dealership 
system track the security’s true price more efficiently. The analysis is un­
dertaken by extracting the price volatility, measured as the deviation of the 
transaction prices on both the order book and the dealership system from the 
true “system-wide” price. The latter is calculated using a state-space model 
that extracts the information content from the order flow. Within a hybrid 
trading system, it is found that a dealership system is more robust than an 
order book system in that it can transact higher volumes with lower price 
volatility. This evidence suggests that dealers, acting in a hybrid trading 
system, provide price stabilisation, even if they have no binding obligation 
to do so, thus improving the market’s quality.
However, there are various ways in which the order book contributes to 
the price discovery process. For example, the order book appears to be 
contributing through order imbalances that are formed; in essence, order 
imbalances are found to contain useful trade information for traders’ strate­
gies. Existing literature has found that the benefits from introducing the 
order book is the narrowing of spreads leading to benefits to small traders’s 
transaction costs (See Naik and Yadav, 1999, for the LSE evidence). The 
result obtained in this Chapter is that the order book serves other purposes, 
besides producing lower transaction costs, considered important for traders’ 
strategies. This evidence ties in with the results obtained by Harris and 
Panchapagesan (1999) for the New York Stock Exchange.
As far as strategic interaction between the two systems is concerned, this 
Chapter shows that in a hybrid trading system large trades axe directed to the 
dealership system where liquidity is provided by the dealers and this routing 
takes place even when the order book is relatively full and can accommodate
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such trades. On the other hand, medium sized trades are directed to the 
auction system through a trading strategy aimed at picking up the best 
possible prices on the other side of the market.
In terms of trading behaviour, we find that within a hybrid architecture, 
as price uncertainty increases traders are not encouraged to provide liquidity 
on the order book through limit orders. Instead orders migrate to the dealer­
ship system for execution there. This re-affirms the dealers’ contribution to 
the trading process and their role becomes vital in times of price uncertainty.
1.3.2 Contribution to Literature
This Chapter makes a number of contributions to the market microstructure 
debate, especially in terms of market designs. The trading mechanism used 
by the LSE makes various market microstructure comparisons possible. Fur­
thermore, the data set made available by the LSE is particularly interesting 
since it contains high frequency data which can be fruitfully used to analyse 
(a) the order flow and its impact on volatility rather than the usual opening 
and closing prices which have been used up to now; and (b) the application of 
recent developments in the analysis of high frequency data to the systematic 
study of market microstructure. The data available is among the first of its 
kind that makes available to researchers both the order flow going on the 
book and off the book. The NYSE, which has a similar organisation to LSE, 
has rarely made available the data related to the upstairs market. Hence, 
the LSE dataset provides us with a complete picture of the order flow, rather 
than just one segment.
The Chapter provides also a useful insight into the contribution made by 
dealers towards price stabilisation. The results should lead to a re-evaluation 
of the dealers’ role in promoting orderly markets. There is also a dynamic 
analysis of market making, in the sense that the role of dealers is investi­
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gated under various market conditions, mainly adverse conditions, for exam­
ple when price volatility increases.
1.4 Conclusion
This study aims at investigating various issues related to the trading process 
and the price discovery process under different market microstructures. One 
major theme running through this work is the issue of parallel markets 
(whether they are physically fragmented in (a) different countries, or (b) 
housed under one roof and operated by the same Exchange authority) and 
how they interact between them.
Most theoretical models in the market microstructure field are modelled 
to investigate the case of a single Exchange. Extending these models to con­
sider multiple markets tends to increase considerably their complexity. The 
price discovery process in such models would have to contemplate the numer­
ous ways in which informed traders can use their superior information across 
different markets with transparency regimes that vary substantially across 
markets. In such a set-up, the strategies open to both informed and liquidity 
traders increase exponentially. This level of complexity can explain why it 
has been difficult to construct a general model of trade in multiple (paral­
lel) markets that can be fruitfully used by all parties involved to generate 
explanations and predictions in the way markets operate.
It is because of the difficulties encountered by theory that empirical work 
can generate useful results that can be used to understand better the trad­
ing processes in a world where cross-listings are becoming, slowly but surely, 
the norm (at least for large capitalisation stocks). This study is aimed at 
this direction, mainly in understanding (a) how different market microstruc­
tures can influence trading processes, and (b) how parallel markets interact
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with each other in terms of liquidity provision, price formation and trade 
migration.
One of the major objectives of this research is to indicate directions that 
further theoretical work can adopt in the future in the field of parallel mar­
kets.
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Chapter 2.1nter-market Im pacts G enerated  
by Large Trades
2.1 Introduction
The practice of cross-quoting securities provides traders with the possibil­
ity of trading the same security on different markets with different trading 
mechanisms. Related to the analysis of how different market microstructures 
attract different traders, there is the issue of how block trades axe transacted 
in this trading environment. Large trades represent an important part of the 
institutional investors’ business and account for a substantial part of the total 
volume transacted on equity Exchanges and hence merit special attention.
Furthermore, large trades axe important because they have been found 
to contain price-sensitive information. A major study of large trades on 
the LSE, carried out by Gemmill (1996), finds that block purchases and 
sales generate statistically significant permanent price impacts. These results 
imply that laxge trades do have a substantial information content, providing 
an information advantage to those aware of such laxge orders.
Investigating execution of laxge trades in an inter-market trading envi­
ronment presents an exciting issue given the amount of cross-border trading 
carried out by institutional investors. European equity maxkets provide an 
interesting environment where a fruitful analysis on the interaction of dif­
ferent trading mechanisms can be undertaken since cross-quoted securities, 
listed on their home market and quoted on London’s SEAQ-I market, form 
a sizeable group. Trading in these securities could take place through differ­
ent trading modes: Continental European equity markets are either largely 
auction-based systems or pure-hybrid systems while SEAQ-I, the London 
Stock Exchange’s electronic price dissemination system for international se­
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curities, is often described as a dealership market.
There is the common belief among European equity markets participants 
that, for these cross-quoted securities, the liquidity offered by SEAQ-I mar­
ket and the Continental Exchanges is different. The emerging view is that 
SEAQ-I serves as a “wholesale” market whereas Continental Exchanges could 
be seen as “retail” markets. SEAQ-I is held to provide a higher level of depth 
where it is easier to execute large orders than the home markets, which are 
often seen to provide an advantage for smaller transactions. These views are 
also supported by empirical evidence carried out in the early 1990s, when 
SEAQ-I lacked any form of post-trade transparency and where trades exe­
cuted in this market where reported to the LSE but never published.
This Chapter finds that, notwithstanding substantial changes in Con­
tinental European Exchanges aimed at facilitating the execution of laxge 
trades, the average size of SEAQ-I trades remains, generally speaking, much 
larger than the average size of trades executed on the Paris Bourse’s CAC 
system, Deutsche Borse’s IBIS system (predecessor of the present XETRA 
system) and the Italian Exchange. This means that SEAQ-I remains the pre­
ferred place for the execution of large trades, leaving smaller, retail-oriented 
trades for the Continental European Exchanges.
The possibility of such market segmentation raises the question as to the 
impacts of large trades executed in London on the price and volatility levels in 
home markets. This study focuses on French, German and Italian securities 
which axe cross-quoted in London and as such should produce interesting 
results as far as inter-markets effects are concerned in that the trading system 
in place is materially different in each home market.
The period under consideration is the first six months of 1996 which co­
incides with time when the LSE started enforcing the publication of trades
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executed on SEAQ-I. Until 1995, there was no obligation whatsoever to pub­
lish prices of SEAQ-I trades and this could have explained why SEAQ-I was 
the preferred market for large trades. This Chapter shows that it does not 
appear that the change in the publication regime has decreased SEAQ-I at­
tractiveness for institutional investors.
The major objectives of this Chapter are (a) to assess the price and 
volatility impacts produced by large trades executed in London on the home 
markets and how these effects vary according to the type of market mi­
crostructure utilised; (b) to estimate the speed of adjustment for the price 
to reach the new equilibrium level after a large trade; (c) given the abil­
ity to undertake ‘protected trades’ in London and in view of the possible 
pre-positioning undertaken by London market makers, to evaluate whether 
information of a large trade leaks to the respective home market before the 
trade is published on SEAQ-I; and (d) to appraise whether delaying the pub­
lication of a large trade produces a smoother price adjustment, delays the 
price’s adjustment speed to the new equilibrium price level and causes less 
volatility in the home market.
The different equity markets used for this study have been chosen on 
the basis of their trading mechanisms and level of trading sophistication 
which should satisfy the need of analysing price impacts in different market 
microstructure set-ups. Both the Paris Bourse and the Italian Exchange 
(henceforth the “IE”) are auction markets and both operate through a screen- 
based system. In contrast, the trading system used in the German market 
provides an interesting case of trading fragmentation as IBIS - the screen- 
based trading system that executes approximately 60% of the daily volume 
for the DAX 30 securities - is combined with floor-trading for a number of 
hours during the trading day. Although there were substantial disagreements
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regarding IBIS’s true trading typology, there was some consensus that it 
was best described as a hybrid mechanism with both auction and dealership 
characteristics combined together.
This work is also designed to shed light on the impact of market par­
ticipants’ behaviour in one equity market on the price levels in a different 
market. There are various ways in which dealers on one Exchange can use 
another Exchange for trading purposes. For example, they may use it as a 
source of information or as an alternative channel for the execution of orders. 
There is also another subtle way in which dealers can use the parallel market: 
taking large orders in one market and working them in both markets in order 
to find the best sources of liquidity. This can be particularly true of London 
market makers in working large orders for cross-quoted securities. For ex­
ample, Board and Sutcliffe (1995) have already found that London market 
makers carry out pre- and post-positioning when they receive a large order 
for UK securities (traded on SEAQ, the market for UK listed securities). If 
the same type of behaviour is adopted for cross-quoted securities, we can 
have a situation where the pre- and post-positioning takes place on both the 
London market and the home markets.
An interesting feature is that a substantial number of London market 
makers in European cross-quoted securities are major Continental banks (for 
example, Paribas, Deutsche Bank and IMI) which have simultaneous access 
to both the home market and SEAQ-I. The use of both markets is illustrated 
by Jacquillat and Gresse (1995) that show how London market makers tend 
to use the Paris market to rebalance their trading positions.
It is expected that the inventory positioning carried out by London mar­
ket makers on Continental Exchanges will generate a price impact in these 
Exchanges in addition to the possible impacts created by the information
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contained in the laxge trade. The analysis of the evolution of price impacts 
pattern around the time when the large trade is executed can contribute to­
wards a critical evaluation of London’s one-hour publication delay’s effects 
on the price adjustment process in the home markets. Moreover, the issue 
of whether or not large orders on SEAQ-I axe observed by the Continental 
Exchanges before they are eventually executed and the relevant information 
is published by the LSE presents some important academic, practical and 
regulatory issues.
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 and 3 present 
the literature review and the hypothesis to be tested in this Chapter while 
Section 4 reviews the methodologies employed to investigate price and volatil­
ity impacts produced by laxge trades. Section 5 presents the results obtained 
from both the event study, that considers only a limited sample of total laxge 
trades executed, and a regression model that investigates the full sample of 
laxge trades considering volume effects.
2.2 Literature R eview
The literature reviewed in this Section goes through (a) work carried out 
on the execution of laxge trades and their impact; (b) the development and 
evolution of SEAQ-I through time; and (c) the fragmentation of the order 
flow across different markets together with a review of the major differences 
between dealership-based and auction-based markets.
2.2.1 Large Trades
The impact generated by large trades has attracted interests from several 
quarters. One major issue that has been analysed within the context of the 
LSE has been the transparency regime adopted by the Exchange authorities
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for laxge trades. The argument used by the LSE to defend the lack of trans­
parency accorded to large trades was based on two views: (a) first, that large 
trades do not contain price-relevant information, and hence any price impact 
is likely to be temporary in nature, rather than permanent, and (b) mar­
ket makers providing liquidity for large orders must be allowed to re-balance 
their inventories after executing the large trade in relative opaqueness.
A number of empirical studies have rejected the LSE’s argument on the 
basis that large trades were found to produce permanent price impacts be­
sides a temporary one. The first major study of large trades on the LSE 
was carried out by Gemmill (1996) who found that block purchases and sales 
produce a statistically significant permanent price impact although the sales’ 
impacts were almost statistically insignificant. These results imply that large 
trades do have an information content and this provides an information ad­
vantage to those aware of such trades.
Gemmill finds that prices’ adjustment speed to the new permanent price 
level is the same whether trade publication is immediate, has a 90 minute 
delay or a 24 hours delay. Such evidence rejects the hypothesis that delayed 
publication produces a smoother adjustment process. This evidence shows 
that, although large trades possess price information and knowledge of the 
trade gives an advantage to the parties involved in that trade, information 
about the order execution leaks to the marketplace before it is published by 
the LSE.
Board and Sutcliffe (1995) find that large trades executed on the LSE 
produce a permanent price impact which ‘accord with the prior expectations 
that large Customer buys signify good news, while large Customer sells indi­
cate bad news’ (Board and Sutcliffe 1995). In fact, large purchase trades of 
alpha securities (in the 3 X NMS bracket) were found to produce a permanent
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price impact of H-0.230% while large sale trades of alpha securities produce 
a permanent price impact of -0.179%. The authors find that SEAQ market 
makers often engage in pre-positioning before a large trade is executed. In 
the case of liquid stocks, the pre-positioning took more than three hours to 
be completed. The level of pre- and post-positioning decreases as the trade 
size increases.
2.2.2 SEAQ-I: Impact and Evolution
The introduction and evolution of SEAQ-I has attracted wide interest, not 
only from a regulatory point of view, but also from academia and market par­
ticipants, given the order flow migrating from European Exchanges towards 
this market. This trading set-up, where large capitalisation securities are 
traded on parallel markets with different transparency regimes, has provided 
an ideal environment for the investigation of various aspects of the trading 
process.
There axe numerous studies analysing the integration between SEAQ- 
I and Continental Exchanges and the many factors that led to SEAQ-I’s 
success, which are discussed below. One important trend that emerged was 
the migration of large trades, made by institutional investors, to SEAQ-I. 
Evidence of this was presented by de Jong et al. (1995) who found that the 
mean and median size of a sample of French cross-quoted securities trades in 
London were approximately ten times those of trades executed on the Paris 
Bourse. In addition, using the same sample, very few transactions occurring 
in Paris exceeded the Normal Market Size (NMS) while almost half of the 
London trades exceeded NMS.
Pagano and Roell (1990), who were among the first to start analysing the 
order flow fragmentation between home markets and SEAQ-I, document the 
different levels of transaction costs and spreads across the major European
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Exchanges. When they undertake a direct comparisons of the best bid and 
ask quotes between the Paris Bourse and SEAQ-I, they find that the former is 
consistently generating lower spreads than SEAQ-I. However, this advantage 
does not seem to be maintained when order sizes increase which, in itself, 
indicate the difference between tightness and depth on different markets.
Taking the analysis one step further, Pagano and Roell (1990) measure 
the depth on each market when they compare the trading for 16 cross-quoted 
securities in the two markets. They compare orders of the same size in the two 
markets, showing that the Paris Bourse market is both tighter and deeper. It 
must be noted, however, that Pagano and Roell do not take into account the 
fact that a substantial proportion of SEAQ-I trades are effectively executed 
at prices within the best spread which used to be displayed on the screen. 
Furthermore, this result is only obtained for orders whose size is equivalent 
to the market makers’ maximum quoted volume in London; these orders are 
large by Paris levels but not considered so on London. In fact, Pagano and 
Roell (1990) do not consider the large trades on London, the main reason for 
such an omission being that these London trades do not find any comparables 
on the Paris Bourse.
This consideration prompts the authors to suggest that SEAQ-I’s appeal 
may be due to the fact that market makers post prices for immediate trans­
actions whereas on the Paris Bourse traders have to wait for their orders to 
execute.
In another study, Pagano and Roell (1991) investigate the degree of in­
tegration between SEAQ-I and the IE for cross-quoted securities on the two 
markets. The test used by the authors is based on the bid-ask spread that 
emerges on SEAQ-I for these securities. The pricing errors on the IE are 
found to occur in about 11 % of the cases, which is considered to be a high
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figure and these errors are found to induce an adjustment to SEAQ-I quotes. 
This type of analysis was also carried out by the same authors for French 
cross-quoted securities on SEAQ-I (Pagano and Roell, 1990).
The most important aspect of the study on Italian cross-quoted securities 
is the investigation of which market, out of the two parallel ones, produces 
the highest amount of price sensitive information for these securities. If, 
as many suggest, this is the home market, then we should be able to have 
evidence of this in the behaviour of SEAQ-I market makers in setting their 
quotes. The authors argue that SEAQ-I spreads should widen when the main 
source of information - in this case the IE - is closed and this should take 
place to compensate SEAQ-I market makers for the expected losses that they 
incur by trading with informed traders. The results show that the spread did 
indeed contract when the IE was open for trade, but the authors find that 
the effect was less pronounced than for the French cross-quoted securities. 
Furthermore, when the IE was closed completely for holidays, the SEAQ-I 
spread was either significantly smaller or indistinguishable from those days 
when both Exchanges operated.
Over the years, Continental Exchanges tried to reform their trading sys­
tems in a bid to stop orders flowing to SEAQ-I and, possibly, get back some 
of the orders directed to London. Over the years, market makers on SEAQ-I 
are thought to have changed their commitment to SEAQ-I in different ways. 
One visible change was that the quotes posted to the screen were perceived to 
be as starting points for the bilateral negotiation between the market maker 
and the trader. Firm quotes were, essentially, obtained through direct solic­
iting to market makers. Pagano and Steil (1995) argue that, following these 
various developments, London dealers rather than using their inventory to ac­
commodate clients’ trades, are increasingly operating directly on Continental
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European equity markets and work orders through the local systems.
Jacquillat and Gresse (1995) are of the view that, given the recent perfor­
mance of the SEAQ-I market, the main emerging economic role of SEAQ-I 
market makers is that of providing firm quotes for very large volumes, creat­
ing a wholesale market in conjunction with Continental Exchanges that are 
designed to attract the retail trading interests. This view would be compat­
ible with London developing in a sort of an upstairs market where the very 
large trades, especially if they are liquidity-motivated, are executed in such a 
market. This development of SEAQ-I could be considered to be in line with 
the model proposed by Seppi (1990), which is discussed below.
2.2.3 Fragmentation of Order Flow
There are a number of models that consider under the conditions under 
which the order flow fragments between different markets. Two such models 
are by Freedman (1989) and Chowdry and Nanda (1991). In Chowdry and 
Nanda (1991) we have an analysis of the order flow fragmenting between two 
markets that are open simultaneously. The model considers both one and two 
periods to compare different order flow dynamics. The authors assume the 
existence of an informed trader who is capable of splitting her orders across 
different markets where they are executed simultaneously. The ability of 
liquidity traders to migrate from one market to another differs in (a) trader’s 
size, and (b) across the time settings considered. In the one period setting, 
large liquidity traders are allowed to migrate but no splitting of orders across 
markets is allowed in the two-period setting. Furthermore, in the two period 
setting, the Chowdry-Nanda assumes that market makers in each market will 
only respond to prior orders received in their own market.
Chowdry and Nanda show that in the presence of competitive zero-profit 
market makers and liquidity traders, the informed trader will obtain a benefit
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from the opportunity to hide his information. If some small liquidity traders 
are also allowed to split their orders across markets, then in equilibrium there 
will be a concentration of orders in one market leading to an important result: 
the trade’s expected price impact is minimised in an Exchange where there 
is a concentration of small noise traders.
By extending the model to a two-period setting, the authors show that 
any trade information flowing across markets will generate an increase in 
depth. This result is obtained because information sharing reduces the profits 
earned by informed traders in later periods. In this sense, the “rent” charged 
to liquidity traders, which is introduced in the model as a compensation to 
market makers for the loss they expect to incur when they trade with traders 
with superior information, can be reduced.
On the other hand, Freedman (1989) considers a somewhat simpler model 
where two markets are open sequentially and are temporally separated, but 
private information is long-lived. Another major difference with respect to 
the Chowdry and Nanda (1991) model is that liquidity traders cannot migrate 
from one Exchange to another.
In this model there is the opportunity to trade in the market that leads, 
providing the right incentives to some liquidity traders to take advantage 
of such a situation. At the same time, a number of informed traders are 
modelled to be active on both markets and this trading activity releases 
price-sensitive information. Freedman shows that when there is more than 
one informed trader operating in the markets, the home market’s depth is 
always higher when there is a foreign market. Competition between the 
different informed traders leads to an increased volume of trade which causes 
market makers to incur losses due to information asymmetry, but the price 
will contain higher information.
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Comparing the Chowdry and Nanda (1991) and the Freedman (1989) 
models, we can see that while in the former the informational effect pro­
duces an increase in depth, the latter provides an explanation rooted on the 
competitive forces unleashed by the traders to account for the increase in 
depth.
The set-up based on a mixture between liquidity-motivated and information- 
motivated traders, central to the models considered above, is avoided by 
Pagano (1989) when he investigates trading across multiple Exchanges. Pagano 
relies on utility maximisation as the only motivation driving trading and each 
trader behaves on the basis of his conjecture of how the other traders present 
in the market will act. In a two period setting, Pagano shows that traders 
select the most suitable market to submit their order to on the sole basis of 
the maximum expected utility ex ante. One major result obtained by Pagano 
is based on the self-fulfilling aspect of trading: agents will trade when they 
expect the market to be deeper. This results in an equilibrium where, keep­
ing transaction costs equal across markets, all traders will migrate to a single 
Exchange. A conjectural equilibrium is also possible when transactions costs 
are not equal and this is an important result for our study: the larger trades 
may migrate to the market with the highest fixed costs, provided such a 
market appears to be deeper. This result is rooted in the impact of transac­
tion costs on the trading positions of large and small traders. For the large 
traders, going to the most expensive but deeper market, means that they 
will incur a loss from transaction costs but this loss is outweighed by market 
depth which minimises the price impact due to a higher liquidity value.
Another model is by Seppi (1990) where a trader is given the choice 
between trading in the “upstairs” or going to the “downstairs” market. Seppi 
argues that a liquidity trader may use the “upstairs” market if he can credibly
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signal to the market makers that his trade is not information-based. In 
Seppi’s (1990) model, a credible signal is provided by the commitment on 
the part of the liquidity trader not to ‘bag the street’. Other signals could 
come in the form of implicit commitments or are provided by the trader’s 
reputation. Arguably, such reputational signals can be used more effectively 
in a quote driven mechanism with market makers with whom traders can 
build a long-term trading relationship. Applying Seppi (1990) model to the 
developments taking place on SEAQ-I, we could argue that SEAQ-I is being 
used as an “upstairs” market, where market makers serve as a screening 
device and mitigate the adverse selection costs that are bound to arise from 
a large order.
Grossman (1992) explores a trading set-up which is similar, in spirit, to 
the Seppi (1990) model. Traders face a choice between going to a “down­
stairs” market or migrating to an “upstairs” market. In the former, there is 
an open-order trading environment whereas in the latter system prices are ne­
gotiated bilaterally. Going to the “upstairs” market entails additional search 
cost but these are offset by decreased volatility resulting from the familiar 
assumption that market makers on the “upstairs” market are better informed 
and are therefore in a better position to intermediate between the different 
traders. Due to the different costs in these two markets, in equilibrium trad­
ing may take place on both the “upstairs” and “downstairs” markets. The 
model contains also the feature of traders’ self-reinforcing beliefs: where an 
Exchange is perceived to offer greater depth there will be a tendency for this 
belief to become fact.
Another strand of the literature that investigates order fragmentation is 
based on the different microstructures that are assumed to impact on traders’ 
decision. Pagano and Roell (1991) argue that a risk averse trader would prefer
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dealership market over an auction type of trading because the former offers 
the advantage of removing execution risk from the trading process. The 
market maker provides immediacy and hence execution risk is removed (at a 
cost), but an order submitted to an auction system may need the arrival of 
a new limit order for it to execute, generating trading uncertainty.
Continuing in this vein, Pagano and Roell (1992) show that when traders 
possess some form of information advantage then market makers in a cen­
tralised environment will not have a large incentive to widen spreads. Such 
a centralised market, based on market makers intervention, will generate 
narrower spreads in equilibrium.
2.3 Institutional Background and H ypotheses
This Section provides a brief description of the institutional evolution of 
SEAQ-I and sets out the hypotheses to be tested in this Chapter.
SEAQ-I’s initial success in attracting institutional investors can be at­
tributed to one major factor: London market makers provide a higher level 
of immediacy than the continuous auctions on the Continent which resulted 
in a deeper market where market makers are always ready to trade block 
trades.
Since the late 1980s, Continental European equity markets carried out 
a number of significant changes aimed at addressing needs of institutional 
investors and attract some of the order flow back from London. The major 
efforts were made mainly to facilitate the execution of large trades in the 
auction trading systems used by most of the Continental exchanges.
The Paris Bourse, for example, introduced the hidden order facility which 
provides for parts of a large order not to be placed in the limit order book 
and are hence rendered invisible to the market. The publication regime
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established by the Paris Bourse was also changed in order to provide higher 
protection to the execution of large orders.
Over the same period, SEAQ-I has experienced a number of changes 
that have transformed the nature of services it provides. Pagano and Steil 
(1995) find that market makers, who were initially committing capital to the 
system through their inventory, ceased to act as all-weather market makers. 
In addition, compared to the early 1990s, the bid-ask spreads quoted on 
the screens widened substantially, ceased to be firm and are now perceived 
as serving exclusively as an advertisement for the services provided by the 
market makers. Firm quotes can only be obtained by a direct contact with 
the market maker.
Tables 1-4 provide summary statistics that can help classify the trades’ 
typology for cross-quoted securities executed on different markets. Trades in 
the home markets are much more frequent than those executed on SEAQ-I 
and this must be interpreted as a result of the different market microstructure 
in that a medium to large order is normally executed as an entire trade in a 
dealership market but could result in a number of smaller trades if executed 
through the limit order book. Trades on the Paris Bourse are 16.62 times 
more frequent than on SEAQ-I; trades on the IE are 17.07 times frequent 
than on SEAQ-I; and 8.11 times more frequent on IBIS than on SEAQ-I. For 
the London-executed trades, it could be noted that the distribution of their 
size is skewed with the mean being substantially larger than the median. The 
same can be said for the trades executed on the Paris Bourse, IBIS and the 
IE.
It is clear that trades on SEAQ-I are much larger than those executed on 
the home markets. The Tables show that the mean size of transactions in 
European cross-quoted securities executed on SEAQ-I is 19.839 times that
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Table 1: T rad ing  of French cross-quoted securities on SEAQ -I and
th e  P aris  B ourse
P a n e l  A: T r a d in g  o n  SEAQ-I
T rade size 
Mean Std. Dev. Median
T rade size percentiles
90th 95th 99th
Alcatel Alsthom 6059 33843 1400 10500 21886 65000
AXA 8460 21624 2391 20000 32000 85000
BNP 10760 43345 2530 21950 41200 116000
Elf Aquitaine 10244 61948 2000 15379 33000 125000
Michelin 10719 29850 2500 23707 46424 145000
Paribas 7988 36870 1700 15572 28000 106084
Peugeot 3099 14764 840 6425 11150 30500
Rhone-Poulenc 24409 73754 5500 60000 100300 248157
Societe General 4640 22178 1000 8000 16200 50664
Total 10177 39908 2500 20000 38607 121000
UAP 16638 62450 4000 35220 60000 200000
P a n e l  B: T r a d in g  o n  t h e  P a r is  B o u r s e
TVade size 
Mean Std. Dev. Median
T tade  size percentiles
90th 95th 99th
Alcatel Alsthom 391 3071 100 974 1190 3200
AXA 582 2472 246 1200 2000 4785
BNP 343 3449 39 912 1250 3580
Elf Aquitaine 334 5116 30 878 1400 3464
Michelin 603 2467 182 1150 2040 5000
Paribas 465 5277 100 1000 1550 4734
Peugeot 312 3964 131 530 1000 2000
Rhone-Poulenc 505 3718 50 1031 2054 5000
Societe General 301 2706 70 600 1000 2150
Total 821 10342 250 1516 2468 6000
UAP 460 4189 83 1000 1946 4981
The Table reports summary statistics for the size of trades executed on SEAQ-I (Panel A)
and on the Paris Bourse (Panel B) for a sample of French cross-quoted securities over
the period January-June 1996.
Table 2: T rading  of G erm an cross-quoted securities on SEAQ -I and
th e  D eutsche Borse
P a n e l  A: T r a d in g  o n  SEAQ-I
Trade size 
Mean Std. Dev. Median
T rade size
90th 95th
percentiles
99th
Allianz 530 3818 100 800 1578 5500
BASF 2656 13184 760 4500 9680 34000
Bayer 2717 25984 531 4750 93000 28811
BMW 6669 13591 2000 17600 30000 72500
Commerzbank 2699 10032 1000 5000 10000 33000
Daimler-Benz 1858 6360 500 3000 5810 21600
Deutsche Bank 16126 125874 5000 23000 50000 197347
Dresdner Bank 60111 252657 5500 58140 287000 1036444
Lufthansa 2871 7812 1000 6000 10000 29000
Mannesman 1515 3513 500 3270 6000 18000
Volkswagen 2047 5636 500 4500 7620 28200
P a n e l  B : T r a d in g  o n  t h e  D e u t s c h e  B O r s e
Trade size 
Mean Std. Dev. Median
T rade size percentiles
90th 95th 99th
Allianz 306 180 200 600 600 1000
BASF 1431 849 1000 2000 2000 4000
Bayer 2720 4186 1000 7000 10000 20000
BMW 3036 3268 2000 60000 10000 14000
Commerzbank 1510 984 1000 2000 3000 5000
Daimler-Benz 1291 711 1000 2000 2000 4000
Deutsche Bank 8810 9000 9000 20000 20000 40000
Dresdner Bank 8737 7433 8000 20000 20000 40000
Lufthansa 1104 882 1000 2000 2000 4000
Mannesman 1284 689 1000 2000 2000 4000
Volkswagen 1324 917 1000 2000 2000 4000
The Table reports summary statistics for the size of trades executed on SEAQ-I (Panel A)
and on the Deutsche Borse (Panel B) for a sample of German cross-quoted securities over
the period January-June 1996.
Table 3: T rad ing  of Ita lian  cross-quoted securities on SEAQ-I and
on th e  Ita lian  Exchange
P a n e l  A: T r a d in g  o n  SEAQ-I 
Figures for Panel A only are shown in 000
T rade size 
Mean Std. Dev. Median
T rade size percentiles
90th 95th 99th
Assicurazioni Generali 31 114 10 62 114 322
BCI 244 948 65 400 750 4787
Benetton Group 30 76 70 76 120 300
Credito Italiano 334 982 105 690 1180 3582
FIAT 196 514 60 432 520 2190
Istituto San Paolo 112 338 22 201 381 1741
Mediobanca 436 207 44 83 150 479
Olivetti 934 2410 277 2500 4000 8125
Pirelli 261 756 100 500 950 3000
STET 196 457 75 450 778 2000
Telecom Italia 346 1404 75 690 1211 2000
P a n e l  B: T r a d in g  o n  t h e  It a l ia n  E x c h a n g e
T rade size T rade size percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. Median 90th 95th 99th
Assicurazioni Generali 1506 9356 500 3000 5000 10000
BCI 7459 91237 2000 14000 22000 50000
Benetton Group 2372 13014 1000 5000 5000 12000
Credito Italiano 15589 157208 5000 27500 47500 100000
FIAT 9662 48808 5000 20000 30000 60000
Istituto San Paolo 3499 49427 1000 5000 7500 20000
Mediobanca 2333 5571 1000 5000 7000 15000
Olivetti 26126 67431 10000 50000 100000 200000
Pirelli 15146 36904 10000 30000 50000 100000
STET 12085 56945 5000 25000 37500 70000
Telecom Italia 20655 260563 7500 40000 50000 100000
The Table reports summary statistics for the size of trades executed on SEAQ-I (Panel A)
and on the Italian Exchange (Panel B) for a sample of Italian cross-quoted securities over
the period January-June 1996.
Table 4: Summary statistics for a sample of cross-quoted securities
P a n e l  A: F r e n c h  c r o s s - q u o t e d  s e c u r it ie s
T rade frequency ratio T rade size ra tio
AGF 0.0414 59.7922
BNP 0.0459 31.3703
Elf Aquitaine 0.0531 30.6707
Eurotunnel 0.0205 37.7353
Rhone-Poulenc. 0.0308 48.3347
UAP ----------- 0.0306 36.1696
A ll F r e n c h 0.0602 19.8395
P a n e l  B: G e r m a n  c r o s s - q u o t e d  s e c u r it ie s
Bayer 0.1453 3.1029
Degussa 0.3082 2.7393
Deutsche Bank 0.2282 1.8304
Dresdner Bank 0.2107 6.8801
Hoechst 0.0348 12.4830
Volkswagen 0.1844 1.5461
A ll  G e r m a n 0.1233 2.9255
P a n e l  C: It a l ia n  c r o s s - q u o t e d  s e c u r it ie s
Alleanza 0.0431 17.9962
Ferruzzi Finanziaria 0.0433 254.6357
FIAT 0.0329 20.3032
Montedison 0.0481 40.6565
Olivetti 0.0439 35.7548
Telecom Italia 0.0492 16.7649
A ll It a l ia n 0.0585 32.6882
The Table analyses the number of trades for the cross-quoted securities 
(executed in the home and foreign markets) and the mean trade size. 
Trade frequency ratio is defined as
Number of trades executed on SEAQ-I 
Number of trades executed in home market
Trade size ratio is defined as
 Mean size of trades executed on SEAQ-I_____
Mean size of trades executed in home marketsize of
on Paris Bourse (for French securities), 32.688 times that on the IE (for 
Italian securities) and 2.9255 times that on IBIS (for German securities). 
The upper size percentiles (the Tables reproduce the size of the 90th, 95th 
and 99th percentile) confirm the size difference between the trades executed 
on SEAQ-I and the home markets.
The reason for SEAQ-I’s attractiveness as a place to execute large trades 
is very much a disputed issue. Roell (1992) and Madhavan (1995) have 
shown that large trades tend to emigrate towards the market with the least 
onerous publication regime. However, although the changes introduced in 
January 1996 gave SEAQ-I a more onerous trade publication regime, the 
evidence shows that this has not led to the migration of large trades away 
from London.
On the other hand, Wells (1993) suggests that the London market’s major 
competitive advantage is provided by the market makers’ commitment of 
capital to the system which leads to higher liquidity for large trades when 
compared to that provided by continuous auction systems such as those in 
operation in Continental European exchanges.
2.3.1 H ypotheses Tested
Since no previous work has dealt with price impacts of large trades in an inter­
market set-up, most of the theoretical and empirical background reviewed 
here is obtained from the existing literature that investigates LSE market 
makers’ behaviour and execution of large trades in a single market set-up. 
Such literature could help disentangle some of the issues which relate to how 
market-markers carry out inventory management, an issue directly related 
to this Chapter’s objectives.
Hypothesis 1: Large trades executed on SEAQ-I do not produce any price
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impact in the home market before the trade’s reported time on SEAQ-I.
Hypothesis 2: Large trades executed on SEAQ -I do not generate any price 
impact in the home market after the trade is reported as executed on SEAQ-I.
A number of studies have found that large trades were found to produce a 
permanent price impact besides a temporary one. Gemmill (1996) finds that 
block purchases produce a statistically significant permanent price impact 
while block sales also produce permanent price impacts but these are almost 
statistically insignificant. This implies that large trades do have an informa­
tion content and this provides an information advantage to those aware of 
such trades.
Board and Sutcliffe (1995) find that large trades executed on the LSE 
produce a permanent price impact which ‘accord with the prior expecta­
tions that large Customer buys signify good news, while large Customer sells 
indicate bad news’ (Board and Sutcliffe 1995).
Burdett and O’Hara (1987) state that “because block trades have pre­
dictable price effects, information as to the very existence of a trade can be 
valuable. The success of the block trader, therefore, depends on his being 
able to curtail knowledge of his syndication activities. This suggests that the 
trading process, itself, may generate information effects on security prices” .
An interesting question is whether the price impact starts manifesting 
itself before the trade is actually reported as having been executed. This 
might be caused by any inventory pre-positioning carried out by SEAQ-I 
market makers through trading in the home markets.
Board and Sutcliffe (1995), investigating London-listed securities, find 
that market makers often engage in pre-positioning before a large trade is 
executed. In the case of liquid stocks, the pre-positioning took more than 
three hours to be completed.
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In the case of European cross-quoted securities, the pre-positioning can 
either take place on the same SEAQ-I system or through the home markets. 
In addition, since ‘protected trades’3 are allowed on SEAQ-I it is expected 
that at least part of the pre-positioning associated with such trades takes 
place in the home markets. The suspicion that London market makers carry 
out inventory management for European cross-quoted securities in the home 
markets finds confirmation in Jacquillat and Gresse (1995). They argue 
that ‘as a great deal of the block traded by SEAQ-I market makers are 
finally executed on the CAC, the CAC order book can be considered as an 
interdealer broker, taking advantage of commercially more aggressive UK 
based market makers’ (Jacquillat and Gresse (1995)).
Hence, it is expected that the information content of a large trade exe­
cuted in London will not be confined exclusively to the London market but 
also produces a price impact on the home market. The trading activity asso­
ciated with pre-positioning is expected to act as a signal about the presence 
of a large order to be executed, the trade direction of which can be inferred 
by the type of inventory management carried out by the market maker.
In this way, the news of a large trade leaks to the market and information 
gets impounded in the prices (formed in the home markets) before the trade 
is actually reported as executed on SEAQ-I and before the relevant trade 
information is published on the SEAQ-I screens.
Hypothesis 3: The price impact produced by large trades is not an increas­
ing function of the trade size.
3The LSE defines a protected trade as ‘a transaction which is accepted by a member 
firm on the basis that the price or price and size at which the transaction is to be executed 
in the market is to be improved upon within a specified period’. The maximum period 
over which the protected trade remains valid is the end of the MQP following the receipt 
of the order. Protected trades are reported to the LSE and published through the same 
channels used for the other trades.
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It is argued that pre- and post-positioning carried out by London market 
makers is an important channel through which the price impacts are produced 
in the home markets. Board and Sutcliffe (1995) find that the level of pre- 
and post-positioning decreases as the trade size increases. If rebalancing in 
home markets for large trades executed in London were to follow the same 
trading behaviour used by market makers on SEAQ4, then price impacts 
should not increase with the trade size.
Jacquillat and Gresse (1995) argue that the main emerging economic role 
of SEAQ-I market makers is that of providing firm quotes for very large vol­
umes. One possible implication of such an argument is that SEAQ-I market 
makers are willing to accommodate large orders, employing their inventory 
to provide the necessary depth, and then rebalancing their position slowly 
over time, rather than aggressively.
This behaviour is compatible with the emerging view that London is 
developing in an “upstairs” market where the very large trades are executed 
in such a market. In this way, the London market makers on SEAQ-I serve 
as a screening device and mitigate the adverse selection costs that are bound 
to arise from a large order.
This development of the LSE would be in line with Seppi (1990) who uses 
a model where a trader has the choice between trading in the upstairs or on 
the downstairs market. The liquidity trader may use the upstairs market if he 
can credibly signal to the block trader that his trade is not information-based. 
In Seppi’s (1990) model, a credible signal is provided by the commitment on
4 Board and Sutcliffe (1995) find that the mean number of trades which are pre­
positioned represents 26.85% in the case of trades in the 10-20 X NMS bracket, decreases 
to 25.06% for trades in the 20-35 X NMS bracket and decreases further to 20.21% in the 
case of trades larger than 35 X NMS. The same trading behaviour takes place when post­
positioning is considered with post-positioning representing 16.40% in the case of trades 
in the 10-20 X NMS bracket, 9.69% for trades in the 20-35 X NMS bracket and amounts 
only to 7.76% of all the trades larger than 35 X NMS.
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the part of the liquidity trader not to ‘bag the street’. Other signals could 
come in the form of implicit commitments or are provided by the trader’s 
reputation. This model can be applied in the case of SEAQ-I.
A block trade originating from a liquidity trader should generate a lower 
price impact than one from an informed trader if the liquidity trader can 
credibly signal his status. There is also the consideration that even if market 
makers were willing to pre- and post-position the very large trades, they 
could effectively be hitting a liquidity barrier in the home markets as they 
off-load the large trade. Hence, fully aware of such problems, SEAQ-I’s 
market makers could be off-loading very large volumes slowly rather than 
aggressively so that the overall price impact is minimised.
Hypothesis 4: Delaying trade publication does not hold the price from  
adjusting to its new equilibrium price in the home markets before the infor­
mation is published on the LSE.
As from 1 January 1996, large trades reported as having been executed 
on SEAQ-I are published with a one hour delay in the case of trades in the 
size bracket 6 X NMS to 75 X NMS while those larger than 75 X NMS can 
be published up to five days after execution. This publication regime allows 
us to analyse whether the one hour delay enforced by the LSE does in fact 
prevent the price transacted in the home markets from adjusting to its new 
equilibrium level before the trade information is published.
In a different context, Gemmill (1996) finds that prices’ adjustment speed 
to the new permanent price level following a large trade is the same whether 
trade publication is immediate, has a 90 minute delay or a 24 hours delay, 
also rejecting the hypothesis that delayed publication produces a smoother 
adjustment process. This evidence shows that information leaks to the mar­
ketplace before it is published by the Exchange authorities. This leaves
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limited, if any, advantage to the trade parties to use their information.
This publication regime also allows an analysis on whether the one hour 
publication delay produces a smooth price adjustment process in the home 
markets.
Hypothesis 5: Volatility produced by large trades is not higher in auction 
markets (CAC and IE) than in hybrid trading systems (IBIS).
Madhavan (1992) analyses a quote driven system and an order driven 
mechanism where the former is an extension of the Glosten (1989) model 
which utilises competing market makers while the latter is an extension of 
the Kyle (1989) model. The market makers in the quote driven system 
provide bid and ask quotes which can be revised only after a trade has been 
executed. This system allows the trader to know the execution price for each 
order before the trade is executed and hence results in no execution risk. The 
order driven system is characterised by dealers who engage in competition 
by submitting a ‘set of price-quantity combinations such that the quantity 
demanded at each price is the desired order quantity conditional upon that 
particular price clearing in the market’ (Madhavan, 1992).
Madhavan conjectures that price variability in the continuous auction 
mechanism is higher than in a dealership system. He argues that competition 
between market makers in a quote driven system should eliminate the differ­
ence between the transacted price and the expected security value. However, 
the competition in the price-quantity schedule that takes place in an order 
driven system allows for strategic behaviour between dealers and this distorts 
prices and makes the system more sensitive to information asymmetry.
Both the Paris Bourse and the IE resemble the order driven mechanism 
described by Madhavan whereas the IBIS trading system, because of the 
presence of market makers (Kursmaklers, Freimaklers) and bank traders that
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trade for their own account (constituting the major competing counterparties 
to investors willing to trade) is nearer to the quote-driven system as defined 
by Madhavan (1992). Hence, it is expected that the price generating process 
of securities on the CAC and the IE should be more sensitive, compared to 
IBIS, to the news of a block trade executed on SEAQ-I.
2.4 D ata  and M ethodology
2.4.1 D ata
The data for the LSE is provided through the Transaction Data Service of the 
LSE’s Quality of Markets Group. The data consists of transaction records 
in relation to the first six months of 1996 and collected from the settlement 
system.5
Before conducting the analysis, the transactions data needs to be screened 
to extract records of transactions from the reporting records as explained by 
Hansch and Neuberger (1993, 1996), Board and Sutcliffe (1995), and Reiss 
and Werner (1996, 1997). The main three screening devices to achieve the 
proper data set are briefly explained here.
The original SEAQ-I data is constructed from the transcripts of trans­
actions. For each transaction, there are two records: one submitted by the 
buyer, the other one submitted by the seller. Each transaction bears a unique 
transaction number and as such any transaction will be identified and one 
record per transaction should be extracted from the paired transactions data.
The trade direction needs to be inferred so as to divide the screened data
°The transactions data contains the quantity and price for each transaction executed 
and the classification of the ‘capacity’ of each trading parties. In particular, trading parties 
(which are named as ‘firm’ or ‘counter party’) are classified in five categories: brokers 
acting on behalf of clients (assigned class ‘A’), market makers (assigned class ‘M’), market 
makers’ private clients (assigned class ‘N’), inter dealer brokers (assigned class ‘I’) and 
non-market makers acting as principals (assigned* class ‘P ’).
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in buy records and sell records. In line with Board and Sutcliffe (1995), a 
transaction is assigned a buy record if the transaction represents a purchase 
from the market maker while a transaction which involves a sale to a market 
maker is assigned a sell direction. For reasons which are explained below, only 
Agent to Market Maker trades (the so-called Customer trades) are extracted 
from the screened data.
Data for the Paris Bourse is extracted from the trade file of the Paris 
Bourse Data Base. Data contains the transaction date, transaction time, 
the record sequence number (used to rank trades which are recorded at the 
same time), the trade price, trade size and a cross-trade indicator. The 
latter indicates whether a member firm enters a pre-arranged trade. The 
put-through trade can be matched either between two customers or with a 
member firm when the latter is acting as a principal. All put-through trade 
records are removed from the data set since they are pre-arranged and do 
not fall within the scope of this study.
The trade direction could not be inferred directly from the trade file 
and quotes data, provided by the Paris Bourse, was used to classify trade 
directions. Transactions and quotes data were merged together and the best 
bid and best ask prices were obtained in continuous time. For transactions 
executed inside the spread, the Harris (1989) methodology was used, in which 
case trades are called buys if they are closer to the ask and classified as sells 
if they are closer to the bid price. This approach leaves trades executed 
at the mid-quote unclassified. In the sample used, there were 2.18% of all 
transactions carried out at the midquote and these records are removed from 
the sample.
The data for IBIS was provided by the Institut Fur Entscheidungstheorie 
und Unternehmensforschung of the University of Karlsruhe. The database
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contains tick-by-tick price and volume for securities traded on IBIS from 
which the relevant data for the DAX30 securities was extracted. In addition, 
the date and time of the transaction is provided together with the flag that 
indicates whether a transaction is initiated by a Makler or by a Bank. If 
no flag is used, then the transaction is initiated by an IBIS member bank, if 
the flag is assigned a value of ‘A’ then the transaction was initiated by the 
Kursmakler and if the flag is assigned a value of ‘F ’ then the transaction was 
initiated by a Freimakler. The time-stamp is accurate to the 100th second. 
There is one record for each transaction executed.
Data for the IE was provided by the “Servizio Studi Sviluppo e Dati” of 
the IE. The data contains the date, time, price and volume for each trans­
action, including those executed at the opening call. The data contains one 
record for each trade transacted. Data for transactions executed at the open­
ing call auction is removed. The IE does not provide any information about 
put-through trades and no filtering of these trade records can be undertaken.
The data for both IBIS and the IE does not allow a direct inference of 
the trade direction of each transaction in these two markets. In this case, 
direction is decided by using a version of the tick test proposed by Lee and 
Ready (1991) under which trades are classified as buys if they occur on an 
uptick or zero-uptick and sells if they occur on a downtick or zero-downtick.
2.4.2 M ethodology
The three most relevant event studies considered for this work are those em­
ployed by Holthausen et ah (1990), Board and Sutcliffe (1995) and Gemmill 
(1996). These three studies, in contrast with those produced by Kraus and 
Stoll (1972), Ryngaert (1983), Ball and Finn (1983), and Holtahusen et al. 
(1987), use transactions data rather than closing prices, which allows a more 
precise measurement of the price impacts produced by large trades. It must
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be noted, however, that the three studies cited deal with price impacts pro­
duced in the same equity market where large transactions are executed. This 
study is different in that it deals with inter-market price impacts produced 
by large trades.
However, in the light of documented behaviour of market makers in terms 
of pre- and post-positioning and given that this Chapter is set in an inter- 
market environment, a number of methodological changes in traditional event 
studies axe introduced in this Chapter.
2.4.3 Changes From Established Techniques
The trading set-up utilised for this study, where the impact of a large trade 
in one market is analysed in different parallel markets rather than in the 
same market where the trade was executed, calls for a number of changes 
from the methodologies employed so far. The first major change has to do 
with the definition of the event. Holthausen et a l (1990) and Gemmill 
(1996) define the event as the largest trades, by number of shares traded, for 
each security in their sample. This definition within the context utilised here 
creates comparison problems because it does not use a common yardstick to 
define the size of a large trade across the securities.
The second major change applied deals with the definition of the bench­
mark period. In view of the Board and Sutcliffe (1995) results on pre- and 
post-positioning, it is argued that a benchmark period as used in the Gem­
mill (1996) analysis may be temporally too close to the event and as such 
could be affected by the pre-positioning behaviour of market makers. It 
should be recalled that a certain amount of positioning before a large trade 
(defined in this case as trade of a size at least 10 X NMS) was found when 
Board and Sutcliffe (1995) analyse the activities of London market makers. 
It is possible that using an estimation period as defined by Holthausen et a l
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(1990) and Gemmill (1996) can produce bias caused by the market makers’ 
pre-positioning. In this case, the pre-positioning which is directly caused by 
the event itself will interfere in the estimation of the mean trade-to-trade 
returns in the benchmark period and will influence the parameter estimates.
Another improvement proposed by this Chapter deals with the problem 
of handling event-induced increases in volatility. Mikkelson (1981), Penman 
(1982) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1989) found that the event-period’s stan­
dard deviation is about 1.2 to 1.5 higher than that experienced during the 
benchmark-period.
Although this is a central problem in event studies since it influences 
the ability of the t-statistics used by event-study methodologies to test for 
excess returns, it has only received sparse attention. Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985) argue that the variance of returns will increase when an event 
produces different effects on securities.
They warn that under these circumstances, the traditional event-studies 
fail to produce correct results. More recently, Brown, Harlow and Tinic 
(1988, 1989) show that events cause a temporary increase in the variance of 
abnormal returns which accompany the shift in the mean. This increase in 
variance is caused by the temporary change in the securities’ systematic risk. 
Hence, controlling for event-induced variance is a necessary step in order to 
conduct the appropriate test of the null hypothesis.
One way to deal with event-induced variance is provided by a number of 
event-studies (See Charest (1978), Dann (1981), Mikkelson (1981), Penman 
(1982) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990)) that use cross-sectional variance 
extracted from the event window rather than estimated from a benchmark 
period. Other methods include a generalised least squares technique to deal 
with event-date clustering (Collins and Dent (1984)), applying a Maximum
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Likelihood estimation to stock return data (Ball and Torous (1988)) and non- 
parametric rank tests to capture asymmetry in cross-sectional excess returns 
(Corrado (1989)).
2.4.4 Trade Clustering and Filtering Rules
Large trades transacted in a quote-driven market can be executed in three 
possible ways: (a) the market maker is one of the parties to the trade as a 
buyer in which case its inventory is increased with the quantity bought; (b) 
the market maker is one of the parties in the capacity of a seller in which case 
its inventory is reduced; and (c) no market maker is involved in the trade 
which gives rise to an agency cross. Trades classified as (a) or (b) above can 
include protected trades6, that are trades where the initiator agrees with the 
market maker for the trade to be deferred later on in the trading day possibly 
leading to a better price for the initiator.
A material number of trades are reported as having taken place after the 
home markets are closed. In particular, for all three types of cross-quoted 
securities, there is a surge of large trades executed between 16:00:00 hrs 
and 17:00:00 hrs (London time) which coincides with the hour following the 
home markets closure. In addition, a substantial number of these trades 
are reported as having been executed between 17:00:00 hrs and 20:00:00 hrs, 
although the number of trades in French and Italian cross-quoted securities 
is higher than that for German securities.
The large trades for every security were also sorted by the time interval 
between one large trade and the other (in the same security group) for each 
single trading day. The results are shown in Table 5 and demonstrates trade 
clustering for most securities, in that more than half of the number of trades
6 Since the LSE is not informed that a particular trade was covered by the one day 
protection rule, these trades cannot be identified as such in the data provided by the LSE.
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are executed within one hour of each other with very few large trades being 
executed within the two and three hours intervals. Trades executed in the 
four hours interval form a substantial group.
Only large Customer trades are investigated since the main objective is to 
analyse price impacts in home markets produced by total buying or selling 
pressures in London which is not due to inventory positioning; trades be­
tween market maker trades are expected to be executed for purely inventory 
management reasons and so are not considered. In addition, the Agent to 
Agent trades (the so-called agency crosses) are also ignored since in this case 
the trade direction cannot be identified. The classification of large trades into 
three categories is motivated by the need to analyse the impacts produced 
by large trades of different sizes.
For the event study methodology, four filtering rules are used to define the 
event under consideration. First, any large trade which occurred in the two 
hours following another large trade is removed from the sample. Secondly, 
any large trade which is followed in the following two-hour interval by other 
large trades is ignored. Thirdly, any large trade for which there was another 
large trade (in any size class) in the previous trading day is also removed 
from the sample. The fourth filtering rule removes those trades which are 
reported as having been executed before 09:00:00 hrs (London time) and 
those after 17:00:00 hrs (London time) in the case of French and Italian cross­
quoted securities and trades executed before 07:30:00 hrs (London time) and 
those after 17:00:00 hrs (London time) in the case of German cross-quoted 
securities.
Following the identification of the large trade in London, a four hour 
event-window is opened in the home market and the trades which are exe­
cuted in the home markets in the two hours before the event and two hours
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Table 5: Temporal aggregation of trades in French, German and 
Italian cross-quoted securities executed on SEAQ-I
French quoted German quoted Italian quoted
I n t e r v a l  A
Number of trades 22240 12302 14332
% of total trades 62.32 53.79 63.42
"In t e r v a l  B
Number of trades 3187 1242 1512
% of total trades 7.62 8.52 7.66
I n t e r v a l  C
Number of trades 927 524 704
% of total trades 2.95 4.47 3.74
I n t e r v a l  D
Number of trades 583 248 403
% of total trades 1.98 2.55 2.46
I n t e r v a l  E
Number of trades 6106 2596 3414
% of total trades 25.13 30.66 22.72
Large trades were extracted from the datasets and sorted by the date and 
time of execution. The exercise was implemented for every trading day in 
the period January-June 1996.
Large trades with an inter-trade interval of less than 1 hour are placed in 
Interval A; large trades with an inter-trade interval between 1 to 2 hours 
are placed in Interval B; large trades with an inter-trade interval between 
2 to 3 hours are placed in Interval C; large trades with an inter-trade of 3 
to 4 hours are placed in Interval D; while large trades with an inter-trade 
interval larger than 4 hours are placed in Interval E.
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following the event axe considered. Although it could be argued that the de­
cision about the duration of the event-window is in itself arbitrary, it should 
be noted that the duration chosen is broadly in line with the findings of 
Board and Sutcliffe (1995) for SEAQ securities.7
In order to avoid the problems caused by the bid-ask bounce, the analysis 
is conducted in the Board and Sutcliffe (1995) vein whereby all buy trades 
executed in the home markets during the four-hour event-window are com­
bined with the large London buy and all sell trades executed in the home 
market are combined with the large London sale.
The four hour window periods are then divided into five-minute intervals. 
The time at which the London-executed trade takes place is used to fix the 
initial time of interval 0. Since SEAQ-I dealers have up to 3 minutes to 
report a trade to the LSE, it is possible that trade time misreporting occurs 
and this means that the real trade execution time is not necessarily placed 
at interval 0 but could effectively be in close intervals. However, since we 
adopt a very wide event window period, this problem is not likely to pose 
serious problems. The 47 five-minute intervals before and after the large 
London-executed trade are identified with respect to time interval 0.
Two methodologies are utilised. The first one generally follows conven­
tional literature where excess returns are computed and the null hypothesis 
is tested through the usual t-test, while the second one uses standardized 
returns and the standardized cross-sectional test.
Event time is denoted by t , with the reporting time of the execution of 
the large trade on SEAQ-I being t =  0. The benchmark period is defined as
7They essentially find that most of the pre-positioning that London market makers 
carry out takes some 185 minutes but 75% of the pre-positioning for very liquid securities 
takes just over 2 hours while that for low liquid securities take 108 minutes. The post-event 
window has been chosen to provide sufficient time for the price impact to materialise given 
that trades of different sizes are being considered.
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the interval t = T0 + I  to t =  T \ , being followed by the event window which 
occupies the time period from t = T\ +  1 to t =  T2.
This set-up implies that Z\ =  T\ — To, being the benchmark period, and 
Z2 =  T2 — T\ being the event window. For the purpose of this Chapter, the 
event window starts at time interval -24 and ends at time interval +23. The 
LSE data is only utilised to identify the large trade (the time of transaction 
and the trade size) and define the four hour interval period. However, the 
event-window itself is exclusively populated by the trades executed in the re­
spective home market. The one hour clock time difference between London 
and the home markets is taken into consideration and the necessary adjust­
ments in the home markets’ transaction reported time are implemented in 
the data.
For a number of large trades, the event-window opened does not fit in 
the same trading day. In particular, the trades reported as having been 
executed before 11:00:00 hrs will have an event-window that starts in the 
previous trading day while the large trades executed after 14:00:00 hrs will 
have an event-window that ends in the following trading day. The event- 
window for the trades that are reported between 16:00:00 hrs and 17:00:00 
hrs is constituted by trades executed in the two last trading hours in that 
trading day and the first two trading hours of the following trading day in 
the home market.
The choice of this event-window is justified by the consideration that if 
London market makers do use the home markets to pre- and post-position 
large trades executed on SEAQ-I, then it is expected that trades which occur 
near the home markets’ close should experience a pre- and post-positioning 
phases that stretch from one trading day to another. In such cases, the 
opening trade in the home markets is omitted so as to minimise the impact
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of the accumulation of information in the overnight period.
The Excess Returns (ER) on day d for each of the 48 five-minute intervals 
t  over which transactions are executed in the home market m for security j  
and transacted before and after the large trade I is executed in London, axe 
given by:
where ERdtjim represents the interval-to-interval return for trades exe-
SEAQ-I and buy trades in the case of a buy laxge trade on SEAQ-I) from 
interval -24 to interval +23.
The benchmark interval-to-interval returns, BR(d-i)tm, are calculated us-
large trade in London is executed. In the case of trades that axe executed
previous trade, the benchmark returns are computed using all trades exe­
cuted up to one hour before the start of the event-window.
Average excess returns (AER) axe obtained by averaging across all secu­
rities and event-window intervals. In particular abnormal returns for Cus­
tomer buy trades at time t are computed by averaging across all companies 
and blocks in the following way:
where Lb is the total number of laxge Customer buy trades for all com­
panies.
The average excess returns (AER) from trading in the home markets 
are cumulated to produce the cumulative average abnormal return measure
ERdtjim Rdtjlm B  R(d—l)tm (1)
cuted in the home market (sell trades in the case of a sell large trade on
ing all trades transacted in the home market the day before the particular
before ll:00hrs and hence have part of the pre-event window starting in the
A E R ^ t f :
j=1 1=1
-dtjlmb
(2)
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around the execution of the large trade on SEAQ-I, denoted as C A R ( ti ,t2), 
in the following way (the following refers to buy trades)
C A R {t\ , £2) =  (3 )
t= t  1 \ j = 1 1=1 b )
where L  is the number of large buy trades and Ti < ti < £2 < ^ 2-
The standard deviation of interval-to-interval returns was computed using 
the same trades used to obtain the benchmark returns. The t — statistic  was 
calculated by adjusting the excess returns obtained for each day, large trade, 
security and interval by y/N(d-i)tm, the number of intervals used for the 
computation of the standard deviation, and then divided by the standard 
deviation SD(d-i)jmin the following way:
E R d t j i m  X  y j N [d — 1 ) tm ,
t d t j l m  =  I V
& ■L'(d—l ) tm
After conducting the analysis using the updated version of conventional 
methodologies, we address the problem of event-induced increases in volatil­
ity. It must be noted that if the variance induced by the event is under­
estimated, this leads to the serious problem of having a test statistic that
rejects the null hypothesis of zero average abnormal returns more frequently 
than it should (Brown and Warner, 1980 and 1985). In order to solve this 
problem, the present work will make use of the standardized cross-sectional 
test developed by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) in addition to the 
traditional method.
The standardized cross-sectional test is the result of combining together 
the standardized-residual technology developed by Patell (1976) and the or­
dinary cross-sectional methodology proposed by Charest (1978) and Penman 
(1982). The innovative aspect of this test is the combination of variance in-
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formation extracted both from the benchmark period and the event-window 
period.
For the standardized cross-sectional residuals methodology, interval-to- 
interval standardized returns for each security j  and large trade t is calculated 
in the following way:
CD   zp L> / c n  /i j______ _^_____I________{.R d tjlm  B R ( d  l)tm)_______
Oridtjlm ~  n t td t j lm / t  +  +  N _
N^d-Dtm T,n=l(B R (d-l)tm ~  B  R {d_1)tm)2.
(5)
where B R ^-i)tm  is the average interval-to-interval returns obtained for 
the benchmark period.
The test-statistic is obtained in the following way:
\
where J  is the number of firms used in the computations.
As explained, this study makes use of interval-to-interval returns rather 
than trade-to-trade returns. Although this methodology is expected to stan­
dardize the time over which different series of excess returns (resulting from 
different large trades) are aggregated, it is not immune to the problems as­
sociated to nonsynchronous trading. Although many cross-quoted securities 
trade heavily in their respective home markets, a limited number of such 
securities present lower trading frequencies. Hence, the possible impact of 
the nonsynchronous trading presence must be explored.
The nonsynchronous trading effect takes place when asset prices are 
recorded at intervals of irregular lengths when in fact the computation as­
sumes that they are recorded at intervals of equal lengths. The case which 
is of interest here is represented by those securities with unequal trading fre-
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quencies and are included in the same sample used for the event study. In 
particular, although the length of the intervals used is five minutes, different 
trading frequencies within and between intervals should create a situation 
where that interval-to-interval returns are not recorded with a five minute 
time span.
This is because the first trade in each interval does not necessarily take 
place on the first second of each interval and as such these trades are not 
evenly spaced. In addition, it is also possible that no trades are executed in 
a particular security for a number of intervals in which case the time interval 
between the first trade of one interval and the first trade for the next available 
interval is substantially higher than five minutes.
In view of this problem, the mean time of the interval-to-interval returns 
for different securities was computed. The cross-quoted securities were di­
vided into two groups - first, those with less than 150 trades per trading day; 
the second group being formed by those securities for which there axe more 
than 150 trades per trading day.
The mean time of the interval-to-interval return in the first group is 7.01 
minutes while that for the second group is 6.14 minutes. The difference 
between the two mean times is not statistically significant and, hence, the 
problems caused from the presence of nonsynchronous trading axe not con­
sidered to be severe.
Following the analysis of the laxge trades filtered from the presence of 
other laxge trades, the whole sample of laxge trades is then utilised in a 
regression model.
69
2.5 R esults
2.5.1 Event Study M ethodology
Results show that the excess returns in the home markets around the exe­
cution of the block trade on SEAQ-I are statistically significant whereas the 
excess returns in both tails of the event-window are not statistically signifi­
cant. Tables 6-8 and Figures 1-4 shows the mean excess returns recorded over 
a smaller number of time intervals (from the larger four-hour interval) that 
spans from time interval -14 to time interval -f-14 (henceforth the ‘statistically 
significant period’).
Figures 5-8 provide the Cumulative Abnormal Returns on the home mar­
kets over the four hour interval period surrounding the large trade generated 
by the large buy and sell trades, using the Excess Returns as computed in 
(1). The mean interval-to-interval excess returns over a number of intervals 
that surround the time when the large trade is executed on SEAQ-I are sig­
nificantly different than zero. In general, most of the excess returns recorded 
over the period that spans from interval -13 to interval +13 are statistically 
significant.
The t — statistics for most of the mean excess returns within the statisti­
cally significant period reject the null hypothesis of zero excess returns at the 
1% confidence level. The mean excess returns recorded from interval -12 to 
interval -1, and hence before the large trade is actually executed on SEAQ-I, 
are statistically different than zero which can be explained in two different 
ways. It is either because there is a leakage of information and prices start 
adjusting accordingly in view of the large trade due to be executed or the 
pre-positioning carried out by London market makers in the home markets 
leads to prices adjusting accordingly.
Interestingly, there are few intervals (especially at or around interval 0)
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Table 6: Excess Returns and Standardized Cross-Sectional Resid­
uals around large trades (6 to 45 NM S) for French cross-quoted
securities
L a r g e  B u y  T r a d e s L a r g e  S e l l  T r a d e s
Inter. Excess t-test SC-S SCR-ts Excess t-test SC-S SCR-ts
Return Resid. Return Resid.
-9 0.0292 2.83 0.0213 2.55 -0.0480 -3.70 -0.0378 -3.16
-8 0.0311 3.82 0.0210 2.14 -0.0712 -13.34 -0.0254 -5.39
-7 0.0378 3.91 0.0422 4.19 -0.0251 -3.72 -0.0151 -2.35
-6 0.0639 12.21 0.0929 7.92 -0.0459 -3.55 -0.0359 -2.12
-5 0.0911 14.61 0.0390 3.99 -0.0124 -1.68 -0.0708 -5.54
-4 0.0467 2.04 0.0192 3.15 -0.0062 -2.96 -0.0215 -3.15
-3 0.0474 2.58 0.0124 2.17 0.0211 1.23 -0.0213 -6.79
-2 0.0705 14.68 0.0401 4.70 -0.0458 -3.34 -0.0419 -4.24
-1 0.0506 3.75 0.0486 3.16 -0.0832 -13.01 -0.0779 -10.75
0 -0.0023 -0.81 -0.0001 -1.17 -0.0505 -3.02 -0.0334 -2.98
1 0.0668 16.23 0.0433 6.21 -0.0596 -4.26 -0.0712 -6.80
2 0.0905 10.06 0.0145 2.19 0.0214 1.95 -0.0611 -2.10
3 0.0214 3.18 0.0188 3.86 -0.0642 -4 .27 -0.0544 -4.11
4 0.0292 2.52 0.0218 3.11 -0.0568 -11.80 -0.0436 -4.99
5 0.0446 14.98 0.0229 3.35 -0.0466 -11.13 -0.0277 -3.83
6 0.0293 4.37 0.0295 3.17 -0.0265 -2.77 -0.0395 -3.23
7 0.0388 2.30 0.0212 2.85 -0.0484 -3.06 -0.0295 -2.38
8 0.0197 2.32 0.0130 2.01 -0.0417 -2.92 -0.0050 -1.12
9 0.0071 2.24 0.0193 2.52 -0.0034 -2.01 -0.0024 -1.14
The Table shows the Excess Returns, with the corresponding t-test, together with the 
Standardised Cross-Sectional Residuals and the Standardised Cross-Sectional test for 
trades in the 6 NMS - 45 NMS trade size bracket. Excess returns are calculated as:
BRdtjlm Rdtjlm RR(d—l)tm
where Rdijtm represents the interval-to-interval return for trades executed in the home 
market over the interval period and is benchmark interval-to-interval returns.
Standardised Cross-Sectional Residuals are calculated as follows:
C D    IT'D / C D  /1  _i_______1_______ |________ ( R d t j l m - B R ( d - i ) t m ) 2
where B R ^ - i ) tm  is the average interval-to-interval returns obtained for the benchmark.
Table 7: Excess Returns and Standardized Cross-Sectional Resid­
uals around large trades (6 to 45 NM S) for German cross-quoted
securities
L a r g e  B u y  T r a d e s  L a r g e  S e l l  T r a d e s
Inter. Excess t-test SC-S SCR-ts Excess t-test SC-S SCR-ts
Return Resid. Return Resid.
-9 0.0592 6.23 0.0620 6.80 -0.0436 -5.38 -0.0221 -4.12
-8 0.0117 2.14 0.0148 2.54 -0.0294 -2.62 -0.0433 -5.40
-7 0.0587 6.34 0.0499 4.21 -0.0689 -6.98 -0.0611 -7.38
-6 0.0633 12.48 0.0513 9.48 -0.0126 -12.16 -0.0412 -4.11
-5 0.0182 2.56 0.0205 2.52 0.0128 11.97 0.0183 2.17
-4 0.0597 11.16 0.0391 8.95 -0.0696 -2.13 -0.0487 -4.11
-3 0.0452 2.43 0.0221 2.24 -0.0565 -7.87 -0.0486 -4.18
-2 0.0714 15.14 0.0875 11.42 -0.0552 -11.59 -0.0341 -6.94
-1 -0.0384 -0.55 -0.0124 -0.60 -0.0205 -2.85 -0.0257 -3.68
0 0.0324 4.29 0.0321 4.22 -0.0145 -0.44 0.0058 1.11
1 0.0554 7.65 0.0627 8.73 -0.0244 -2.95 -0.0165 -2.24
2 0.0221 2.40 0.0206 4.20 0.0110 2.48 0.0186 -2.90
3 0.0162 2.69 0.0169 3.47 -0.0392 -12.96 -0.0228 -10.69
4 0.0134 2.32 0.0129 2.17 -0.0238 -6.57 -0.0241 -4.91
5 0.0204 2.66 0.0202 2.20 -0.0081 -2.39 -0.0115 -2.50
6 0.0495 15.13 0.0237 4.16 -0.0097 -2.65 -0.0142 -2.15
7 0.0374 6.90 0.0283 5.70 -0.0431 -2.53 -0.0227 -4.11
8 0.0051 2.93 0.0318 3.91 -0.0104 -2.93 -0.0286 -4.98
9 0.0097 2.36 0.0137 2.82 -0.0254 -4.92 -0.0198 -3.11
The Table shows the Excess Returns, with the corresponding t-test, together with the 
Standardised Cross-Sectional Residuals and the Standardised Cross-Sectional test for 
trades in the 6 NMS - 45 NMS trade size bracket. Excess returns are calculated as:
E  Rdtjlm Rdtjlm ER{d—\)tm
where Rdijtm represents the interval-to-interval return for trades executed in the home 
market over the interval period and BR(d-i)tm is benchmark interval-to-interval returns. 
Standardised Cross-Sectional Residuals are calculated as follows:
S R iy l m  =  E R dt } lm/ S D (d. 1) tm] / l  +  ^  
where BR(d-i)tm is the average interval-to-interval returns obtained for the benchmark.
Table 8: Excess Returns and Standardized Cross-Sectional Resid­
uals around large trades (6 to  45 NM S) for Italian cross-quoted
securities
L a r g e  B u y  T r a d e s  L a r g e  S e l l  T r a d e s
Inter. Excess t-test SC-S SCR-ts Excess t-test SC-S SCR-ts
Return Resid. Return Resid.
-9 0.0497 10.65 0.0251 3.11 -0.0447 -5.43 -0.0344 -3.21
-8 - - -0:0328 4.47 0.0218 13.37 -0.0471 -5.65 -0.0311 -4.72
-7 0.0662 5.50 0.0466 5.26 -0.0273 -2.38 -0.0271 -2.79
-6 0.0847 12.97 0.0631 5.17 -0.0315 -4.52 -0.0208 -2.91
-5 0.0965 8.26 0.0551 5.10 -0.0375 -4.79 -0.0121 -2.21
-4 0.0817 13.11 0.0788 4.22 -0.0761 -10.16 -0.0561 -11.66
-3 0.0799 13.74 0.0597 8.73 -0.0498 -13.95 -0.0351 -8.90
-2 0.0506 5.03 0.0517 6.10 -0.0815 -4.39 -0.0639 -8.72
-1 0.0210 2.71 0.0188 3.18 -0.0584 -9.59 -0.0641 -9.95
0 -0.0111 -0.66 -0.0029 -1.28 -0.0214 -2.79 -0.0124 -3.93
1 0.0711 4.73 0.0249 2.20 0.0158 1.44 -0.0102 -1.91
2 0.0433 2.98 0.0362 4.41 -0.0428 -5.18 -0.0311 -3.63
3 0.0221 2.18 0.0191 2.64 -0.0387 -4.43 -0.0231 -2.49
4 0.0285 4.36 0.0388 4.10 -0.0274 -3.50 -0.0166 -2.14
5 0.0121 2.89 0.0192 2.97 -0.0121 -3.62 -0.0112 -2.13
6 0.0312 4.65 0.0236 4.91 0.0126 1.38 -0.0107 -2.48
7 0.0265 2.00 0.0117 2.12 -0.0232 -8.56 -0.0176 -3.15
8 0.0134 2.63 0.0128 2.62 -0.0098 -2.99 -0.0118 -3.53
9 0.0067 2.18 0.0107 2.30 -0.0052 -2.44 -0.0019 -2.12
The Table shows the Excess Returns, with the corresponding t-test, together with the 
Standardised Cross-Sectional Residuals and the Standardised Cross-Sectional test for 
trades in the 6 NMS - 45 NMS trade size bracket. Excess returns are calculated as:
R  Rdtjlm Rdtjlm BR(d—\)tm
where Rdijtm represents the interval-to-interval return for trades executed in the home 
market over the interval period and BR^-i ) tm  is benchmark interval-to-interval returns. 
Standardised Cross-Sectional Residuals are calculated as follows:
S R ^  = E R ^ / S D ^ y j  1 +  ^
where BR(d-i) tm is the average interval-to-interval returns obtained for the benchmark.
where price reversals are detected. However, the individual abnormal returns 
in each interval are not statistically significant at the 5 % confidence level.
Additional tests were carried out to investigate whether the results ob­
tained above are sensitive to the inclusion of large trades for which the event 
window period stretches over two consecutive trades. The results from drop­
ping these large trades, in terms of both the abnormal returns for single 
intervals and for the CARs, are not statistically different from the results ob­
tained above. In addition, another test was carried out to investigate whether 
the basic results axe sensitive to the inclusion of the opening trade in the case 
of large trades for which the event window period stretches over two consec­
utive trades. The basic results are not influenced when the opening trade is 
included.
The pattern of the price impacts found is different than those found by 
Holthausen et ah (1990) and Gemmill (1996). The pattern found here shows 
that the price impact starts materialising some time before the trade is re­
ported as having been executed but with an interval-to-interval mean returns 
that axe relatively small.
Most of the mean excess returns which are statistically significant have 
the expected signs, i.e. positive for large purchase trades in London and 
negative for large sale trades and this is consistent with the view that large 
buy trades signal good news while large sales are signal for bad news. For a 
small number of intervals, the mean excess returns have the opposite expected 
sign and are not statistically significant. This occurs mainly after a number 
of intervals in which the mean excess returns are relatively high. This could 
imply that there is a price correction following periods characterised by price 
overreaction. The number of intervals with anomalous signs get smaller as 
the size bracket increases.
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There is also a clear indication that the SEAQ-I’s one-hour publication 
delay does not appear to be holding prices in the home markets from ad­
justing to their new equilibrium before the trade is actually published by the 
LSE. This result is consistent with similar results obtained by Board and 
Sutcliffe (1995) and Gemmill (1996). In particular, the publication delay is 
unnecessarily long, in that the price adjustment process is fully implemented 
by the time the large trade is published by the LSE.
The general pattern of price impacts does not materially^ change when the 
standardized returns and the standardized cross-sectional test are used. How­
ever, with the same level of abnormal performance but high event-induced 
variance, the standardized cross-sectional test appears to be rejecting the 
null hypothesis less frequently when compared to the traditional test. This 
would imply that the event-induced variance generated by a large trade is 
likely to be higher in Paris and the IE compared to IBIS.
2.5.2 Permanent Price Impacts
A number of studies (Kraus and Stoll 1972, Ball and Finn 1983, Holthausen 
et al. 1987, Holtahusen et al 1990, Board and Sutcliffe 1995, and Gemmill 
1996) document the temporary and permanent price effects produced by large 
trades executed in the same equity market. In general, defining P as the 
pre-block price, Pb as the price at which the block trade is executed and Pps 
as the post-block price, the temporary price effect is measured as ln(Pb/Pps), 
the permanent price effect is given by ln(Pp3/Ppr) and the total price effect 
is measured as ln{Pb/Pw ).
The transactions data used in Section 2.4 is used to calculate the perma­
nent price impacts produced by the large trades included in the sample. Since 
the large trade is not itself executed in the home market it is not possible 
to obtain Pb and hence both the temporary price effect and the total price
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effects cannot be reasonably inferred. However, the permanent price effects 
can be calculated by using prices over time intervals before and after the 
large trade’s execution time which are free from the large trade’s influences.
For each trade, the prices Ppr are calculated at time interval -20 and Pps 
are calculated at time interval +20. The mean excess returns in these inter­
vals are not statistically significant and they have adjacent time intervals with 
statistically insignificant mean excess returns. The permanent price impacts 
for large trades are matched with the permanent price impacts produced by 
trades smaller than 2 X NMS for the same security and transacted during 
the benchmark period employed in Section 2.4.
Table 9 shows the results with the mean difference between the price 
impacts produced by small trades and large trades in each size bracket. The 
t-statistics, which test whether the mean difference between small and large 
trades is significantly different than zero, show that the null hypothesis of 
zero mean difference can be rejected at the 1% confidence level, confirming 
that large trades do produce a permanent price impact. The sell large trades 
appear to be producing a slightly different price impact pattern for the three 
cross-quoted securities groups. The results also show that rebalancing on 
IBIS trading system produces the lowest price impact for each trade size 
when compared to the price impact obtained on CAC and IE.
In addition, the Kruskal-Wallis test to examine the permanent price im­
pact differences across the different trade sizes was run. The p-values show 
that the price impact are not statistically significant different across trade 
sizes.
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Table 9: Permanent price impacts in home markets
P a n e l  A : L a r g e  B u y  T r a d e s
Paris Bourse Deutsche Borse Italian Exchange
6 NMS - 15 NMS 0.5928* 0.4676* 0.5829*
16 NMS - 25 NMS 0.7007* 0.5845* 0.7869*
26 NMS - 35 NMS 0.8541* 0.7007* 0.9049*
36 NMS - 45 NMS 0.8891* 0.7161* 0.9411*
46 NMS - 55 NMS 0.8535* 0.7368* 0.9599*
56 NMS - 65 NMS 0.8109* 0.7221* 0.8736*
66 NMS - 75 NMS 0.7853* 0.6788* 0.8510*
> 2NMS 0.0021 0.0015 0.0028
p- value of differences 0.481 0.266 0.291
across NMS sizes
P a n e l  B : L a r g e  S el l  T r a d e s
6 NMS - 15 NMS -0.5326* -0.4282* -0.6128*
16 NMS - 25 NMS -0.6288* -0.4511* -0.7661*
26 NMS - 35 NMS -0.7897* -0.5052* -0.6664*
36 NMS - 45 NMS -0.7996* -0.5178* 0.6831*
46 NMS - 55 NMS -0.7677* -0.5251* -0.6981*
56 NMS - 65 NMS -0.7836* -0.4936* -0.6841*
66 NMS - 75 NMS -0.7131* -0.4294* -0.6088*
> 2NMS -0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0041
p-value of differences 0.411 0.564 0.122
across NMS sizes
Each large trade for cross-quoted securities is put into different size brackets in terms 
of NMS and the permanent price impact is calculated as ln(Pps/Ppr) where the prices 
Ppr are calculated at time interval -20 and Pps are calculated at time interval +20. The 
permanent price impacts for large trades are matched with the permanent price impacts 
produced by trades smaller than 2 X NMS for the same security and transacted during 
the benchmark period.
An (*) indicates that the mean difference between the permanent price impact of a large 
trade in the different size brackets and the price impact of a trade smaller than 2 NMS is 
statistically significantly different than zero.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is used to examine the mean permanent price impact difference 
across the different trade size groups.
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Figure 1. Excess returns in the home markets before and after the SEAQ-I large buy trade
(6-45 NMS)
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Figure 2. Excess returns in the home markets before and after the SEAQ-I large sell trade
(6-45 NMS)
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Figure 7. CARs in the home markets generated by the SEAQ-I large buy trade
(46-75 NMS)
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Figure 8. CARs in the home markets generated by the SEAQ-I large sell trade
(46-75 NMS)
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These results, together with the one obtained for the buy (large) trades, 
are in line with the Seppi (1990) conjecture regarding the type of trades 
executed in the upstairs market. It is quite possible that very large trades are 
actually liquidity-motivated, rather than information-motivated, and hence 
produce a price impact of the same level or lower than trades which are 
relatively smaller but contain trade information.
2.5.3 Regression Results
Following the results obtained from the event-study methodology, a regres­
sion model was run to analyse the simultaneous effects of various trading 
factors, where no filtering rules are employed and hence the entire sample of 
large trades is considered.
Excess returns are calculated in the same way as used for the event-study 
methodology. As in that case, the London-executed large trade is used to 
define the trade size class and the time of execution fixes the initial time 
of interval 0. The interval-to-interval excess returns are calculated over the 
interval period that starts from interval -25 until time interval +25.
The benchmark returns are calculated in a different way, than described 
above, to accommodate the high number of large trades and their distribution 
in the trading day which produces overlapping event-windows for different 
large trades. In the case that two clear hours between one large trade’s event 
window and another large trade’s event window exist, benchmark returns are 
calculated using the interval-to-interval returns over this two-hour period. If 
in one particular trading day this benchmark period is not available, the 
benchmark returns are provided by the most recent two hours which are 
clear of any effect produced by other large trades.
The dependent variable is the mean interval-to-interval excess returns in 
the home markets over the two hours before and two hours after the large
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trade in London.
The independent variables are chosen in the following way:
a. Volumes on the home market: If London market makers use the home 
markets to rebalance their trading positions on the LSE then a large order 
executed in London will generate higher volumes in the home markets as 
market makers re-establish the optimal inventory position. In this case, we 
use total volume transacted in the home markets from interval -25 until 
time interval +25. We use the logarithmic change in the volume from the 
benchmark period to each time interval.
b. Volumes on the London market: London market makers can also use 
SEAQ-I market, in conjunction with the home markets, to fetch liquidity for 
the rebalancing of their trading positions. This is expected generate higher 
volumes on SEAQ-I as market makers re-establish their optimal inventory 
position. In line with (a) above, we use total volume transacted on SEAQ-I 
from interval -25 until time interval +25 and employ the logarithmic change 
in the volume from the benchmark period to each time interval.
c. Interval dummy: The time interval to capture the price pattern seen in 
the event-study methodology above where the price impact is not a one-shot 
phenomenon but rather a protracted process over a long period, before and 
after the large trade is executed. In order to model the price impact over the 
interval period, a number of dummy variables are used to identify different 
intervals. Interval Dummy 1 takes a value of 1 for the excess returns in the 
interval period between interval -25 to interval -15 and 0 otherwise; Interval 
Dummy 2 takes a value of 1 for the excess returns in the interval period 
between interval -14 to interval 0 and 0 otherwise; Interval Dummy 3 takes a 
value of 1 for the excess returns in the interval period between interval 1 to 
interval +15 and 0 otherwise; and Interval Dummy 4 takes a value of 1 for
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the excess returns in the interval period between interval 4-16 to 4-25 and 0 
otherwise.
d. Trade size: The size of the trade executed to investigate whether the 
price impact is increasing in size. Dummy variables are used to capture the 
trade size effects. In order to be consistent, different trades are grouped 
using the same classification criteria used for the event-study methodology, 
namely (i) trades between 6 NMS to 15 NMS; (ii) trades between 16 NMS 
to 35 NMS; and (iii) trades between 36 NMS to 75 NMS._
e. Activity in the market: Number of trades in the four hours immediately 
before the large trade’s execution to control for the level of market activity 
and clustering of trades. Section 2.4.4 shows that large trades are mainly 
clustered within one hour of each other with very few trades taking place 
within two, three or four hours of each other. These patterns could cause a 
clustering problem that is likely to reflect in the price impacts produced by 
each individual large trade. If two or more large trades of the same trade 
direction are executed few minutes of each other, the price impact is expected 
to be larger than when one trade is executed.
f. Time o f the day: Hour of the trading day is used to capture (i) the 
time of the day effects and (ii) the behaviour of SEAQ-I market makers who 
are likely to become more aggressive in rebalancing large trades executed 
in London as the available trading time decreases. In addition, the price 
impacts produced in the last trading hour are expected to be higher than for 
other trading hours due to the ‘deadline effect’.8 Dummy variables are used 
for every trading hour.
g. Trade type: The type of trade to control for the presence of put-
8This is in line with Roth et al (1988) who conducted a simulated experiment to test for 
patterns of bargaining across time and found that the most visible phenomenon was a very 
high percentage of agreements being reached just before the deadline for the negotiations.
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throughs in the data set. The put-throughs’ characteristics imply that these 
trades are not expected to generate any price impact which is directly at­
tributable to the market makers’ inventory management since immediate re­
balancing takes place in two opposing directions and undertaken for the same 
volume. It is also possible that put-throughs do not touch in any way the 
home markets in that market makers find the counter-party for such trades 
directly in London. However, put-throughs’ characteristics do not necessarily 
imply no price impact since these trades can generate information flows to 
the market makers involved in the trade. The dummy variable takes on a 
value of 1 if the trade is not a put-through and 0 if it is a put-through.
The following regression model is estimated:
AERtim  =  ao+PiAHVoltiTn+P2A F V o lti+P2DU7nmyi /  In tervalt+/33Sizei+
(3 4 A ctivitym+ (3 bD um m ym /  T im e o f  day+(36Dummyi /  Trade Type+ttim
(7)
In order to avoid multicollinearity, four dummy variables (one each from 
the groups of dummies) are dropped from the estimation procedure. The 
interval dummy 1, the trade size dummy 1, the dummy variable for the 4th 
trading hour and the dummy for the time gap 4 were dropped and their 
impact will be reflected in the intercept. Dummy variables in the model 
must be interpreted with respect to the dummies dropped in each group.
As suggested by results obtained by Hausman et al. (1992), true price 
innovations are heteroskedastic, one reason being the calendar time difference 
between one trade and another. It is suspected that, due to the mentioned 
reason and others, there is a time-varying conditional variance. While the 
coefficients are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, the standard errors 
are adjusted for conditional heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using 
White’s (1980) methodology.
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Table 10: Regression results of the price impacts
French securities German securities Italian securities 
Buys Sales Buys Sales Buys Sales
Intercept 0.0511 -0.0497 0.0385 -0.0302 0.0455 -0.0404
(3.144) (-2.981) (2.415) (-2.177) (2.912) (-2.889)
Volume (home) 0.0047 -0.0041 0.0037 -0.0038 0.0055 -0.0061
(2.273) (-2.216) (2.061) (-2.94) (4.141) (-4.716)
Volume (SEAQ-I) 0.0028 -0.0026 0.0025 -0.0021 0.0035 -0.0039
(2.016) (1.945) (2.158) (1.961) (2.192) (2.851)
Interval dummy 2 0.0041 -0.0047 0.0027 -0.0112 0.0051 -0.0056
(2.294) (-3.118) (4.723) (-3.868) (6.375) (-4.771)
Interval dummy 3 0.0038 -0.0042 0.0021 -0.0019 0.0058 -0.0048
(2.133) (-2.969) (2.648) (-2.768) (5.341) (-4.661)
Trade size dummy 2 0.0109 -0.0167 0.0121 -0.0158 0.0301 -0.0314
(2.628) (-4.128) (2.814) (-3.515) (2.283) (-2.114)
Trade size dummy 3 0.0108 -0.0145 0.0109 -0.0122 0.0319 -0.0328
(2.039) (-2.498) (1.977) (-1.992) (2.681) (-2.304)
Buy trades (interval) 0.0036 0.0014 0.0023 0.0011 0.0013 0.0016
(4.345) (2.796) (2.818) (1.983) (2.054) (2.108)
Sell trades (interval) -0.0024 -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0034
(-2.673) (-2.303) (-2.373) (-1.608) (-1.444) (-3.909)
R2 10.92 9.12 9.51 10.96 12.72 13.82
For all large trades in cross-quoted securities, the following regression model is estimated:
AERum  =  &o +  Pi AHVoltim  +  P2 AFVolti +  PzDummyi /  In te rv a l  +  /?4 Si zei 
+(3bA ctivitym +  p§Dummym /  T im e o f  day +  (37Dummyi /  Trade Type -1- eti
where A E R  are the average excess returns calculated from interval -25 until interval +25, 
A H V ol is the logarithmic change in the transacted volume in the home market from the 
benchmark period to each interval, AF V olti is the logarithmic change in the transacted 
volume on SEAQ-I from the benchmark period to each interval, D um m y  /  Interval is 
a dummy variable to denote the intervals within the 4 hour period around the large trade, 
Si ze is the size of the trade on SEAQ-T, Activity  is to the number of trades in the two 
hours before the large trade’s execution, D um m y  /  Tim e o f  day is a dummy variable 
capturing the time of the day effect, while D um m y  /  Trade Type is a dummy variable 
to control for the type of trade (presence of put-through trades).
The t-statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) standard errors.
The results from the regression model, shown in Table 10, lead to the 
following major conclusions:
a. As expected, transacted volume in the home market rises around 
the execution of the large trade on SEAQ-I market and this produces a 
substantial impact on the prices observed in the home markets. This result 
suggests that, indeed, rebalancing, or part of it, is taking place on the home 
markets and this accounts for the price impact observed above.
b. Transacted volume also increases on SEAQ-I around the execution 
of the large trade. This result implies that London market makers search 
for liquidity on the London market in conjunction with the pre- and post­
positioning on the home markets. One major implication is that SEAQ-I 
is an “active market” that allows the re-balancing of part of the inventory 
positions through trading with counter-parties rather than just a place that 
has a limited role, mainly for the “book-keeping” of trades that are then 
entirely worked in the home markets.
c. In all three home markets, the price impact recorded over the interval 
period from interval -14 to interval +15 are statistically significant and this 
result shows that the price impact takes place slowly over these intervals 
and in the hypothesised direction. In some cases large buy trades carry 
higher impacts compared to the large sell trades but this is not a consistent 
phenomenon.
d. The type of trade dummy variable is statistically significant and holds 
the hypothesized sign implying that the price impact produced by non-paired 
trades is different than that of paired trades.
e. There is contrasting evidence on the trade size dummies’ impact, al­
though most of these dummy variables are statistically significant. In the 
case of the IE, the trade size seems to matter for both large purchase and
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sale trades with the price impact getting marginally bigger as the trade size 
gets larger. However, the difference between the price impacts does not seem 
to be economically significant. The same cannot be said for the French and 
German cross-quoted securities. Indeed the results show that the price im­
pact for the trades included in the 36-75 NMS trade size group (the biggest 
trades in our sample) is slightly lower when compared to the price impact 
produced by the second trade size groups and this result holds for both buy 
and sell large trades._______
f. Most of the coefficients for the time of the trading day are statisti­
cally significant and in the hypothesized direction. This implies that as the 
trading day’s close nears, any rebalancing that takes place becomes more 
aggressive, causing larger price impacts towards the close. In particular, for 
most home markets the last trading time coefficients are larger than most of 
the results obtained for other trading times which could imply that pre- and 
post-positioning in the home markets becomes very aggressive in the final 
hour of trading.
g. In general, the number of large buy trades and large sell trades in the 
two hour interval prior to each trade seems to have an influence on the price 
impacts of large trades. The existence of large buy trades appear to lead to 
an increase in the price impact produced by a buy large trade while having 
a dampening effect on the price impact produced by sell large trades. The 
opposite effect is produced by the number of sell large trades.
2.5.4 Volatility Levels
If SEAQ-I large trades generate uncertainty in the home markets around 
the time when these trades are executed, then it is expected that market 
participants in the home markets will increase the bid-ask spreads to cover 
themselves from the increased risk. This behaviour is expected to be captured
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by the volatility tests computed for each home market.
The first investigation of the impact of large trades on home markets’ 
volatility levels is conducted through the conventional variance ratios. We 
consider a sample with the same large trades employed in Section 2.4, and 
applying the same filter rules used before. The unconditional volatility of 
the interval-to-interval returns (in the home markets) during the benchmark 
period is obtained. Following this, the unconditional volatility of the interval- 
to-interval returns (in the home markets) in the one hour before and one 
hour after the reporting of the large trade on SEAQ-I are calculated. The 
two variance ratios are measured as follows:
V a r i a n c e  R a t iO ( p Te_ large trade) == 0 /  d  d  ' \
(J  \£ J
V a r i a n c e  R a tiO (^ os\,- large trade) =  2 /  d  D ' \
er K ( d —X)ji)
For each security j  and each large trade Z, the interval-to-interval returns 
in the hour before (denoted as period x) and the hour after (denoted as 
period y) the execution of the large trade on SEAQ-I are computed and 
the variance of these returns, a2{RdjXi) and cr2(Rdjyi), is then derived. This 
level of variance is then compared with the variance obtained for the same 
security j  in the benchmark period, cr2(BR(d-i)ji), which is given by the 
corresponding four hours of trading for that security in the day previous the 
large London trade’s execution.
Tables 11-13 show that, in general, the large trade on SEAQ-I increases 
the returns volatility in the hour before and after the execution of the large 
trades. The results also show that volatility is lower on the IBIS system 
which combines dealership and auction characteristics, suggesting that the
maklers trading on the system provide a higher level of price stabilisation
compared to the order book used by the Paris Bourse and the IE.
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Table 11: Variance Ratios for French cross-quoted securities around
the execution of large trade
H o u r  b e f o r e H o u r  a f t e r
Alcatel Alsthom 2.48* 2.36*
(15.83) (22.89)
AXA 1.92* 2.28*
(9.79) (18.42)
BNP 2.31* 2.52*
(14.84) (16.67)
Elf Aquitaine 2.35* 1.78*
(16.67) (11.72)
Paribas 3.29* 2.81*
(23.44) (17.22)
Peugeot 3.99* 2.25*
(25.96) (18.61)
Rhone-Poul. 3.40* 2.32*
(22.85) (16.63)
Schneider 3.24* 3.15*
(22.85) (26.29)
Societe General 2.81* 2.09*
(18.79) (18.55)
UAP 2.06* 2.18*
(18.51) (19.77)
A l l  F r e n c h 3.15* 2.68*
(24.91) (16.59)
The Table shows the Variance Ratio for interval-to-interval returns volatility 
one hour before and one hour after the large trade is reported on SEAQ-I 
over the interval-to-interval returns volatility during the benchmark period. 
The Variance Ratio for the hour before the SEAQ-I trade is calculated as:
Variance Ratio  =  ■ <
For each security j  and each large trade I, interval-to-interval returns in period 
x  (1 hour before the SEAQ-I trade) are computed and the variance of these 
returns, a 2(Rjit), is then derived.
This variance is compared with the variance obtained for the same security 
j  in the benchmark period.
The null hypothesis for individual securities is tested employing Lagrange 
Multiplier test; whereas for the whole sample the Wald Statistic is utilised.
An asterisk denotes significance at the 1 % level.
Table 12: Variance Ratios for Italian cross-quoted securities around
execution of large trade
H o u r  b e f o r e  H o u r  a f t e r
Assicurazioni Generali 2.58* 3.54*
(18.17) (32.11)
BCI 3.38* 2.96*
(22.72) (27.38)
Benetton Group 3.78* 2.02*
(29.98) (21.33)
Credito Italiano 3.15* 2.67*
(29.22) (24.58)
FIAT 2.83* 1.91*
(15.34) (9.68)
Istituto San Paolo 4.49* 3.53*
(26.18) (28.71)
Mediobanca 3.54* 2.65*
(28.22) (28.08)
Olivetti 3.86* 2.77*
(23.79) (15.47)
STET 2.94* 1.39
(21.47) (9.18)
Telecom Italia 2.63* 3.82*
(17.48) (31.16)
A ll  It a l ia n 3 .6 8 * 2.97*
(2 9 .8 6 ) (25.36)
The Table shows the Variance Ratio for interval-to-interval returns volatility 
one hour before and one hour after the large trade is reported on SEAQ-I 
over the interval-to-interval returns volatility during the benchmark period. 
The Variance Ratio for the hour before the SEAQ-I trade is calculated as:
Variance Ratio  =  \
For each security j  and each large trade Z, interval-to-interval returns in period 
x  (1 hour before the SEAQ-I trade) are computed and the variance of these 
returns, cr2{Rdjxi)M then derived.
This variance is compared with the variance obtained for the same security 
j  in the benchmark period.
The null hypothesis for individual securities is tested employing Lagrange 
Multiplier test; whereas for the whole sample the Wald Statistic is utilised.
An asterisk denotes significance at the 1 % level.
Following the first test, we augment the sample of large trades considered 
in the first test in order to test whether the result holds when a larger sample 
of large trades is considered. For this second test, the third and fourth filter 
rules which were used in the event study methodology in Section 2.4.2 were 
applied. However, the first and second filter rules were changed so that only 
those large trade which occurred within less than one hour from each other 
are removed from the sample. In this way, a larger number of trades is 
captured and, thus, volatility impacts could be measured for a larger sample 
of trades.
The event window is found using the same technique explained in Section 
2.4. However, instead of using the interval-to-interval returns, the volatility 
tests will use the trade-to-trade returns for the group of trades within each 
interval in both the event window period and the benchmark period. As is 
the case for the event study methodology, the volatility tests use only the 
trades that take place in the home markets within the event period. For 
each security j  and each large trade I, the trade-to-trade returns in interval i 
placed in the event window are computed and the variance of these returns, 
a 2( R j u ) ,  is then derived.
The volatility level is then compared with the volatility obtained for the 
same security j  in each interval i in the benchmark period, which is given by 
the corresponding four hours of trading for that security in the day previous 
to the large London trade execution. The trade-to-trade returns within each 
interval i in the benchmark period are obtained for each security j  and each 
London large trade I and the variance of these benchmark returns, a 2( B R j i ) ,  
are then obtained.
Following this, an F-test was computed in the following way:
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Figure 9. Price volatility in the home markets before and after the SEAQ-I large buy trade
(6-45 NMS)
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Figure 10. Price volatility in the home markets before and after the SEAQ-I large sell trade
(6-45 NMS)
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Figure 11. Price volatility in the home markets before and after the SEAQ-I large buy trade
(46-75 NMS)
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Figure 12. Price volatility in the home markets before and after the SEAQ-I large sell trade
(46-75 NMS)
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Fja =  ^ ( R j u V A B R j i )  (10)
for i =  —24......+  23
Figures 8-12 show that volatility is highest in the case of large trades 
executed for French cross-quoted securities. For both buy and sell trades 
within the three trade size groups, the London-executed large trades appear 
to induce high returns volatility for the trades within the event period exe­
cuted in the same security on the Paris Bourse. Volatility is protracted over 
a number of intervals before and after the trade is reported as having been 
executed on SEAQ-I. The same pattern is noticed for the large trades for the 
Italian cross-quoted securities.
The volatility levels induced by London large trades on IBIS appear to be 
generally limited to few intervals before the large trade is actually executed 
on SEAQ-I. In addition, the volatility levels appear to be materially smaller 
than those obtained for the Paris Bourse and the IE.
The F  — test analysis shows that the increase in the returns volatility 
levels for the cross-quoted securities traded on both the Paris Bourse and 
the IE around the execution of the large trades on SEAQ-I is statistically 
significant and spans a number of time intervals. The F-test also indicates 
that the increase in returns volatility for the cross-quoted securities traded 
on the IBIS system is limited to few time intervals, generally to the time 
intervals before the trade is reported as executed.
To test hypothesis 5, volatility in auction markets is compared with 
volatility in the hybrid market using the following model:
N
Volatji= OiQ+Pi’M a r (32M C a p j- \- (3 $ B E /M E ^ V o lj i_ 1 +  ^   ^(3§DTjtt~\~£ji
k=1
(11)
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Table 13: Variance Ratios around the execution of large trades o f
French cross-quoted securities
L a r g e  B u y  T r a d e s  L a r g e  S e l l  T r a d e s
Interval Trade Size 1 TradeSize 2 Trade Size 1 Trade Size 2
-9 1.86* 2.02* 2.01* 2.35*
-8 2.04* 2.26* 2.16* 2.75*
-7 2.28* 2.41*----------- 2.26* 2.73*
-6 2.56* 2.62* 2.83* 2.82*
-5 2.68* 2.86* 2.97* 3.04*
-4 2.76* 2.98* 3.07* 3.14*
-3 2.82* 3.02* 3.14* 3.21*
-2 2.88* 3.04* 3.30* 3.38*
-1 3.01* 3.28* 3.57* 3.66*
0 3.08* 3.24* 3.52* 3.61*
1 3.15* 3.37* 3.68* 3.77*
2 3.36* 3.45* 3.77* 3.87*
3 3.42* 3.52* 3.84* 3.94*
4 3.44* 3.54* 3.86* 3.97*
5 3.39* 3.49* 3.81* 3.91*
6 3.36* 3.45* 3.77* 3.87*
7 3.38* 3.48* 3.79* 3.89*
8 3.16* 3.25* 3.53* 3.63*
9 3.06* 3.14* 3.42* 3.51*
The Table shows the Variance Ratio for trade-to-trade returns volatility around 
the time when the large trade is reported as executed on SEAQ-I over the trade 
returns volatility during the benchmark period. The Variance Ratio, calculated 
in the home markets, is measured as:
F j i t  =  ^ ( R ^ / a ^ B R a )
For each security j  and each large trade I, trade-to-trade returns in interval i is 
obtained and the variance of these returns, a 2(Rju), is then derived. This 
variance is compared with the variance obtained for the same security j  in the 
benchmark period.
Large trades are classified in (a) Size 1 (trade sizes of 6-45 NMS), and (b) Size 2 
(trade sizes of 46-75 NMS).
An asterisk denotes significance at the 1 % level.
Table 14: Variance Ratios around the execution of large trades of
German cross-quoted securities
L a r g e  B u y  T r a d e s  L a r g e  S e l l  T r a d e s
Interval Trade Size 1 Trade Size 2 Trade Size 1 Trade Size 2
-9 1.61 1.68 1.62 1.62
-8 1.62 1.61 1.66 1.63
-7 - 1.74* 1.76* 1.74* 1.92*
-6 1.89* 1.92* 1.96* 2.04*
-5 1.96* 2.12* 2.05* 2.21*
-4 2.04* 2.14* 2.15* 2.36*
-3 2.14* 2.32* 2.26* 2.41*
-2 2.25* 2.46* 2.37* 2.37*
-1 2.36* 2.51* 2.42* 2.59*
0 2.42* 2.56* 2.47* 2.64*
1 2.66* 2.69* 2.59* 2.72*
2 2.68* 2.72* 2.69* 2.68*
3 2.59* 2.75* 2.72* 2.74*
4 2.29* 2.67* 2.71* 2.72*
5 2.16* 2.43* 2.52* 2.66*
6 2.02* 2.28* 2.48* 2.54*
7 1.91* 2.02* 2.29* 2.26*
8 1.73* 1.83* 2.07* 2.09*
9 1.65 1.75* 1.78* 1.96*
The Table shows the Variance Ratio for trade-to-trade returns volatility around 
the time when the large trade is reported as executed on SEAQ-I over the trade 
returns volatility during the benchmark period. The Variance Ratio, calculated 
in the home markets, is measured as:
F ji t  =
For each security j  and each large trade Z, trade-to-trade returns in interval i is 
obtained and the variance of these returns, <r2( R j n ) ,  is then derived. This 
variance is compared with the variance obtained for the same security j  in the 
benchmark period.
Large trades are classified in (a) Size 1 (trade sizes of 6-45 NMS), and (b) Size 2 
(trade sizes of 46-75 NMS).
An asterisk denotes significance at the 1 % level.
Table 15: Variance Ratios around the execution of large trades of
Italian cross-quoted securities
L a r g e  B u y  T r a d e s  L a r g e  S e l l  T r a d e s
Interval Trade Size 1 Trade Size 2 Trade Size 1 Trade Size 2
-9 2.49* 2.52* 2.92* 2.97*
-8 2.58* 2.61* 3.03* 3.09*
-7 2.56* 2.59* 3.01* 3.06*
-6 2.71* 2.75* 3.21* 3.26*
-5 2.84* 2.88* 3.37* 3.43*
-4 2.93* 2.97* 3.48* 3.55*
-3 2.98* 3.04* 3.57* 3.64*
-2 3.15* 3.21* 3.77* 3.84*
-1 3.41* 3.45* 4.09* 4.17*
0 3.36* 3.41* 4.03* 4.12*
1 3.52* 3.55* 4.22* 4.31*
2 3.59* 3.64* 4.33* 4.42*
3 3.66* 3.71* 4.42* 4.51*
4 3.68* 3.73* 4.44* 4.54*
5 3.62* 3.68* 4.37* 4.46*
6 3.59* 3.64* 4.32* 4.42*
7 3.61* 3.67* 4.36* 4.45*
8 3.37* 3.42* 4.05* 4.13*
9 3.26* 3.31* 3.91* 3.98*
The Table shows the Variance Ratio for trade-to-trade returns volatility around 
the time when the large trade is reported as executed on SEAQ-I over the trade 
returns volatility during the benchmark period. The Variance Ratio, calculated 
in the home markets, is measured as:
Fju =
For each security j  and each large trade /, trade-to-trade returns in interval i is 
obtained and the variance of these returns, a 2(Rju), is then derived. This 
variance is compared with the variance obtained for the same security j  in the 
benchmark period.
Large trades are classified in (a) Size 1 (trade sizes of 6-45 NMS), and (b) Size 2 
(trade sizes of 46-75 NMS).
An asterisk denotes significance at the 1 % level.
for i =  —24.... +24 and where M arji is a dummy variable which takes the
value of 1 if the trade takes place on IBIS and 0 if the trade is executed on 
either the Paris Bourse or the IE; M Cap  is the log of the firm’s capitalisation 
(in £ to create a common measure through the different markets) in January 
1996; B E /M E  is the ratio of the book to market for each firm measured in 
January 1996; Vol is the log of the volume (in number of shares) in interval 
2 — 1; and D T  is the time of the day dummy variable. This regression model 
is chosen in order to test whether the market design has any impact on 
the price volatility generated by large trade while controlling for (a) firm 
characteristics; (b) trading activity in the market; and (c) time of the day 
effects that have been found in empirical literature to influence volatility 
measures during the trading day.
It is expected that if returns volatility is lower on IBIS, /31 should have a 
negative sign. The estimation results show that /31 =  -0.0716 with a t-statistic 
of 2.88 implying that volatility is significantly lower on IBIS compared to the 
Paris Bourse and the IE. Hence, hypothesis 5 cannot be accepted.
These results have important implications in relation to the optimal de­
sign of markets. It is found that a trading platform that allows a substantial 
intervention of market makers produces a more orderly market when a large 
order is placed in the marketplace. The potential impact and the uncertainty 
associated with such orders could be quite high and this could damage the 
market’s quality, generating more inefficient prices and can decrease traders’ 
participation in the market, leading to lower volumes transacted.
2.6 Conclusions
This Chapter investigated the impacts produced by block trades in cross­
quoted securities in an inter-market set-up, with different trading systems in
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operation in the home and foreign markets.
The large trades executed on SEAQ-I produce a permanent impact on the 
price levels obtained in the home markets with the impact being larger in the 
case of continuous auction systems (the Paris Bourse and IE) and lower in a 
trading system that combines auction and dealership characteristics (IBIS).
The results obtained from both the event-study methodology and the 
regression model show that the price impact in each home market takes place 
in a protracted fashion rather than as a one-shot phenomenon. Moreover, 
the price impact starts manifesting itself in the home markets some time 
before the trade is actually reported as executed on the foreign market. This 
implies that there are information leakages that occur before the trade is 
executed, possibly due to market makers’ pre-positioning strategies in the 
home markets.
Another result worth noticing is that there is sufficient time after the 
trade’s execution over which trading profits (before charging transaction 
costs) can be made by market participants who are aware of the existence of 
the large trade before the trade information is published. Hence, hypotheses 
1 and 2 are both rejected.
The permanent price impacts show that such impacts are not increasing 
in trade size. This implies either that the information contained in the very 
large trades is actually lower than that contained in (large) trades of relatively 
smaller size (possibly implying that very large trades are generally executed 
by liquidity traders who can credibly signal their true trading motivation) 
or that pre- and post-trade positioning for the very large trades is not as 
aggressive as for block trades of smaller sizes. This means that hypothesis 3 
cannot be rejected.
The price impact is implemented by the time the LSE publishes the trade
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information, indicating that any asymmetric information that arises from a 
large trade is fully utilised by market participants, at least those aware of the 
large trade, before the relevant trade information is published. This evidence 
could be interpreted in a slightly different way - market participants aware 
of the large trade take advantage of the 1 hour publication delay on the LSE 
and trade on this information either for inventory or for profit motives. This 
leads us not to reject hypothesis 4.
Finally, volatility tests computed for the three home markets demonstrate 
that the returns volatility around the time when a block trade is executed 
is higher in home markets that use continuous auction trading systems com­
pared to the returns volatility found in a hybrid system that contains sub­
stantial dealership characteristics. Hence, hypothesis 5 is not accepted.
This result implies that, as hypothesized by Madhavan (1992), the strate­
gic behaviour of market participants, mainly limit order traders, present in 
the continuous auction markets produce higher levels of returns volatility, 
following a trading shock such as a large order, compared to the volatil­
ity actually generated in a trading system that provides dealership liquidity. 
From a policy-making point of view, this is an important issue because it 
sheds light on the optimal design of markets and the impact that trading 
mechanisms have on orderly markets.
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Chapter 3. Spreads and Their Components
3.1 Introduction
In the recent past we have witnessed a wide-ranging debate among market 
practitioners, regulators and academics regarding the benefits of screen-based 
trading systems and automated order execution systems together with the 
appropriate role of mandatory (or voluntary) dealers in such markets. While 
major markets have introduced or enhanced screen-based trading, there has 
been a re-appraisal of dealers’ contributions towards improving liquidity pro­
vision and market quality
A very important issue related to this debate is the level and evolution of 
trading costs in different market microstructures. The spread paid by traders 
is important to the entire gamut of investors: small traders’ costs have come 
under close scrutiny from regulators while they can also impact on the prof­
itability of portfolio managers’ positions. Furthermore, these trading costs 
directly reflect the level of frictions in financial markets and it is important 
to investigate the sources of these frictions.
Some of the most important reforms undertaken by Exchanges have fo­
cused on decreasing trading costs. But the success of these reforms depends 
heavily to our ability to understand the different sources of these frictions.
The major purpose of this Chapter is exploring the possible finks be­
tween the mark-up charged by the suppliers of liquidity in different markets 
- the bid-ask spread - and market structures. This analysis is carried out 
through an empirical investigation of the trading costs (both quoted and ef­
fective spreads) in a multiple dealer market set-up (London Stock Exchange’s 
SEAQ system), a pure limit order book market set-up (Paris Bourse’s CAC 
system) and a screen-based hybrid trading system (Deutsche Borse’s IBIS 
platform). These three systems differ in terms of information dissemination
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(pre- and post-trade transparency), level of competition, cost structures and 
institutional design.
But should different market microstructures influence the levels and for­
mation of the spreads? Existing literature, making use of the differences 
between the “traditional” dealership versus auction systems, provides a pos­
itive answer. It is because of this reason that hybrid trading systems are 
getting more attention and their attributes, in terms of liquidity provision, 
price formation and spread levels are being investigated.
Viswanathan and Wang (1998) provide a theoretical background for the 
comparison between the different trading systems ((i) dealership, (ii) limit 
order book, and (iii) hybrid) through a welfare comparison of the different 
market structures. They make use of the trade-off between the bid reduction 
effect (that takes place in both the auction and the dealership markets but in 
opposing directions as the trade size increases) and the zero-quantity spread 
to show that a risk-neutral customer would choose an auction system when 
the number of market makers is low and the variability of the trade size is 
low. The dealership system is chosen by a risk-averse customer when the 
number of market makers is large and the variability of the trade size is high.
They show that a hybrid structure, an environment where trades smaller 
than an exogenously fixed level are channelled to the limit order book while 
bigger sizes are submitted to a dealership mechanism, dominates the pure 
dealership system wherever this type of architecture is found to improve on 
the auction system. The main conclusion is that “when the cutoff point (in 
terms of trade size) is chosen appropriately, the hybrid limit-order book/dealership 
market generates higher trading profits for the customer than the pure deal­
ership market” (Viswanathan and Wang, 1998).
The issue relating to the level of execution costs is receiving substantial
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attention both from academics and regulators. NASDAQ has undergone 
through a number of reforms, aimed at increasing competition and reducing 
transaction costs. Barclay et al. (1997) find that trading costs on NASDAQ 
fell after the reforms. The same appears to have happened for the execution 
of small orders on the LSE since the introduction of the limit order book in 
October 1997, although spreads at the open have widened (Naik and Yadav, 
1999).
In view of these developments, this Chapter analyses the absolute levels 
and the components of the bid-ask spread developing in different systems, 
considering, for the first time, two screen-based systems that differ in terms 
of the interaction between public traders and designated dealers. Another 
interesting issue considered here is whether the level of dealers competition 
and their market power can contribute towards our understanding of trading 
costs.
In order to carry out a meaningful analysis, comparable orders must be 
found across the three different trading systems. Due to different institutional 
designs, it is likely that orders submitted to the different systems would have 
different sizes. This complicates our analysis since a comparison of trading 
costs can only be carried out while keeping order size constant. In view 
of this, we use the Normal Market Size (defined as 2.5 % of average daily 
volume transacted in the previous three months on each market) measure to 
standardise order sizes. The comparisons will be drawn on order within the 
same NMS size brackets.
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on spread formation and spread components. Section 
3 presents the data and the methodology used for the analysis. Sections 4 and 
5 present the results for quoted and effective spreads on competing market
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microstructures with Section 6 providing the results for the decomposition 
of the spread.
3.2 Literature R eview
3.2.1 Real Resources
Following Bagehot (1971), the bid-ask spread can be decomposed into two 
major segments. The first part is represented by the monopoly power, the 
order processing costs and inventory costs sustained by market makers in 
the course of their business. The second segment refers to the presence of 
asymmetric information in the market that leads market makers to set prices 
in a way to protect themselves from the presence of traders with superior 
information. Stoll (1978b), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll 
(1981), Ho and Macris (1985) and Laux (1995) have modelled the trading 
friction as being due to the real resources incurred in the process of executing 
orders. Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) have 
focused on the adverse information part.
Suppliers of immediacy require real economic resources to execute orders 
submitted to the marker and then to settle trades once executed. The ex­
penses incurred - to get capital and labour - must be covered by the final 
customers. Besides these operational expenses, liquidity suppliers sometimes 
deviate from their optimal inventory policy so as to provide immediacy when­
ever it is required. This inventory risk must be compensated. Finally, the 
dealers’ market power is one of the possible contributors to market frictions 
since such agents can use their power to widen the spread relative to their 
costs.
In particular, Ho and Macris (1985) use the dealers’ collective ability to 
adjust inventory levels, arguing that market depth is increasing in the number
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of dealers present on the market. This benefit, however, is achieved at a 
cost represented by wider bid-ask spreads. A multiple dealer market set-up 
enhances the collective ability to absorb imbalances in inventory levels while 
competition limits the individual power of each dealer on the bid-ask quotes. 
In this set-up, transaction of large orders is facilitated but the community of 
dealers will pay higher costs for carrying more inventory.
Ho and Macris also argue that dealers’ fixed costs, such as the opportunity 
costs of dealers’ time, increase proportionately with the number of dealers on 
the market. These higher fixed and inventory costs are expected to translate 
into wider bid-ask spreads in dealership markets.
3.2.2 Information in the Market
Another view of the spread is based on trade information that exists in the 
market to explain why market makers set wide bid-ask spreads. This ap­
proach can be divided into two branches: (a) one based on the free trading 
option, and (b) the other based on the presence of asymmetric informa­
tion. Copeland and Galai (1983) models the first approach while Easley and 
O’Hara (1987), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Glosten (1989, 1994) model 
the second approach.
Suppliers of immediacy provide free options to traders and their position 
becomes more difficult at times when the arrival of information is intense. 
Because posting and adjusting/removing quotes takes time, suppliers of im­
mediacy can suffer at times when new information hits the market since 
informed traders can “pick off” these quotes. In such a scenario, if dealers 
(or limit order traders) are not fast enough in adjusting existing quotes they 
will lose out. In view of this, the spread exists to compensate suppliers of 
immediacy for the option they grant to the rest of the market.
The second branch is based on the presence of asymmetric information.
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Dealers face the danger that their firm quotes will be accepted by traders 
with superior information. Market makers axe aware that there are investors 
with superior information and they widen the spread in order to offset the 
losses th6y incur when trading with informed traders. In other words, the 
adverse selection component is the reward paid to market makers for provid­
ing liquidity when there is the risk of trading with superior informed traders. 
In equilibrium, the spread has to cover these possible losses.
Continuing in this vein, Glosten (1989) argues that, due to adverse se­
lection, cross-subsidisation between different types of trades will occur. The 
market maker is expected to lose out to informed traders and tries to re­
cover this lost revenue by earning excessive profits from liquidity-motivated 
traders. The question that arises relates to the type of market microstructure 
that is most likely to be effective in protecting traders against the presence 
of adverse selection.
One possible approach is to classify markets on the “centralised - frag­
mented” continuum, depending on whether orders submitted to the market 
axe channelled to one location or whether they axe submitted to different 
dealers who do not share trading information amongst themselves. Dealer­
ship markets, such as the telephone broking system in operation on the LSE, 
NASDAQ, the foreign exchange markets and the Treasury bond markets axe 
classified as fragmented markets since trading occurs through bilateral nego­
tiation, whereas the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the USA and the 
Cotation AssistSe en Continu (CAC) system used by the Paris Bourse axe 
classified as centralised markets.
The underlying difference between the two market set-ups refers to market 
participants’ ability to view the order flow and the price discovery process. 
In centralised markets, information about the (i) order flow, (ii) bidding by
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other market participants, and (iii) trades and volumes executed is readily 
available given that pre-trade transparency is higher in a centralised market.
In this sense, the dealers’ information set in centralised markets is richer 
than the corresponding sets of market makers in fragmented dealership mar­
kets. Hence, centralised markets are expected to deal more effectively with 
private information. In view of this, the adverse selection component of 
the spread should be lower in centralised markets compared to fragmented 
systems.
Rock (1991) provides a further extension, using the specialist structure 
employed by the NYSE to show that the specialist has two alternatives for 
trading - either to take up the order himself or let it trade against the limit 
orders submitted to the market. This flexibility is expected to limit the 
specialist’s losses due to adverse selection. On the other hand, Benveniste, 
Marcus and Wilhelm (1992) show how the specialist could have enough power 
to discipline informed traders leading to a reduction of the losses suffered by 
the market makers community from adverse selection.
However, Biais (1993), modelling the fragmented market similarly to a 
Dutch auction (sealed bid) and the centralised market along the vein of Ho 
and Stoll (1983), shows that the expected bid-ask spread in a fragmented 
market is expected to be the same as the spread generated by a centralised 
market, achieving the irrelevancy argument. What differs between the two 
markets is the volatility of the spread whereby volatility is expected to be 
higher in the centralised market.
3.2.3 Trading Practices
A useful extension to these arguments is provided by considering the trading 
practices, mainly the practice of preferencing, internalisation and collusion, 
existing in different markets. Preferencing is a trade practice whereby an
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order is directed to a market maker not posting the best quotes but, because 
of best execution arrangements, provides an assurance that the order will be 
executed at the best quoted price in the market.
Internalisation occurs when a broker routes his order flow to the market 
maker belonging to the same firm. Both the LSE and NASDAQ allow the 
practices of preferencing and best execution of the order flow. “Soft dollar” 
arrangements (which provide an incentive for internalisation) are not illegal. 
Such arrangements are less likely to take place in screen-based systems.
These arrangements are expected to have a material impact on how mar­
ket makers deal with adverse selection. Preferencing and internalisation im­
ply that a long-term business relationship is built between the trader (es­
pecially the institutional investor) and the market maker in a way that the 
latter should, adopting the Huang and Stoll (1996) terminology, “know their 
order flow” . This means that market makers know their clients well enough 
that they can extract information from the order flow submitted to them, 
thus being able to effectively protect themselves from adverse selection.
According to Battalio and Holden (1996), Kandel and Marx (1996) and 
Dutta and Madhavan (1997), preferencing and arrangements of best execu­
tion go against Bertrand competition since the order flow is rendered insen­
sitive to quote changes. Under these circumstances, there are low incentives 
to engage into aggressive quote revisions since posting better quotes will not 
necessarily increase the order flow to the market maker posting the best 
quotes. The expected outcomes are (a) wider bid-ask spreads, (b) worse 
execution quality, and (c) higher market maker profits being generated.
The possibility of collusion between market makers must also be investi­
gated further, given the evidence of Christie and Schultz (1994) in relation 
to implicit collusion among NASDAQ market makers.
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Preferenced order flow can only lead to better execution if trades occur 
within the best quotes; this is what normally happens when trade negotiation 
takes place. In turn, it is likely that negotiation occurs for larger trades, 
submitted by institutional investors, rather than for small orders. In line 
with Harris (1993) and Grossman et al. (1997), this feature of dealership 
markets can account for the differential treatment of small and larger orders, 
also found for SEAQ trades. However, negotiation within the spreads is not 
a costless activity since it normally involves searching costs for the dealer 
who is able to provide the best execution terms (Harris 1993 and Grossman 
et al. 1997). In view of this, a trader who wants immediacy but no searching 
costs will decide in favour of preferencing his order flow but the quality of 
execution is expected to be worse than that obtained by a patient trader who 
is willing to search for the best quotes submitted by dealers.
On their part, Rhodes-Kropf (1997) show that negotiation leads to wide 
spreads since dealers know that there will be an amount of negotiation taking 
place and prices will be improved from the wide spreads. It is expected that 
negotiation is more likely to take place for certain traders, especially larger 
ones. The model shows that wider spreads will obtain for those traders who 
cannot negotiate and a differential treatment of orders on the same market.
3.2.4 Empirical Evidence
Empirical research has provided useful insights how various trading behav­
iours and incentives influence the spread and its formation. Huang and 
Stoll (1996) use 175 paired securities on NASDAQ and NYSE and show 
that quoted spreads, effective half spreads and perfect foresight spreads are 
wider for the paired securities trading on NASDAQ compared to NYSE.
One possible explanation for such a result can be that the NASDAQ 
market does not protect effectively against the presence of adverse selection.
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However, Huang and Stoll found that (a) realised half spreads are still higher 
on NASDAQ compared to NYSE; and (b) adverse selection component of 
the effective half spread is effectively bigger on NYSE than on NASDAQ. 
These results imply that adverse selection is not an appropriate explanation 
why bid-ask spreads are wider on NASDAQ compared to NYSE.
The reforms implemented in NASDAQ, in January 1997, were aimed 
at enforcing mandatory display of customer limit orders leading to more 
competitive quotes. According to the new rules (imposed by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission), when a NASDAQ dealer receives a customer 
limit order he has four alternative ways to transact the order: (a) use his 
inventory to accommodate the order; (b) send the order to another dealer 
for execution; (c) push the order through a proprietary trading system; or 
(d) post the order through the system by specifying the quote price and the 
quote size.
Barclay et al. (1997) find that the rule change, allowing wider scope 
for limit orders to be submitted to the market, narrowed the quoted and 
effective spreads by some 30% from the pre-reform trading. The biggest 
drop in transaction costs were actually registered for the widest spreads. The 
narrowing of the spread was not obtained at the cost of a lower liquidity; in 
fact, market depth was not materially affected after the rule change.
Naik and Yadav (1999) investigate the impact of the reforms carried out 
by the LSE after October 1997 when the FTSE-100 securities started trading 
on the order book system called SETS. They show that, although SETS had 
only attracted about 20%-30% of public trades, there was an appreciable 
impact on the spreads for these securities. When the first hour of trading 
is excluded (spreads in the opening hour widened appreciably after SETS’s 
introduction), the average effective spread decreased significantly from the
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period when FTSE-100 securities were traded exclusively in a dealership 
system (1996 and 1994). These results confirm those obtained for NASDAQ 
after the reforms enacted in January 1997.
Besides the literature based on spread’s behaviour following system changes, 
there is also some work based on preferencing’s impact on execution terms. 
Hansch et al. (1998) provide empirical evidence of the profitability of trad­
ing practices practiced by market makers on SEAQ and their impact on the 
quality of execution. They found that preferenced trades face worse execu­
tion terms than non-preferenced trades without market makers executing the 
preferenced order flow realising higher trading profits.
Some branches of the literature have investigated the interactions between 
market orders and limit orders in centralised markets. One such study is by 
Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) on the Paris Bourse who found that (a) large 
market orders (by Paris Bourse levels; such orders are larger than the depth 
at the quotes submitted) are only partially executed; (b) the remaining part 
of the market order which is unexecuted is converted into a limit order; (c) 
following a market order coming on the market, there is a high probability 
that the next order will come in to provide liquidity to the market order; 
(d) the evidence shows that substantial monitoring from outside the book, 
on the state of affairs in the book, takes place with traders investigating and 
waiting for advantageous trading opportunities to submit their orders. Most 
of the order flow is placed at or inside the bid-ask quote, with a large part of 
the order placements improving upon the best quotes in the market. These 
improvements on each side of the market occur in quick succession, reflecting 
the competition in the supply of liquidity. The authors argue that this result 
is due to the tradeoff faced by traders in such cases: when the market is 
already deep, the only way for orders to execute is for traders to undercut
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the existing quotes, creating competition on that side of the market.
Biais et al. (1995) also find that “after large sales (purchases), which 
consume liquidity at the quote and thus induce a decrease in the bid (increase 
the ask), there is often a new sell (buy) order placed within the quotes, 
which generates a decrease in the best ask (increase the best bid) and reflects 
the adjustment in the market expectation to the information content of the 
trade.” (Biais et a l, 1995)
3.3 H ypotheses
The hypotheses to be tested in this Chapter deal with, on one hand, the 
absolute level of the bid-ask spreads in the three different market systems 
and, on the other, the adverse selection components of the spread.
Hypothesis lo -  By facilitating the matching of buy and sell orders without 
the need of the intervention from a market maker and allowing the submission 
of public orders that increase competition, both IB IS  and CAC will produce 
lower bid-ask spreads compared to SEAQ.
Hypothesis 2 o'- Since both IBIS and CAC allow public traders to submit 
competing orders to compete with designated dealers, the two systems should 
produce spreads that are not statistically different from one another.
Hypothesis 2o draws on theoretical and empirical work, reviewed above, 
which shows that allowing different traders to compete with each other is 
expected to increase competition for the order flow and reducing the bid- 
ask spread on screen-based systems. As far as total operational costs are 
concerned, screen-based systems are perceived to be more cost-effective com­
pared to dealership markets. The former leave investors (both the public 
and market members) the freedom to trade against each other without the 
presence of an intermediary, leading to a reduction of execution costs.
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In addition, limit orders are intrinsically different than market orders 
(the only type submitted in a dealership market). Limit orders are price- 
contingent orders that have to be priced aggressively otherwise they become 
stale and run the risk of being ‘picked off’. This outcome is particularly true 
when market conditions change fast.
The arguments used for Hypothesis 2o are an extension of the arguments 
mentioned above. If, as it has emerged from previous studies, an auction 
system has the ability to reduce transaction costs mainly due to its trading 
architecture based on limit orders submitted to the order book, than IBIS 
should produce bid-ask spreads that axe not statistically significantly different 
from those on CAC.
Hypothesis 3 o ' Given that screen-based systems centrally collect all avail­
able information used by market participants, it is expected that such an 
arrangement will provide better protection to liquidity suppliers from traders 
who possess superior trade information. This should reduce the adverse selec­
tion component of the bid-ask spread in auction systems compared to dealer­
ship markets. Hence, the adverse selection component of SEAQ trades must 
be higher than for IB IS  and CAC trades.
Hypothesis 3 a ' The trading relationships between market makers and 
their customers together with the trading practices on dealership markets, 
such as preferencing and internalisation, allow market makers to extract in­
formation from their order flow. In this way, they can more easily separate 
liquidity-oriented from information-oriented traders. Hence, it is expected 
that the adverse selection component for IBIS and CAC trades will be bigger 
than for SEAQ trades.
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3.4 M ethodology and D ata
3.4.1 M ethodology
A natural sample for such a comparison would be the cross-quoted securities 
across European exchanges. De Jong et al. (1993) compare bid-ask spreads 
for French securities cross-quoted on the Paris Bourse and SEAQ-I. Their 
study uses data from 1991, at a time when quoted spreads on SEAQ-I were 
firm and London market makers were committing substantial capital to make 
markets in such securities.
These arrangements appear to have changed and spreads on SEAQ-I now 
only serve for advertising purposes with firm quotes available after contact­
ing directly the market maker. This makes the publicly disseminated quotes 
data very unreliable. Other well-documented problems include trade report­
ing for securities listed on London’s SEAQ-I (Jacquillat and Gresse 1995, 
Pagano and Steil 1995). In view of these problems, it was decided to ignore 
cross-quoted securities and match securities on the different Exchanges on a 
different basis.
There are a number of alternative pairing technologies which can be de­
vised. For example, the one used by Booth et al (1995) is based on pairing 
securities between IBIS, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and NASDAQ was 
based on the level of transacted volume for individual securities. Although 
this pairing exercise provides some advantages, chief amongst them is the 
ease of devising the paired sample, it ignores the possible impact of individ­
ual firm characteristics, such as the sector, size, growth prospects etc., on 
the bid-ask spread which could damage the pairing process.
Considering these constraints, we must identify a number of proxies for 
securities’ risk across different markets in order to pair securities in a mean­
ingful way. The pairing exercise is considered to be fundamental for our
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purpose, in that securities with similar risk characteristics across different 
trading systems must be chosen to effectively control for the impact of a 
number of firm-specific characteristics together with institutional differences, 
on the bid-ask spreads.
One possible starting point is the application of the Fama-French (1992) 
framework, whereby securities are paired based on firm characteristics, such 
as book-to-market and market capitalisation. However, such a framework 
can be perceived as restrictive when applied in a cross-country and cross­
system environment. In view of this, the Heston et al. (1998) framework for 
European securities must be closely considered.
Hence, the major objective here is to devise a paired sample based on 
similar risk characteristics leaving institutional differences to explain the dif­
ferences between the bid-ask spreads registered for the different markets. We 
employ the Fama and French (1992) and the Heston et al. (1998) to pair 
securities across markets. Appendix B reviews the Fama and French (1992) 
and the Heston et al. (1998) methodologies.
The first pairing exercise is based on the Fama-French (1992) framework 
and takes into consideration three major factors. First, paired securities 
across markets must be in the same industrial sector. Secondly, the securi­
ties were paired so as to minimise the “book-to market” values (Book Eq­
uity/Market Equity) and “size” (Market Equity) premiums differences across 
the exchanges.
The statistics used are those obtained for December 1995. Pairs were 
deleted if
B E / M E sk -  B E / M E t j  
1 (B E / M E sk +  B E J M E t j )  /  2 U  '
or
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. MEsk -  MEtj . —--------- - —  > 0.401 (M E sk +  M E tj) /  2 1 “
where the subscripts sk  and t j  refers to security s trading on market k and 
security t trading on market j .
This deletion process is undertaken to avoid pairs with securities listed in 
the same industrial sector but having value and size premia far apart from
each other, making the spread analysis very difficult.
Having carried out the first pairing exercise, the second one is imple­
mented based on the Heston et al. (1998) framework. The first condition 
is that paired securities must be in the same industrial sector. Following 
this condition, pairing took place in terms of minimising the Beta and ME 
differences across securities trading on different systems. Pairs in the second 
exercise were deleted if
. Betaak — B etatj
(Betask +  Betatj) /  2
or
M E sk -  M E tj |
> 0.40
>0.401 (M E sk +  M E tj) /  2 
where the subscripts have the same meanings as in the first pairing exer­
cise.
These pairing exercises are similar, but not identical, to the Huang and 
Stoll (1996) methodology used to pair securities from the NYSE and NAS­
DAQ. The methodology used for this study does not merely attempt to 
minimise differences between different factors but imposes a ceiling for these 
differences. The two pairing exercises were run and there were no major 
differences neither in terms of the companies nor in the results obtained. In 
view of these similarities, we reproduce the results obtained from the second 
pairing exercise.
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The pairing exercises are done at two different levels to capture different 
security samples. First, SEAQ securities were paired with CAC securities 
and IBIS securities. This pairing exercise produces the sample of securities 
used for the SEAQ-CAC and SEAQ-IBIS comparisons. Hence, we have the 
samples of securities for the “Dealership-Limit Order Book” (henceforth “D- 
B”) and the “Dealership-Hybrid” (henceforth “D-H”) comparisons.
Following this, the second pairing exercise was undertaken whereby IBIS 
securities were paired with CAC securities for the “Limit Order Book-Hybrid” 
(henceforth “B-H”) comparison.
Tables 16 and 17 provide the characteristics of the D-B and D-H matched 
samples, dividing the samples according to firms’ size. The whole list of 
matched securities is provided in Appendix C. Tables 16, 17 and 18 show 
that the matched securities have ME/BE and ME characteristics very similar 
to each other.
In general, the market capitalisation of SEAQ securities is larger than 
for CAC securities whereas the BE/ME magnitude of CAC securities is mar­
ginally higher than that of SEAQ securities. As regards the D-H matched 
sample, Table 17 shows that SEAQ securities, with the exception of the 
smaller firms, have a lower market capitalisation but a larger ME/BE ratio 
compared to IBIS securities. Beta for the matched samples are also similar.
The major difference between the matched samples that arises from Ta­
bles 16 and 18 is the share price level. The share prices of SEAQ securities 
are materially lower when compared to the share prices of CAC and IBIS 
securities (in £, using the share price in the respective currencies and the 
sterling exchange rate as at the end of 29 December 1995).
When this difference was investigated further, it was found that the num­
ber of outstanding shares is much higher for SEAQ securities compared to
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Table 16: Firms’ characteristics of SEAQ-CAC paired securities
P a n e l  A: SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  CAC s e c u r i t i e s
Market Cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size . . - ..............
Portfolio I 1,162.04 2.207 0.71 2.95
Portfolio II 3,321.99 2.468 0.81 4.24
Portfolio III 12,062.87 1.988 0.86 5.15
P a n e l  B: CAC s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s
Market Cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size
Portfolio I 1,026.57 2.485 0.80 36.17
Portfolio II 3,599.02 3.203 0.92 38.43
Portfolio III 9,515.36 2.192 0.96 56.76
The three firm capitalisation categories were obtained on the basis of the firm’s 
market capitalisation as at the end of December 1995. Portfolio I contains firms 
with market capitalisation of less than £2,500m; Portfolio II contains firms with 
capitalisation larger than £2,500m but lower than £5,000m; while Portfolio III 
has firms with a capitalisation larger than £5,000m.
Market capitalisation, ME/BE, beta and price were extracted from Datastream 
and refer to values obtained at the end of December 1995. Reported statistics 
refer to mean values.
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Table 17: Firm s’ characteristics of SEAQ-D3IS paired securities
P a n e l  A: SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  IBIS s e c u r i t i e s
Market cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size----------
Portfolio I 1,918.67 1.987 0.85 2.56
Portfolio II 3,493.10 2.316 0.83 4.91
Portfolio III 12,711.94 2.932 0.96 6.72
P a n e l  B: IBIS s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s
Market cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size
Portfolio I 1,495.26 2.011 0.94 83.74
Portfolio II 3,033.65 1.955 0.92 92.08
Portfolio III 15,228.97 2.606 1.05 149.51
The three firm capitalisation categories were obtained on the basis of the firm’s 
market capitalisation as at the end of December 1995. Portfolio I contains firms 
with market capitalisation of less than £2,500m; Portfolio II contains firms with 
capitalisation larger than £2,500m but lower than £5,000m; while Portfolio III 
has firms with a capitalisation larger than £5,000m.
Market capitalisation, ME/BE, beta and price were extracted from Datastream 
and refer to values obtained at the end of December 1995. Reported statistics 
refer to mean values.
Table 18: Firms’ char act eristics of CAC-IBIS paired securities
P a n e l  A: CAC s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  IBIS s e c u r i t i e s
Market cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size
Portfolio I 1,426.52 2.682 0.96 42.81
Portfolio II 3,981.66 3.438 0.98 48.92
Portfolio III 15,291.22 2.894 1.06 62.29
P a n e l  B: IBIS s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  CAC s e c u r i t i e s  
____________ Market cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta______ Mean Price (£)
Firm size
Portfolio I 1,581.21 2.251 0.98 85.81
Portfolio II 3,624.16 2.105 1.02 94.41
Portfolio III 16,181.02 2.511 1.10 152.81
The three firm capitalisation categories were obtained on the basis of the firm’s 
market capitalisation as at the end of December 1995. Portfolio I contains firms 
with market capitalisation of less than £2,500m; Portfolio II contains firms with 
capitalisation larger than £2,500m but lower than £5,000m; while Portfolio III 
has firms with a capitalisation larger than £5,000m.
Market capitalisation, ME/BE, beta and price were extracted from Datastream 
and refer to values obtained at the end of December 1995. Reported statistics 
refer to mean values.
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both IBIS and CAC securities. This confirms the conjecture that share prices 
differ across countries due to different share capital structures and corporate 
governance mechanisms adopted by firms in different countries.
The substantial difference in the outstanding shares is bound to generate 
differences in the volume of shares traded and, as a consequence, the mean 
trade sizes transacted on different markets. Tables 19 and 20 show that 
the mean daily volume and the mean trade size are much bigger for SEAQ 
securities compared to IBIS and CAC securities.
In such a scenario, when outstanding shares are very different across 
markets, a number of difficulties can arise when calculating transaction costs 
across different systems. To solve this problem, a common trade yardstick is 
devised to rank trades. Following the pairing exercise, the Normal Market 
Size (NMS) for each security was calculated using the same methodology 
adopted by the LSE.
The NMS statistics for the different samples are shown in Tables 19 and 
20. Trades were ranked in the following classification: (a) “small trades” are 
smaller than 0.5 X NMS; (b) “medium trades” are those between 0.5 X NMS 
and smaller than 1 X NMS; and (c) “large trades” axe those of at least 1 X 
NMS.
The quoted and effective spreads are calculated over the period of con­
tinuous trading on the CAC and IBIS systems and for the Mandatory Quote 
Period on SEAQ. The effective spreads on CAC and IBIS were also mea­
sured one second before trades are executed. This methodology has been 
undertaken since trades on order driven platforms can potentially alter the 
effective spread.
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Table 19: Trading characteristics of SEAQ-CAC paired securities
P a n e l  A: SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  CAC s e c u r i t i e s
Issued shares Daily volume Mean NMS Mean trade size 
(in 000) (Mean)
Firm size
Portfolio I -642,419 3,078,873 5,996
Portfolio II 1,584,064 3,212,327 18,931
Portfolio III 3,997,531 3,380,847 38,758
P a n e l  B: CAC s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s
Issued shares Daily volume Mean NMS Mean trade size 
(in 000) (Mean)
Firm size
Portfolio I 151,409 347,843 1,050 651
Portfolio II 172,439 386,424 2,735 427
Portfolio III 309,011 428,722 6,722 389
The three firm capitalisation categories were obtained on the basis of the firm’s 
market capitalisation as at the end of December 1995. Portfolio I contains firms 
with market capitalisation of less than £2,500m; Portfolio II contains firms with 
capitalisation larger than £2,500m but lower than £5,000m; while the remaining 
firms with a capitalisation larger than £5,000m are classified in Portfolio III.
Outstanding shares is the number of shares issued by each firm as of December 
1995. Mean daily volume is the average volume in shares transacted during the 
period under consideration. NMS is the mean value of the Normal Market Size 
in December 1995. Mean volume per trade is the average trade size transacted 
over the period considered.
13,212
16,828
21,770
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Table 20: Trading characteristics for SEAQ-IBIS paired securities
P a n e l  A: SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  IBIS s e c u r i t i e s
Issued shares Daily volume Mean NMS Mean trade size 
(in 000) (Mean)
Firm size
Portfolio I 962,312 3,092,677 6,150
Portfolio II 1,449,424 3,526,483 18,357
Portfolio III 1,693,028 3,713,465 56,718
P a n e l  B: IBIS s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s
Issued shares Daily volume Mean NMS Mean trade size 
(in 000) (Mean)
Firm size
Portfolio I 59,932 204,524 957 2,083
Portfolio II 121,913 254,618 1,497 1,455
Portfolio III 459,897 1,242,054 10,079 3,280
The three firm capitalisation categories were obtained on the basis of the firm’s 
market capitalisation as at the end of December 1995. Portfolio I contains firms 
with marketcapitalisation of less than £2,500m; Portfolio II containsfirms with 
capitalisation larger than £2,500m but lower than £5,000m; while the remaining 
firms with capitalisation larger than £5,000m are classified in Portfolio III.
Outstanding shares is the number of shares issued by each firm as of December 
1995. Mean daily volume is the average volume in shares transacted during the 
period under consideration. NMS is the mean value of the Normal Market Size 
for each firm in December 1995. Mean volume per trade is the average trade 
size transacted over the period considered.
10,706
16,641
21,513
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3.4.2 Test Procedure
After obtaining the measure of spreads for different trade sizes, we test 
whether the mean spread for each trade size class differs across the three 
different trading platforms. The traditional t — test is not deemed to be 
appropriate in our case since the mean spreads obtained for each market 
come from different distributions. A more appropriate methodology is the 
boostrapping technology based on permutation tests is applied to test for 
statistical significance.
The major application of permutation tests is to the two-sample prob­
lem. In our case, when we pair two different markets we obtain observa­
tions of the mean quoted and effective spreads sa =  (sia)S2a, •••> 5na) and 
Sb =  (si6,2/265 •••> Vnb) where sa is the mean spread from the first market and Sb 
is the spread from the second market being paired. It is assumed that these 
observations are drawn from different probability distributions F a and G b .
Having observed sa and s*,, we want to examine whether the null hypoth­
esis of no difference between the two population distributions, F a and G b  is 
correct: i.e. there is no difference between the probabilistic behaviour of a 
random sa or a random s*,.
In this Chapter we make use of the Fisher’s permutation test to investigate 
the null hypothesis that the level of spreads across the different markets are 
the same (hence F a =  G b ) . We combine all the spread observations from the 
two markets being paired at each time, in all m  -I- n  observations from both 
groups together. Following this, a sample of size m  without replacement 
is taken from the combined sample to represent the first group with the 
remaining n observations constituting the second group. We compute the 
difference between group means and then repeat this process 10,500 times.
The Achieved Significance Level (henceforth the “ASL”) is obtained after
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making 10,500 replications of the different measures of quoted and effective 
spread from each trading system. This number of replications allow us to 
obtain confidence levels lower than 0.025. Further background to the permu­
tation tests is provided in Appendix D.
3.4.3 D ata
Tirades and quotes data for SEAQ stocks were obtained from the LSE’s 
Quality of Markets Department, whereas the Paris Bourse provided data 
for CAC securities. Data for IBIS securities was obtained from two sources: 
trades data was provided by the Institut fur Entscheidungstheorie und Un- 
ternehmensforschung of the University of Karlsruhe whereas the Institut fur 
Geld- und Kapitalverkehr at the University of Hamburg provided the quotes 
data.
There are substantial differences in the type of data across the different 
Exchanges. For the Paris Bourse, trades and quotes data come together 
with the orders data, providing exact information as to the types of orders 
submitted on the limit order book, the quantity for each order and the time 
limit for each order.
On the other hand, data for IBIS contains the best bid and best ask 
quotes at each point in time (generated from the order book by an algorithm 
used by Institut fur Geld- und Kapitalverkehr). However, due to lack of 
sufficient order data (mainly the history of the order flow), the order book 
itself cannot be built for IBIS securities.
Data for the LSE contains the trades data together with the best bid and 
best ask prices (the so-called yellow strip) with the relevant information as 
to the counter-parties for each trade. No order book was in operation for 
SEAQ during the January-June 1996 period. Only Agent to Market Maker 
trades (the so-called Customer trades) are extracted from the data.
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Trade classification for the different markets was carried out through three 
different methodologies. For SEAQ trades, the Board and Sutcliffe (1995) 
methodology was used. In this algorithm, a transaction is assigned a buy 
(sell) record if the transaction represents a purchase from (sale to) the market 
maker.
For CAC trades, the trade direction could not be inferred directly from 
the trade file. Hence, the best bid and best ask prices were obtained in 
continuous time and merged with the trades data to classify trade direction 
for each trade. For transactions executed inside the spread, the Harris (1989) 
methodology was used. Using this algorithm, trades are classified as buys if 
they are closer to the ask and as sells if they are closer to the bid price. This 
approach leaves trades executed at the mid-quote unclassified. In the sample 
used, there were 3.11% of all transactions carried out at the midquote and 
these records are removed from the sample.
For trades executed on IBIS, direction is decided by using a version of the 
tick test proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) under which trades are classified 
as buys if they occur on an uptick or zero-uptick and sells if they occur on a 
downtick or zero-downtick. As fax as the quotes data for the three markets is 
concerned, bid-ask quotes are removed from the data if either the bid price 
or the ask price axe reported as being 0.
It should be noted that the time accuracy of trades’ reported execution 
varies across the different markets. Trades on CAC and IBIS axe reported 
to the nearest second and the nearest hundredth of a second respectively. 
Trades on SEAQ axe time-stamped to the nearest second but market makers 
had up to three minutes to report it to the LSE.
The delay on SEAQ is bound to increase the measurement error of the 
effective spread at the time of trade execution. Under certain circumstances,
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this lack of accuracy could lead to a downward bias in SEAQ’s transaction 
costs. For example, Porter and Weaver (1995) found that NASDAQ dealers 
take advantage of the allowed window of 90 seconds to report trades to ‘paint 
the tape’ to their advantage. If similar practices occur on SEAQ then it is 
expected that measures of transaction costs will be downward biased. In 
order to attempt a solution to this problem, the analysis is rim three times 
with SEAQ’s reported transaction times anticipated by one, two and three 
minutes respectively.
3.5 Spreads on Different Trading A rchitectures
This Section analyses the execution costs for different trades on the three 
trading systems. Quotes submitted by market makers represent the costs of 
immediacy on SEAQ while the limit order book provides the cost of imme­
diacy for trades executed on CAC and IBIS.
The quoted spread on SEAQ is the difference between the best bid and 
best ask prices submitted by the market makers (the so-called yellow strip). 
On both CAC and IBIS the quoted spreads are measured by the difference 
between the bid and ask prices submitted by limit orders for different trade 
sizes.
The spreads in this Section are all measured in percentage to normalise 
over the three markets, each using a different currency for the price, ask and 
bid quotes.
3.5.1 Quoted Spreads
The first methodology is based on a “crude” measurement of the difference 
between the best ask and bid prices at each point in time in the following 
way:
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rw ask pricet — bid pricet% spreadt =  100 • - — ----------    (12)
midpricet
The second approximation for the average quoted spread was obtained 
through the calendar-time average of spreads for the different markets in the 
following way:
% spreadc (m) =
N
i=l i=l
i fj. x \  ~-l abK PrLCC lci) — m a p r ic e  [tj, x\ ; u  + x
I U U -2 ^ ( . t i+1 ti) m f c - * ! , .  J  / 2 ^ ^ + l  H>
N
i=l
as/: price [£*, x]  bid rice [£*, x] 
midprice [t*, x]
(13)
where U is the calendar time index of the ith change in the best bid and 
best ask prices, ask price [£*, x] is the ask price at time U for order of size m, 
bid price is the bid price at time U for order of size m and N  denotes 
the number of changes in the best prices. This measure of the calendar-time 
average provides the average quoted spread for a particular transaction size 
by averaging the spread for all smaller trades denoted by x.
The major drawback of the calendar-time average quoted spread is that 
equal weights are allocated to heavy-trading and low-trading periods. In 
line with de Jong et al. (1993), the transaction-time average is calculated 
conditional on the time that elapses between one trade and another in the 
following way:
% spread'T (m ) =  100--jr EEN m r (ask price \ti,x] — bid price [U, x])N i=l x=l midprice [U,x]
where U still denotes the calendar time index of transaction i.
/  m  
(14)
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3.5.2 Effective Spreads
The quoted spread is neither the only methodology nor the optimal technique 
that can be used in order to measure trading costs. First, some transactions, 
especially those involving medium-sized and large orders, do not necessarily 
take place at the best bid or ask prices. The price for such orders could be 
negotiated, with the execution taking place within the spread.
This process takes place both on dealership and order book markets, al­
beit through a different mechanism. For example, SEAQ market makers who 
submit quotes appear to be willing to trade inside the spread and improve 
on the best prices quoted at the time when a larger order is submitted. In 
this case, best quotes can be perceived to be a starting point for negotiation.
On the other hand, the Paris Bourse allows crosses to be made and these 
are expected to be the product of negotiation between two counterparties 
and take place within the spread. Principal trades in the top 53 stocks which 
exceed the Normal Block Size (the £NBS’ is defined by the Paris Bourse and it 
is an order whose size is approximately 2.5% of average daily trading volume 
in the preceding three months) are not bound to satisfy orders in the central 
book. Such orders can be transacted within the weighted average CAC spread 
(the fourchette moyenne ponderee which, according to the Paris Bourse’s 
rules, is ‘based upon the average prices that are formed, after weighting 
of prices by number of shares, by the interaction of buy and sell orders 
that are posted on the central market’) rather than the narrower fourchette. 
Furthermore, hidden orders are allowed to be placed on the limit order book 
without any visibility except when they are executed and are subsequently 
reported to the Bourse.
Furthermore, one has to consider that even on markets expected to ex­
ecute trades at the best quotes, such as the screen-based system used by
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CAC and IBIS, there is a transaction cost difference between patient trading 
and aggressive trading. It is expected that patient trading is carried out 
by traders willing to trade only when the market is deep enough and lower 
transaction costs are obtained.
In view of these reasons, the effective spread is a more reliable and in­
dicative measure of the true execution costs and is calculated in the following 
way:
% spreadef f  =  (m ,m ) =
N
100 • 2 ^  S( m  < m i < m  )■
i =  1
S B h (pt [t] -  vt [i]) N/  V J S ( m  < m i < m  ) 
(15)
1 = 1
where % spread^f is the percentage effective spread, trades are grouped 
into classes with m  being the smallest trade size and m  being the largest 
trade size within each group, S(-) is a binary variable that takes the value of 
1 if the trade falls between m  and m, p [z] is the transaction price for trade i 
and vt [i] is the mid price which existed at the time when the it/l transaction 
took place and SB u  is a binary value that takes on the value of +1 if the 
trade is a buy and -1 if it is a sell. In line with Biais et a l (1992) and de 
Jong et al. (1993), who suggest that large trades are clustered at times when 
the quoted spread is relatively low, the measurement of the effective spread 
is made conditional on the trade size.
The effective spread can be viewed as an implicit spread at which trades 
take place and is expected to be lower than the quoted spread. In setting the 
effective spread, market makers must cover the usual operating and inventory 
costs together with the adverse selection component.
One important issue involved with the estimation of the effective spread
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is the use of mid quotes, considered to be a proxy for the security’s true 
economic value. However, there are issues regarding the amount of bias in 
the estimation of (15) using the mid quote that could occur under certain 
trade reporting practices. A formal exposition of this concept follows.
Transaction i takes place at time t at a transaction price Pt. Prom market 
efficiency, we know that before the trade is executed, Pt is a random variable, 
conditional on the information available to the market in such a way that
Pt =  E  (Pt | <pt_i) +  v t 
= p ; + v t
where (f)t_l is the information set before transaction i is executed at time 
t, v t is a random term with mean zero and P* is the unbiased estimate of Pt.
In order to use (15) an estimate for Pt* must be found. Assuming that 
Pt~ is an unbiased estimate of P /, we have
P~ = Pt* + et
where et is the disturbance term, with mean zero, uncorrelated with both 
P* and v t .
Blume and Goldstein (1992) produce two assumptions under which the 
effective spread measured in (4) is unbiased. First, when | et | is always less 
than the difference | Pt — P~ | wherever the difference is positive and the 
conditional expectation of et is zero and, secondly, when | et | is zero when 
the difference | Pt — Pt~ | is zero then (4) will not result in any unbiasedeness. 
Using these two assumptions, it is possible to show that
2 E ( | P t - P ~ | )  =  2 P ( | P t - P t*|)
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In essence, if | et | is small relative to | v t | (when | vt | is positive), we have
the sign of (v t — et) being determined by the sign of v t. Hence
E  (| Pt — Pt \) — E  (—v t + Et | v t < 0)+P  (| Et || v t = 0)+ E  (v t — Et \ v t > 0)
The assumptions that the conditional expectation of £t > 0 when v t > 0 
and that Et =  0 when s t = 0 lead to the following
E (  | Pt -  P f  |) = E ( - v t \ v t < 0) + E ( v t \ v t > 0)
=  £ ( l  Wl I)
= E( \ p t - p ; \ )
Whenever et is correlated with either (Pt — P4~) or (Pt — P?) there will 
be bias in the estimation of (15). One possible cause of the bias occurs 
when trades are reported with some delay but the adjustments to the quotes 
are reported immediately. This is the case of SEAQ where trades could 
be reported within three minutes from their execution. This is likely to 
cause bias in the estimation of the effective spread for SEAQ spreads and 
it is unlikely that the bias will be completely corrected by the methodology 
adopted.
Following the calculation of the effective spread, the natural extension for 
this analysis is to calculate how much a trader is expected to pay, on average, 
from the quoted spread submitted at each point in time on different markets. 
As such, the transaction price at which each trade takes place is compared 
to the quoted spread and the mid-quote at the trade’s execution time in the 
following way
~ ,, , {[trade pmcet -  (bid prtcet + ask pncet) /  2] \
% payable spread =  100 • 2 • —------------— ■— -^------- -—---------- r-------------
(asA; pricet ~  bid pncet)
(16)
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Neal (1992) defines this measure as the percentage effective spread-2 (as 
against the effective spread-1 which is defined as max [trade price* - bid price*, 
ask price* - trade price*]). However, it is preferred to call this measure as 
the payable spread since it shows the proportion of the quoted spread, being 
quoted at the time of the trade execution, expected to be paid by the trader.
The payable spread assumes a value of 1 when the trade is executed at the 
touch, 0 if it takes place at the mid price. This type of spread measurement 
would reflect the trading difference between markets since the payable spread 
must be lower on SEAQ compared with IBIS and CAC given the amount of 
negotiation that takes place within the spread for larger orders.
3.5.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the quoted spread, effective spread and payable spread 
are reproduced in Table 21. The quoted spread shown in the Table is the 
calendar-time average quoted spread obtained at every point in time. The 
results indicate that, in general, the type of market microstructure appears 
to produce a direct impact on the absolute level of the spreads.
The mean and median values for both quoted and effective spreads gener­
ated on SEAQ are much higher than those generated on either CAC or IBIS. 
The mean value for the quoted spread of CAC-traded securities is 0.3491% 
for the sample which is SEAQ-matched and 0.2714% for the IBIS-matched 
sample. The corresponding values for SEAQ-traded securities are more than 
double these figures.
The pattern emerging from comparing the IBIS-traded and the CAC- 
traded samples demonstrates that, although CAC and IBIS use some similar 
trading practices, the quoted spread for CAC-traded securities is higher than 
for IBIS-traded securities. In so far as the two samples have been matched
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Table 21: Statistics for quoted, effective and payable spreads
P a n e l  A (1). CAC s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  SEAQ s e c u r i t i e s
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 90% 95% 99%
Quoted 0.3491 0.2203 0.3744 4.77 77.64 0.781 0.912 1.798
Effective 0.3004 0.1922 0.3262 4.02 32.02 0.684 0.838 1.594
Payable 0.8901 0.8321 0.1661 3.77 16.11 0.971 0.984 0.996
P a n e l  A (2). CAC s e c u r i t i e s  p a i r e d  w i t h  IBIS s e c u r i t i e s
Quoted 0.2714 0.1974 0.2593 4.08 35.58 0.519 0.748 1.294
Effective 0.2361 0.1735 0.2143 4.26 40.93 0.456 0.599 1.055
Payable 0.9119 0.8715 0.1508 3.15 11.18 0.981 0.983 0.997
P a n e l  B (1 ) .  IBIS SECURITIES PAIRED WITH SEAQ
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 90% 95% 99%
Quoted 0.1708 0.1176 0.1963 7.87 170.61 0.388 0.541 0.896
Effective 0.1517 0.1059 0.1776 8.25 189.13 0.311 0.434 0.810
Payable 1 1 0 - - 1 1 1
P a n e l  B (2 ) .  IBIS SECURITIES PAIRED WITH CAC
Quoted 0.1687 0.1168 0.1903 8.01 170.15 0.316 0.444 0.847
Effective 0.1506 0.1042 0.1825 8.39 188.92 0.309 0.436 0.829
Payable 1 1 0 - - 1 1 1
P a n e l  C (1 ) .  SEAQ SECURITIES PAIRED WITH CAC
Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 90% 95% 99%
Quoted 0.7248 0.5479 0.7243 6.12 64.92 1.210 1.524 2.175
Effective 0.4881 0.3631 1.2252 7.48 71.75 0.632 0.867 1.714
Payable 0.7518 0.7021 1.3611 4.24 51.42 0.899 0.952 0.982
P a n e l  C ( 2 ) .  SEAQ SECURITIES PAIRED WITH IBIS
Quoted 0.5973 0.5084 0.3583 1.57 56.76 1.061 1.432 1.770
Effective 0.3456 0.2347 1.2487 8.01 71.62 0.562 0.745 1.329
Payable 0.7419 0.6831 1.2711 6.22 59.14 0.888 0.942 0.971
The quoted spread is calculated as follows:
% spreadt = 100 • askpr^ ^ lpri-  
The effective spread is measured as follows:
100 • 2 S(m <  m i <m) vt m /  E i i  S(m <  m i < m)
trades are grouped into classes with m  being the smallest trade size and m  being the largest 
trade size within each group. The payable spread is measured as follows:
j q q  2  |[trade pricet—(bid price t+ask  p r ice t) /2]|
(askpricet—bidpricet)
together on the basis of securities’ risk factors, this preliminary result cannot 
be explained as an artifact of sample design and needs further explanation.
Analysing the different samples, it can be noticed that quoted and effec­
tive spreads are generally lower for heavily traded stocks compared with low 
active securities. For example, the mean effective spread for CAC-traded se­
curities paired with SEAQ-traded securities (which includes firms of heteroge­
nous liquidity) is 0.3004% whereas the securities paired with IBIS-traded 
firms (larger securities and with higher liquidity), the mean effective spread 
on CAC is 0.2361%.
Table 21 also shows that the effective spread is lower than the quoted 
spread across the three markets. Trades, especially medium to large ones, 
can be transacted strategically to maximise the benefits from periods with 
liquidity surplus and avoid times of liquidity deficits. Secondly, the result 
suggests that trading costs associated with patient trading are generally lower 
than those obtained by aggressive trading. Thirdly, the difference between 
the mean quoted spread and the mean effective spread is greater on SEAQ, 
implying that negotiation between market makers and traders is generally 
heavier on such a market than on IBIS and CAC. This result is the product 
of pure trading microstuctures since negotiation is contemplated by SEAQ 
but can only take place on CAC for a small number of trades (crosses).
Similarly, the payable spread is clearly smaller on SEAQ than on IBIS or 
CAC. On the latter markets, traders are expected to pay the quoted spread 
submitted at the time when the trade is executed (both the mean and the 
median values are 1) whereas on SEAQ, on average, traders with medium 
to large orders should expect to negotiate their trade and pay 86.6% of the 
quoted spread.
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3.6 Q uoted and Effective Spreads
The calendar time average quoted spread, transaction time average quoted 
spread and the effective spread for the three trading systems are shown in 
Tables 22-30. For ease of comparison, while trades have been classified as 
follows: (a) small trades when the trade size is smaller than 0.5 X NMS; (b) 
medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; and (c) large 
if the trade size is greater than 1 X NMS. The major problem encountered 
with such a classification is that auction-based systems are bound to have 
very small trades being executed, most of them being smaller than 1 X NMS. 
To address this problem, the Tables show the different measurement of the 
spread in different trade bands, each of 0.1 X NMS up to 1 X NMS. In 
addition, securities held in the different samples have been classified as small, 
medium and large depending on their market capitalisation as of December 
1995.
The calendar time average quoted spread shows that limit order book- 
based systems produce very low spreads compared to the dealership system. 
For example, the average quoted spread for small trades in large firms trans­
acted on CAC is 0.1863% at the ask and 0.1894% for a trade at the bid 
compared with spreads of 0.4947% at the ask and 0.4896% at the bid for 
SEAQ trades. In each single trade size and security class, the two systems 
that allow limit orders produce lower spreads compared to the dealership 
system, with the difference being statistically significant using the ASL test.
It is clear that the quoted spreads on both the auction and the hybrid 
systems increase with trade size. This is not the case with SEAQ whereby 
there appears to be a U-shaped transaction costs. Very small trades are 
executed at relatively high transactions costs which decrease for medium 
sized trades and goes up again for large trades.
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Table 22: Calendar-time quoted spread (percent) for CAC- and
SEAQ-paired securities
P a n e l  A .  M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  C A C - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.4775 0.4853 < 0.1 0.3198
I Medium 0.5001 0.5107 0.1 - 0.2 0.3103
I Large 0.5664 0.5761 0.2 - 0.3 0.3185
0.3 - 0.4 0.3176
II Small 0.2878 0.2928 0.4 - 0.5 0.3188
II Medium 0.3444 0.3418 0.5 - 0.6 0.3196
II Large 0.3901 0.4019 0.6 - 0.7 0.3152
0.7 - 0.8 0.3177
III Small 0.1863 0.2051 0.8 - 0.9 0.3213
III Medium 0.1947 0.1952 0.9 - 1.0 0.3361
III Large 0.2259 0.2243
P a n e l  B,. M e a n QUOTED SPREAD FOR S E A Q -P A IR E D  SECURITIES
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.6753** 0.6862** < 0.1 0.6102
I Medium 0.6609* 0.6735* 0.1 - 0.2 0.5987
I Large 0.6447* 0.6436* 0.2 - 0.3 0.5896
0.3 - 0.4 0.5802
II Small 0.6415** 0.6391** 0.4 - 0.5 0.5758
II Medium 0.6118** 0.6088** 0.5 - 0.6 0.5696
II Large 0.6315* 0.6284* 0.6 - 0.7 0.5601
0.7 - 0.8 0.5598
III Small 0.6215** 0.6301** 0.8 - 0.9 0.5370
III Medium 0.6042** 0.6156** 0.9 - 1.0 0.5287
III Large 0.6181* 0.6175*
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The calendar time quoted spread is measured as:
100- £ " i  ( t n - i - t O E S . ! * - 1
Trades have been classified as follows:-
ask price[tj,x]—bid price[tj,x] 
midprice[ti,x\
(a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS; 
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured [SEAQ  — CAC] spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 23: Calendar-time quoted spread (percent) for CAC- and
IBIS-paired securities
P a n e l  A .  M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  C A C - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.4014 0.3985 < 0.1 0.2308
I Medium 0.4622* 0.4721* 0.1 - 0.2 0.2406
I Large 0.5236* 0.5324* 0.2 - 0.3 0.2453
0.3 - 0.4 0.2517
II Small 0.2660* 0.2707* 0.4 - 0.5 0.2529
II Medium 0.3182** 0.3160** 0.5 - 0.6 0.2489
II Large 0.3606** 0.3715** 0.6 - 0.7 0.2511
0.7 - 0.8 0.2538
III Small 0.1522 0.1696 0.8 - 0.9 0.2659
III Medium 0.1801* 0.1804* 0.9 - 1.0 0.2784
III Large 0.2087* 0.2073*
P a n e l  B .  M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  I B I S - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.3306 0.3358 < 0.1 0.1389
I Medium 0.3326 0.3226 0.1 - 0.2 0.1379
I Large 0.3714 0.3658 0.2 - 0.3 0.1351
0.3 - 0.4 0.1514
II Small 0.1517 0.1571 0.4 - 0.5 0.1704
II Medium 0.2213 0.2262 0.5 - 0.6 0.2047
II Large 0.2819 0.2696 0.6 - 0.7 0.2287
0.7-0.8 0.2305
III Small 0.1316 0.1330 0.8 - 0.9 0.2369
III Medium 0.1541 0.1498 0.9 - 1.0 0.2366
III Large 0.1667 0.1608
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The calendar time quoted spread is measured as:
-1 ask price[tj,x]—bid price\tj,x\
Trades have been classified as follows:
midprice[ti,x]
(a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured [CAC — IB IS ]  spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 24: Calendar-time quoted spread (percent) for IBIS- and
SEAQ-paired securities
P a n e l  A .  M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  I B I S - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Firm Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
Small Small 0.3236 0.3287 < 0.1 0.1146
Small Medium 0.3255 0.3157 0.1 - 0.2 0.1228
Small Large 0.3635 0.3581 0.2 - 0.3 0.1291
0.3 - 0.4 0.1641
Medium Small 0.1485 0.1538 0.4 - 0.5 0.1954
Medium Medium 0.2166 0.2214 0.5 - 0.6 0.2347
Medium Large 0.2759 0.2639 0.6 - 0.7 0.2394
0.7 - 0.8 0.2378
Large Small 0.0995 0.1008 0.8 - 0.9 0.2433
Large Medium 0.1508 0.1466 0.9 - 1.0 0.2401
Large Large 0.1632 0.1574
P a n e l  B. M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  S E A Q - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Firm Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
Small Small 0.5717** 0.5701** < 0.1 0.5159
Small Medium 0.5596** 0.5449** 0.1 - 0.2 0.4825
Small Large 0.5458* 0.4852* 0.2 - 0.3 0.4815
0.3 - 0.4 0.4846
Medium Small 0.4822** 0.4738** 0.4 - 0.5 0.4783
Medium Medium 0.4716** 0.4557** 0.5 - 0.6 0.4731
Medium Large 0.4459* 0.4389* 0.6 - 0.7 0.4718
0.7 - 0.8 0.4564
Large Small 0.4177** 0.4219** 0.8 - 0.9 0.4371
Large Medium 0.4059** 0.4148** 0.9 - 1.0 0.4469
Large Large 0.3877* 0.3898*
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The calendar time quoted spread is measured as:
Trades have been classified as follows:
/ E £ i f o + i - * )
ask price[tj,x]—bid price[tj,x] 
midprice[ti,x\
(a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured [SEAQ  — IB IS ]  spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
The other interesting feature arises when the pure limit order book and 
the hybrid system are compared. In this case, contrary to the null hypothesis 
lBo, IBIS appears to generate lower quoted spreads compared with CAC. 
The spread differential in favour of IBIS is especially pronounced for small 
and medium trades. For most trade classes, the difference between IBIS and 
CAC is statistically significant. For example, for the trade sizes not exceeding 
0.1 X NMS, the quoted spread on IBIS is 0.1389% while on CAC is 0.2408%.
In order to avoid the problems associated with the calendar time average, 
the second set of calculations use the transaction time average quoted spread. 
Tables 25-27 show that the two sets of spread measurements are similar, 
implying that trades are not, generally speaking, very sensitive to spread 
changes. The results obtained for CAC are similar to those obtained by de 
Jong et al. (1993) for French securities cross-quoted on SEAQ-I.
The market with the highest difference between the two measurements 
is IBIS. This could be due to the intraday patterns explained in the next 
Chapter. For both SEAQ and CAC, the number of trades and total volume 
transacted are relatively high during the opening phase when the bid-ask 
spreads are high compared to the levels reached during the day.
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Table 25: Transaction-time quoted spread (percent) for CAC- and
SEAQ-paired securities
P a n e l  A .  M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  C A C - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.4917 0.5008 <0.1 0.3015
I Medium 0.5161 0.5242 0.1 - 0.2 0.3196
1 Large 0.5691 0.5741 0.2 - 0.3 0.3245
0.3 - 0.4 0.3251
II Small 0.2918 0.3021 0.4 - 0.5 0.3275
II Medium 0.3512 0.3528 0.5 - 0.6 0.3301
II Large 0.3921 0.4001 0.6 - 0.7 0.3376
0.7 - 0.8 0.3412
III Small 0.2171 0.2164 0.8 - 0.9 0.3425
III Medium 0.2245 0.2210 0.9 - 1.0 0.3471
III Large 0.2451 0.2384
P a n e l  B.. M e a n  <QUOTED SPREAD FOR S E A Q -P A IR E D  SECURITIES
All trades Trades censored at 1 X Is
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.6084* 0.5912* <0.1 0.6381
I Medium 0.5819* 0.5793* 0.1 - 0.2 0.6269
I Large 0.5924 0.6008 0.2 - 0.3 0.6178
0.3 - 0.4 0.6098
II Small 0.5987** 0.5963** 0.4 - 0.5 0.5988
II Medium 0.5646** 0.5608** 0.5 - 0.6 0.5891
II Large 0.5812* 0.5791* 0.6 - 0.7 0.5886
0.7 - 0.8 0.5801
III Small 0.5747** 0.5826** 0.8 - 0.9 0.5681
III Medium 0.5568** 0.5674** 0.9 - 1.0 0.5621
III Large 0.5706* 0.5689*
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The transaction time quoted spread is measured as:
% spreadr (m) =  100 • j ,  £ f =1 E™ , /  
Trades have been classified as follows:- (a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured [SEAQ — CAC] spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 26: Transaction-time quoted spread (percent) for CAC- and
IBIS-paired securities
P a n e l  A .  M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  C A C - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.4526* 0.4615* < 0.1 0.2478
I Medium 0.4731* 0.4842* 0.1 - 0.2 0.2519
I Large 0.5299* 0.5361* 0.2 - 0.3 0.2508
0.3 - 0.4 0.2581
II Small 0.2788* 0.2801* 0.4 - 0.5 0.2594
II Medium 0.3278* 0.3314* 0.5 - 0.6 0.2557
II Large 0.3711* 0.3801* 0.6 - 0.7 0.2535
0.7 - 0.8 0.2598
III Small 0.1601 0.1664 0.8 - 0.9 0.2714
III Medium 0.2045* 0.2151* 0.9 - 1.0 0.2801
III Large 0.2241* 0.2312*
P a n e l  B .  M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  I B I S - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.3424 0.3478 < 0.1 0.1454
I Medium 0.3455 0.3342 0.1 - 0.2 0.1459
I Large 0.3847 0.3789 0.2 - 0.3 0.1535
0.3 - 0.4 0.1721
II Small 0.1571 0.1628 0.4 - 0.5 0.1829
II Medium 0.2292 0.2343 0.5 - 0.6 0.1959
II Large 0.2921 0.2793 0.6 - 0.7 0.2045
0.7 - 0.8 0.2234
III Small 0.1352 0.1367 0.8 - 0.9 0.2316
III Medium 0.1596 0.1552 0.9 - 1.0 0.2475
III Large 0.1727 0.1665
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The transaction time quoted spread is measured as:
% spreadr (m) =  100 • £  £!T=i (ask price[tj,x]—bid price[tj,x\) midprice[ti,x] /  m
Trades have been classified as follows: (a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured [CAC — IB IS ]  spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 27: Transaction-time quoted spread (percent) for IBIS- and
SEAQ-paired securities
P a n e l  A . M e a n  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  f o r  I B I S - p a ir e d  s e c u r it ie s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.3315 0.3409 <  0.1 0.1219
I Medium 0.3376 0.3275 0.1 - 0.2 0.1301
I Large 0.3771 0.3714 0.2 - 0.3 0.1373
0.3 - 0.4 0.1742
II Small 0.1540 0.1596 0.4 - 0.5 0.2037
II Medium 0.2247 0.2297 0.5 - 0.6 0.2487
II Large 0.2862 0.2737 0.6 - 0.7 0.2427
0.7 - 0.8 0.2424
III Small 0.1132 0.1145 0.8 - 0.9 0.2408
III Medium 0.1565 0.1521 0.9 - 1.0 0.2373
III Large 0.1694 0.1631
P a n e l  B .. M e a n QUOTED SPREAD FOR S E A Q -P A IR E D  SECURITIES
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.5605* 0.5681* <  0.1 0.5514
I Medium 0.5381* 0.5308* 0.1 - 0.2 0.5402
I Large 0.5541* 0.5532* 0.2 - 0.3 0.5391
0.3 - 0.4 0.5342
II Small 0.5596** 0.5426** 0.4 - 0.5 0.5371
II Medium 0.5288** 0.5311** 0.5 - 0.6 0.5308
II Large 0.5627** 0.5601** 0.6 - 0.7 0.5272
0.7 - 0.8 0.5281
III Small 0.5441** 0.5484** 0.8 - 0.9 0.5255
III Medium 0.5191** 0.5216** 0.9 - 1.0 0.5115
III Large 0.5496** 0.5508**
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The transaction time quoted spread is measured as:
% spreadr (m) =  100 • £  YliLi ££= i (ask price\tj,x]—bid price\tj,x\) midprice[ti ,z] /  m
Trades have been classified as follows: (a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured [SEAQ — IB IS ]  spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
figure 13. Intraday patterns of quoted spreads (in %) on IBIS
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Figure 15. Intraday patterns of quoted spreads (in %) on SEAQ
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Figure 16. Effective spreads (in%) by trade size
Trade size censored at 1 NMS
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Figure 17. Effective spreads (in%) by trade size
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Tables 28 to 30 show the effective spread for the three markets. For 
CAC and IBIS, it is expected that the costs sustained by a patient trader 
would be smaller compared to costs associated with aggressive trading. In 
addition, given the negative price impact generated by order book-based 
systems when a large order executes, large traders should submit their order 
when the market is deep. Hence, it is to be expected that effective spreads 
axe smaller than quoted spreads, especially for larger trades.
For SEAQ, the argument is different reflecting the different microstruc­
ture in place. On SEAQ, it is expected that larger trades, in contrast to small 
trades, take place within the touch and are executed at prices that are nego­
tiated between the market maker and the trader (London Stock Exchange, 
1992).
The analysis is divided in two parts. First, all trades on all markets 
are considered and classified using the same methodology used for quoted 
spreads. Secondly, only trades up to 1 X NMS are considered on all the 
three markets in order to focus on the most common type of trades across 
the three systems. Following this, all trades are considered but the analysis 
is cut off at the 3 X NMS trade size since there is not much scope in analysing 
trades beyond this size when comparing these three markets.
The results are summarised in Figures 16 and 17 and in Tables 12-14.
When considering trades smaller than 1 X NMS, some definite patterns 
emerge. For the CAC, the effective spread seems largely stable for trade sizes 
up to 0.7 X NMS and then increases slightly over the 0.8-1 X NMS. Over 
this range, the effective spread does not increase with trade size, as was the 
case with the quoted spreads.
When the 0-3 X NMS size range is considered, some other interesting 
patterns emerge. The CAC spreads is stable up to 1 X NMS size, peaking
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Table 28: M ean effective spread (percent) for CAC- and SEAQ-
paired securities
P a n e l  A .  e f f e c t i v e  s p r e a d  f o r  C A C - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.4311 0.4381 < o'.i 0.2725
I Medium 0.4515 0.4611 0.1 - 0.2 0.2916
I Large 0.5115 0.5201 0.2 - 0.3 0.3055
0.3 - 0.4 0.3047
II Small 0.2599 0.2644 0.4 - 0.5 0.3059
II Medium 0.3107 0.3087 0.5 - 0.6 0.3064
II Large 0.3522 0.3629 0.6 - 0.7 0.3088
0.7 - 0.8 0.3188
III Small 0.1782 0.1802 0.8 - 0.9 0.3228
III Medium 0.1858 0.1901 0.9 - 1.0 0.3317
III Large 0.2039 0.2025
P a n e l  B .  e f f e c t i v e  s p r e a d  f o r  S E A Q - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.6265** 0.6366** <0.1 0.5699
I Medium 0.6131** 0.6248** 0.1 - 0.2 0.5631
I Large 0.5981* 0.5971* 0.2 - 0.3 0.5587
0.3 - 0.4 0.5511
II Small 0.4314** 0.4238** 0.4 - 0.5 0.5484
II Medium 0.3807* 0.3915* 0.5 - 0.6 0.5426
II Large 0.3483 0.3545 0.6 - 0.7 0.5383
0.7 - 0.8 0.5244
III Small 0.3497** 0.3468** 0.8 - 0.9 0.5268
III Medium 0.3153* 0.3098* 0.9 - 1.0 0.5261
III Large 0.3061* 0.3072*
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The percentage effective spread is measured as:
■ /  S i l i  S { m <  m i  <  m )
(a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
100 • 2 X lili S(m <  m i <m) SBit(p t[ i] -v t[ iujil
Trades have been classified as follows:
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured SEAQ-CAC spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 29: Mean effective spread (percent) for CAC- and IBIS-paired
securities
P a n e l  A .  E f f e c t i v e  s p r e a d  f o r  C A C - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.3719 0.3732 < 0.1 0.2254
I Medium 0.3913* 0.3878* 0.1 - 0.2 0.2438
I Large 0.4152* 0.4201* 0.2 - 0.3 0.2484
. - — 0.3 - 0.4 0.2488
II Small 0.2822* 0.2892* 0.4 - 0.5 0.2490
II Medium 0.3304** 0.3273** 0.5 - 0.6 0.2433
II Large 0.3656** 0.3764** 0.6 - 0.7 0.2414
0.7 - 0.8 0.2489
III Small 0.1567 0.1564 0.8 - 0.9 0.2635
III Medium 0.1831* 0.1791* 0.9 - 1.0 0.2719
III Large 0.2170* 0.1882*
P a n e l  B .  E f f e c t i v e  s p r e a d  f o r  I B I S - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.3292 0.3344 <0.1 0.1188
I Medium 0.3312 0.3213 0.1 - 0.2 0.1201
I Large 0.3699 0.3643 0.2 - 0.3 0.1455
0.3 - 0.4 0.1654
II Small 0.1511 0.1565 0.4 - 0.5 0.1975
II Medium 0.2204 0.2253 0.5 - 0.6 0.2295
II Large 0.2808 0.2685 0.6 - 0.7 0.2315
0.7-0.8 0.2341
III Small 0.1282 0.1306 0.8 - 0.9 0.2298
III Medium 0.1535 0.1492 0.9 - 1.0 0.2306
III Large 0.1661 0.1601
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The percentage effective spread is measured as:
100 • 2 S(m <  m i <m) vt m / Y ^ i L i < m )
Trades have been classified as follows: (a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured CAC-IBIS spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 30: M ean effective spread (percent) for IBIS- and SEAQ-
paired securities
P a n e l  A .  E f f e c t i v e  s p r e a d  f o r  I B I S - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.3243 0.3294 < 0.1 0.1108
I Medium 0.3262 0.3165 0.1 - 0.2 0.1183
I Large 0.3644 0.3588 0.2 - 0.3 0.1248
0.3 - 0.4 0.1584
II Small 0.1488 0.1542 0.4 - 0.5 0.1852
II Medium 0.2171 0.2219 0.5 - 0.6 0.2261
II Large 0.2766 0.2645 0.6 - 0.7 0.2206
0.7 - 0.8 0.2204
III Small 0.1096 0.1106 0.8 - 0.9 0.2189
III Medium 0.1412 0.1469 0.9 - 1.0 0.2157
III Large 0.1536 0.1577
P a n e l  B .  E f f e c t i v e  s p r e a d  f o r  S E A Q - p a i r e d  s e c u r i t i e s
All trades Trades censored at 1 X NMS
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid Trade size Spread
I Small 0.5325* 0.3571* < 0.1 0.4956
I Medium 0.5212* 0.5311* 0.1 - 0.2 0.4635
I Large 0.5083* 0.5075* 0.2 - 0.3 0.4626
0.3 - 0.4 0.4655
II Small 0.4492** 0.4519** 0.4 - 0.5 0.4595
II Medium 0.4393** 0.4414** 0.5 - 0.6 0.4544
II Large 0.4153** 0.4244** 0.6 - 0.7 0.4533
0.7 - 0.8 0.4384
III Small 0.3891** 0.3931** 0.8 - 0.9 0.4199
III Medium 0.3781** 0.3863** 0.9 - 1.0 0.4294
III Large 0.3611** 0.3622**
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or the best bid. 
The percentage effective spread is measured as:
/  S i l i  S(m< < m)
(a) small when trade size is less than 0.5 NMS;
100 • 2 YliLi S{m < m i <m) 
Trades have been classified as follows:
(b) medium if trade size falls between 0.5 X NMS and 1 X NMS; (c) large if trade size is 
larger than 1 X NMS.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the measured SEAQ-IBIS spread 
is statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
for trades within the 1-1.5 X NMS trade size and then declining marginally 
and staying stable over the remaining trade range. It must be stated that 
the data for trades above 1 X NMS is generally sparse.
For IBIS, different patterns than those experienced on CAC are observed. 
The effective spread increases steadily from 0.11% obtained for trades smaller 
than 0.1 X NMS to reach 0.221% for trades between 0.4-0.5 X NMS. After 
which, the effective spread remains largely stable, declining marginally for 
trades classified in the 0.8-1 X NMS trade size class. However, Figures 16 and 
17 and Table 29 show that effective spreads on CAC are consistently bigger 
than those on IBIS, confirming the result obtained for quoted spreads. The 
biggest absolute difference is obtained for the smallest trades where spreads 
for the smallest sample (less than 0.1 X NMS) are almost double on CAC 
than they are on IBIS.
The effective spread for SEAQ follows a declining trend up to 1 X NMS 
and this is particularly clear for the larger SEAQ securities (the most active 
securities). For example, this particular sample produces spreads that start 
off at 0.4956% for the smallest trades and then settling at 0.454% for the 
0.5-0.6 X NMS trades. Trades that are about 1 X NMS are transacted with 
a spread of 0.429%. When the trade size range is expanded to consider 
trades up to 3 X NMS, a U-shaped curve appears. Smallest trades attract 
0.492%; 1 X NMS trades attract 0.415%; while 3 X NMS attract spreads in 
the magnitude of 0.462%.
Similar patterns for SEAQ were observed by Breedon (1992), Tonks and 
Snell (1992) and Roell (1992). Medium-sized trades have the lowest bid- 
ask spreads on SEAQ. This could be directly related to the stealth trading 
hypothesis advanced by Barclay and Warner (1993). They suggest that in­
formative trading does not take place through large trades but rather via
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medium-sized trades employed by informed traders to camouflage themselves 
and hide their information.
Another important aspect resulting from the SEAQ results is that effec­
tive spreads are substantially lower than quoted spreads. There are a number 
of plausible explanations for such a result. First, it could be due to timing 
misreporting (market makers executing trades on SEAQ are allowed up to 
three minutes to report the trade to the LSE). This reporting lag could in­
duce a bias since quote changes are entered in the system faster than trades’ 
execution, leading to the bias explained above.
In view of this, transaction times in the LSE data set were randomly 
anticipated by 30, 60, 90, 120, 150 and 180 seconds to investigate the robust­
ness of the results obtained directly from the market makers’ trade reports. 
The new results obtained from these exercises were not statistically different 
from the results shown before, leaving scope to search for different causes.
Secondly, this result implies that spreads are submitted by market makers 
as the basis to start a negotiation with the traders submitting certain types 
of trades. SEAQ market makers do not seem to update their quotes as often 
compared to what happens on CAC and IBIS. If submitting quotes to the 
market is tantamount to writing a free option to traders and noting that 
negotiation is expected in a dealership market, then it is clear that quote 
updates on SEAQ are bound to be less frequent than on CAC and IBIS.
As stated above, the ASL test is employed in order to investigate whether 
the spreads’ absolute levels are statistically different across the various mar­
ket microstructures. This test was employed since it was deemed to be better 
suited for our case where spreads drawn from different populations were em­
ployed. However, it must be stated that the same conclusion was obtained 
when a more traditional t — test, based on two normal distributions with
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unequal variances, was employed.
One possible explanation for the tight IBIS spreads can also be given 
by the fact that floor trading on the FSE takes place over a number of 
IBIS trading hours, hence increasing the level of competition in the German 
trading system. Figure 13 indicates that IBIS quoted spreads do not widen 
after 13:30:00 hrs when the floor trading on FSE closes, indicating that IBIS 
quoted spreads are relatively high in the 08:30:00 hrs-10:30:00 hrs, before 
floor trading starts. This evidence, however, is consistent with the view that 
spreads are higher at the open on any system under consideration.
To investigate further whether competition from the FSE has a significant 
impact on IBIS spreads and explaining the lower trading costs, the IBIS 
sample was divided into two samples: (a) Sample 1 with trades that take 
place between 08:30:00 hrs and 10:29:59 hrs and trades between 13:31:00 hrs 
and 17:00:00 hrs; and (b) Sample 2 with trades taking place between 10:30:00 
hrs and 13:30:00 hrs. The first sample has trades taking place when the FSE 
is closed while the second sample containing trades when the FSE is closed.
If the suggestion that spreads on IBIS are low because of FSE trading is 
correct, then we should expect to have spreads in Sample 2 to be significantly 
lower than spreads in Sample 1. Table 31 shows that the low spreads on IBIS 
cannot be explained by trading on FSE since most of the quoted and effective 
spreads are not statistically significantly different across the two samples. 
Indeed, it appears that trades and volume cluster when quotes are low, not 
just in the morning, when FSE is open, but also in the afternoon when the 
FSE is closed. Furthermore, the B-H spread differential over the period when 
the FSE is closed is not significantly different from when the FSE is open.
The general result obtained from the analysis of the different impacts 
generated by various factors, such as inventory costs and adverse selection, on
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Table 31: Impact of floor trading on IBIS effective spreads
P a n e l  A. IBIS s p r e a d  w h e n  FSE is c l o s e d
All Trades (1) All Trades (2)
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid At Ask At Bid
I Small 0.3511* 0.3603* 0.3237* 0.3311*
I Medium 0.3385 0.3368 0.3006 0.3058
I Large 0.3582 0.3741 0.3282 0.3293
II Small 0.1653* 0.1608* 0.1447 0.1404
II Medium 0.2179 0.2217 0.2123 0.2107
II Large 0.2705 0.2597 0.2475 0.2427
III Small 0.1073 0.1086 0.0983 0.0996
III Medium 0.1637* 0.1602 0.1451 0.1414
III Large 0.1659 0.1652 0.1518 0.1562
P a n e l  B. IBIS s p r e a d  w h e n  FSE is o p e n
All trades
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid
I Small 0.2802 0.2781
I Medium . . 0.3221 0.3198
I Large 0.3829 0.3851
II Small 0.1288 0.1311
II Medium 0.2097 0.2147
II Large 0.2944 0.2815
III Small 0.0926 0.929
III Medium 0.1389 0.1307
III Large 0.1538 0.1386
Trades were classified on their trade position - whether at the best ask or best bid. 
Trades executed within the touch were not considered in order to obtain a common 
measure for both the two sub-periods. All trades (1) consider trades in two periods 
08:30:00 hrs - 10:29:00 hrs and 13:31:00 hrs - 17:00:00 hrs. All trades (2) consider 
trades transacted in the period 13:31:0  ^hrs - 17:00:00 hrs.
An * or ** symbol signifies that the difference in the spread is statistically 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.________
effective spreads appear to be mixed. Generally speaking, effective spreads 
on IBIS do increase with size, especially if trades smaller than 1 X NMS 
are considered, implying that dealers take into consideration the fact that 
inventory costs and adverse selection increase with size when setting quotes. 
The same cannot be said for the CAC system whereby effective quotes are 
not very sensitive to changes in trade size for trades lower than 1 X NMS. 
SEAQ results provide mixed evidence whereby small and large trades attract 
relatively higher trades, with medium trades attracting lower spreads.
In terms of the first set of hypothesis tested, hypothesis 1 o is not rejected 
in that spreads on the dealership system are higher than spreads generated 
in both the pure order book system and the hybrid platform. On the other 
hand, hypothesis 2o is not accepted given the number of instances where 
IBIS quoted and effective spreads axe lower than those generated by CAC.
3.T A dverse Selection Com ponent
Another important issue is the identification of the components forming the 
spread and how they change, if at all, from one market to another. If market 
microstructure does matter, then we should find that not only does the level 
of the spread change from one market to another, but also its components 
differ. The most intriguing question, and the one that has received most 
attention, is what percentage of the spread accounts for adverse selection 
and whether it is affected by different trading architectures.
Addressing the spread’s components issue is necessary for two reasons. 
Firstly, to assess whether the spread differentials between the trading sys­
tems, found above, can be explained by the presence of informed traders. The 
preceding Section has shown that spreads on SEAQ are wider than those on 
CAC and IBIS. These wider spreads could be the result of higher adverse
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selection on SEAQ or due to market makers’ inability in dealing effectively 
with private information.
Secondly, we need to shed light on the sources of the spread and inves­
tigate the impact of different market designs on how trade information is 
impounded into prices. The latter analysis will indicate whether one partic­
ular trading system is more effective than others in dealing with asymmetric 
information.
To investigate the spreads’ component due to adverse selection, different 
methodologies will be used. The Huang and Stoll (1996) technique is applied 
in the first place. Secondly, we apply the George et al. (1991), Booth et al.
(1995), Madhavan et al. (1997) and the Huang and Stoll (1997) methodolo­
gies to analyse the robustness of the results obtained.
Following Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), 
the spread’s component due to adverse selection is found by measuring the 
dealers’ (market makers or limit order traders) profits net of adverse selection. 
Due to price movements caused by the presence of adverse selection, the 
effective spread is not the best measure of the actual dealers’ profits. Prices 
have been found to adjust, often in a direction against the dealer, after the 
execution of a large trade mainly due to the information contained in such 
trades.9 This implies that dealers’ revenue is the difference between the initial 
transaction price for a particular trade and the liquidation value of the stock 
some time after the original trade, when information is assumed to have been 
impounded in the price.
The first step is to calculate the price impact generated by each trade, 
defined as the change of the underlying value of the security following the
9Holtahusen et al. (1990) together with Hasbrouck (1988) and Huang and Stoll (1994) 
have found such price movements on NYSE. Gemmill (1996) and Board and Sutcliffe 
(1995) found similar price movements on the LSE.
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execution of a trade.The mid price is assumed to be a good proxy for the 
security’s economic value. If vt is the stock’s economic value at the time of 
trade execution, then vt+i represents the stock’s economic value some time 
after the trade when the information has been impounded in the price.
Hence, while the percentage effective half spread is given by:
% h a lf spreadef f  =  100* S B it (pt [i] -  vt [i]) (17)
M»]
with the same notations used for (15) above, the permanent price impact 
is measured as:
% price impactu =  100 SB{t  (Vt+n [^ ] Vt [ ]^) (18)
M»]
where SB it is the usual binary variable that equals to +1 in the case of 
a customer buy and -1 in case of a customer sell.
Dealers’ gross revenue is measured as the effective spread less the price im­
pact generated by the trade. Following Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessem- 
binder and Kaufman (1997) the gross revenue is given as:
% gross revenue =  100* S B i t  {,Pt [^] Vt+n [^ ]) (19)
vt [i]
This measure uses the correction of the mid quote following the execution 
of the trade, vt+n, to reflect any possible information contained in the original 
trade. It represents the dealers’ revenue net of losses incurred due to adverse 
selection but before other costs, such as inventory and operating costs, are 
taken into account.
A number of explanations and caveats must be used at this stage. No 
prior empirical evidence can be used to correctly identify the time over which 
the information contained in a trade is impounded into prices. The period 
chosen is the product of an arbitrary decision. Too short a period will not
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capture the total effect of price reversal. On the other hand, taking a long 
period of time would allow for substantial variability in the price discovery 
process not directly attributable to one particular trade. Huang and Stoll
(1996) use two time intervals after the trade’s execution; they analyse the 
price level (a) around 5 minutes after the trade; and (b) around 30 minutes 
after the trade. On the other hand, Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) use 
a 24 hour gap for their analysis.10
In view of the uncertainty for the duration of price impact across markets, 
three time horizons have been used for this analysis, namely (a) 5 minutes 
after the trade; (b) 30 minutes after the trade; and (c) 45 minutes after the 
trade. Our suspicion is that the last time interval is excessively protracted for 
CAC and IBIS trades and thus the results obtained should reflect additional 
variability induced by other factors.11
There are two additional issues that must be considered. First, a proxy for 
the security’s true economic value after the trade execution must be found 
to measure correctly the actual dealers’ profits. There appear to be two 
alternatives, namely the actual trade price for trades being executed after 
the specified time horizon has elapsed or using the mid quote over the same 
time horizon. The mid quote is used as the proxy for the security’s true 
economic value.
Secondly, following Huang and Stoll (1996), the average price impact
10Board and Sutcliffe (1995), using large trades executed on SEAQ and considering clock 
time rather than transaction time, found that the price impact takes some 50 minutes to 
fully materialise.
11 De Jong et al. (1995) studying trades on the Bourse de Paris through a VAR method­
ology found that for large transactions the price impact is slightly increasing over 20 
transactions from the original trade but the biggest part takes place within 5 transactions. 
For SEAQ, the situation is slightly different and, following Board and Sutcliffe (1995), it 
is expected that some additional price impact is found using the last two time intervals.
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generated by all trades is close to zero. This means that in order to measure 
the gross revenue, only trades executed at the best bid and ask quotes are 
considered. While this measurement will not bias the results obtained for 
CAC and IBIS, it will overestimate the net revenue earned by SEAQ market 
makers (in so far as a substantial number of trades take place within the 
touch).
Tables 32-34 show the gross revenues earned by market makers on SEAQ 
and limit order traders on CAC and IBIS. The price impact generated five 
minutes after a small and medium trade is not substantial resulting in gross 
revenues that are quite similar to the effective spread. However, large trades 
do appear to cause a price impact resulting in gross revenues equivalent to 
25.6% of effective spreads on CAC, 19.17% on IBIS and 13.44% for SEAQ 
transactions.
The most important results arise from gross revenues obtained over a 
30-minutes time horizon. For small trades, gross revenues still show no sign 
of a price impact. In fact, gross revenues are of the same magnitude of 
effective spreads for all markets, implying that small trades do not contain 
information. For medium-sized trades, the picture is different. First, CAC 
appears to experience a material price impact. In fact, the gross revenues 
for medium-sized trades on CAC are only 12.15% of effective spreads, with 
the difference explained by the price impact. On IBIS, medium-sized trades 
do produce a price impact but it is lower than on CAC (only 62.02% against 
the 84.19% on CAC).
The dealers’ gross revenues show a number of interesting features. First, 
the price impact on CAC is very high, with gross revenues amounting to 
13.64% of total effective spreads. This implies that the price impact gener­
ated by large trades on CAC is substantially higher than the impact gener-
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Table 32: Liquidity providers’ gross revenue on the CAC system
P a n e l  A. M e a n  g r o s s  r e v e n u e  ( in  %) o n  CAC
5 minute 30 minute 45 minute
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid At Ask At Bid At Ask At Bid
I Small 0.4225 0.4294 0.3794 0.3855 0.3707 0.3768
I Medium ~ 0.3612 0.3781 0.1084 0.1014 0.1084 0.1014
I Large 0.3785 0.3744 0.0665 0.0624 0.0691 0.0624
II Small 0.2559 0.2604 0.2339 0.2379 0.2287 0.2326
II Medium 0.2517 0.2531 0.0932 0.0864 0.0746 0.0803
II Large 0.2642 0.2612 0.0598 0.0581 0.0528 0.0472
III Small 0.1665 0.1834 0.1514 0.1667 0.1481 0.1629
III Medium 0.1442 0.1481 0.0509 0.0511 0.0475 0.0476
III Large 0.1570 0.1569 0.0265 0.0263 0.0306 0.0243
Dealers’ gross revenue is measured as the effective spread less the price impact generated 
by the trade as follows:
% gross revenue — 100 vt ft]
where SB a  is a binary variable that equals to +1 in the case of a customer buy and -1 in 
case of a customer sell.
This measure uses a correction of the mid quote following the execution of the trade, Vt+n, 
to reflect any possible information contained in the original trade.
In view of the uncertainty in the exact duration for price impacts across markets, three time 
horizons have been used for this analysis: (a) 5 minutes after the trade; (b) 30 minutes after 
the trade; and (c) 45 minutes after the trade. _______________________________
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Table 33: Liquidity providers’ gross revenue on the IBIS platform
P a n e l  A. M e a n  g r o s s  r e v e n u e  ( in  %) o n  IBIS
5 minute 30 minute 45 minute
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid At Ask At Bid At Ask At Bid
I Small 0.3226 0.3277 0.3095 0.3177 0.3160 0.3177
I Medium 0.2848 0.2698 0.1491 0.1253 0.1524 0.1317
I Large 0.3244 0.3124 0.1506 0.1521 0.1487 0.1495
II Small 0.1488 0.1542 0.1420 0.1471 0.1435 0.1471
II Medium 0.1807 0.1915 0.0859 0.0946 0.0760 0.0971
II Large 0.2345 0.2329 0.1093 0.1098 0.1167 0.1134
III Small 0.1018 0.1016 0.0921 0.0934 0.0931 0.0975
III Medium 0.1289 0.1269 0.0599 0.0627 0.0629 0.0619
III Large 0.1398 0.1381 0.0797 0.0717 0.0689 0.0652
Dealers’ gross revenue is measured as the effective spread less the price impact generated 
by the trade as follows:
% gross revenue =  100
where S B  a is a binary variable that equals to +1 in the case of a customer buy and -1 in 
case of a customer sell.
This measure uses a correction of the mid quote following the execution of the trade, vt+n> 
to reflect any possible information contained in the original trade.
In view of the uncertainty in the exact duration for price impacts across markets, three time 
horizons have been used for this analysis: (a) 5 minutes after the trade; (b) 30 minutes after 
trade; and (c) 45 minutes after the trade.
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Table 34: Dealers’ gross revenue on SEAQ system
P a n e l  A. M e a n  g r o s s  r e v e n u e  ( in  %) o n  SEAQ
5 minute 30 minute 45 minute
Portfolio Trade At Ask At Bid At Ask At Bid At Ask At Bid
I Small 0.6140 0.6239 0.6014 0.6112 0.5889 0.5984
I Medium 0.5383 0.5314 0.4187 0.3902 0.4068“ *0.3883
I Large 0.5457 0.5498 0.3672 0.3923 0.3549 0.3798
II Small 0.4249 0.4174 0.4185 0.4111 0.4098 0.4026
II Medium 0.3274 0.3327 0.2508 0.2492 0.2532 0.2314
II Large 0.3065 0.3119 0.2634 0.2711 0.2564 0.2539
III Small 0.3462 0.3433 0.3392 0.3259 0.3322 0.3191
III Medium 0.2712 0.2633 0.2191 0.2066 0.2128 0.1904
III Large 0.2571 0.2704 0.2221 0.2205 0.2159 0.2043
Dealers’ gross revenue is measured as the effective spread less the price impact generated 
by the trade as follows:
% gross revenue — 100 vt+n[*])ut[tl
where S B  a is a binary variable that equals to +1 in the case of a customer buy and -1 in case 
of a customer sell.
This measure uses a correction of the mid quote following the execution of the trade, vt+n, 
to reflect any possible information contained in the original trade.
In view of the uncertainty in the exact duration for price impacts across markets, three time 
horizons have been used for this analysis: (a) 5 minutes after the trade; (b) 30 minutes after 
trade; and (c) 45 minutes after the trade._________________________________________
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ated by medium sized trades. On IBIS, the same tendency obtains but the 
magnitude is smaller. Price impact for large trades on IBIS is not materially 
higher than that for medium sized trades, accounting for 67.02% of effective 
spreads. However, the results obtained for SEAQ trades are different.
In terms of classifying the magnitude of the adverse selection component, 
it is found that the costs associated with private information are highest 
on CAC, with the price impact wiping some 85% of the effective spread. 
This result can be compared to those obtained by de Jong et al. (1995) 
for the Paris Bourse. Using the Glosten (1994) model, they found that the 
adverse selection cost component of small trades amounts for 30% of the 
effective spread whereas it reaches 45% for large trades. When they used 
a VAR methodology to make the Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b, 1993) model 
operational, they found that the mean permanent price impact generated by 
large trades (defined as 1 X NMS) is in the region of 115% of the estimated 
effective bid-ask spread. The results obtained here would place the adverse 
selection cost component somewhere in between the two different estimates 
made by de Jong et al (1995).
After the first round of results obtained from the Huang and Stoll (1996) 
methodology, the algorithms proposed by George et al. (1991), Booth et a l 
(1995), Madhavan et a l (1997) and the Huang and Stoll (1997). Appendix 
E provides an extensive description of the different methodologies proposed 
by the latter set of models. These theoretical models are made operational 
through a trade-by-trade analysis. At this stage, one could ask whether a 
trade-by-trade approach is likely to impact the results. George, Kaul, and 
Nimalendran (1991) indicate that the differencing interval should not affect 
estimates of the order-processing cost and adverse selection components of 
the quoted spread. They suggest that the “use of high frequency data is more
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appropriate” because of potential small-sample bias. The intraday quote and 
transaction returns is used to calculate autocovariances and estimate these 
models using daily time-series observations.
The results obtained from the various metrics confirm those obtained from 
the Huang and Stoll (1996) methodology and show that the adverse selection 
component of the spreads are lowest on the dealership system. This suggest 
that although SEAQ produces the widest bid-ask spreads, these cannot be 
explained in terms of the adverse selection component. SEAQ market makers 
deal effectively with informed traders, possibly because of the relationships 
that are built. Hence different reasons should be found to explain wider 
spreads on dealership markets.
In view of the above results, Hypothesis 3o cannot be accepted since 
for most trades the adverse selection component of the effective spread is 
significantly lower on SEAQ.
It is pertinent to remember that the measure of the spread used in each 
of these methodologies to calculate the adverse selection component differs 
across the different algorithms. The George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) 
and the Booth, Lin and Sanger (1995) methodologies use the effective spread, 
the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) algorithm uses the implied 
spread whereas the adverse selection component measured on the lines of 
Huang and Stoll (1997) uses the spread as derived by the same authors. 
In view of these differences in terms of the spread used to calculate the 
adverse selection component, it is useful to analyse the correlation between 
the different measures. Table 38 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients 
which shows that the different measures are highly correlated within the same 
Exchange.
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Table 35: Adverse selection component (CAC and SEAQ)
P a n e l  A. A d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  c o m p o n e n t  o n  CAC
Portfolio Trade HS (96) GKN BLS MRR HS (97)
I Small 4.91 3.11 3.82 4.42 4.48
I Medium 79.12 49.69 58.22 61.28 61.04
I Large 84.56 50.12 59.10 64.12 63.61
II Small 5.21 4.54 4.01 5.72 4.95
II Medium 81.22 51.28 59.43 62.49 62.88
II Large 85.62 52.18 61.29 65.21 64.91
III Small 6.01 5.01 5.21 5.86 4.89
III Medium 82.41 52.11 60.01 65.88 64.81
III Large 86.98 53.02 62.46 68.14 66.21
P a n e l  B. A d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  c o m p o n e n t  o n  SEAQ 
Portfolio Trade
I Small 4.82 5.18 4.92 4.86 5.28
I Medium 50.89** 32.81** 36.70** 41.60** 44.17**
I Large 53.14** 34.58** 39.09** 43.15** 46.42**
II Small 6.02 5.96 4.51 5.46 5.81
II Medium 54.26** 34.61** 39.91** 42.82** 45.33**
II Large 55.81** 35.87** 42.21** 45.78** 49.82**
III Small 6.51 5.02 6.68 5.19 5.44
III Medium 56.11** 35.51** 40.97** 44.39** 47.87**
III Large 58.22** 36.89** 43.86** 47.96** 51.13**
The Table provides estimates of the adverse selection component of the spreads 
on CAC and SEAQ (in percentage terms).
The HS (96) estimates are measured using the Huang and Stoll (1996) approach 
on the effective spread. GKN estimate is calculated using the George, Kaul and 
Nimalendran (1991) measure and expressed on the quoted spreads; BLS refers to 
the measure proposed by Booth, Sangrm and Lin (1995) and expressed in terms 
of the effective spread; MRR is the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) 
methodology using the implied spread; while the HS (97) refers to the Huang and 
Stoll (1997) methodology.
An * or ** signify that the difference in the spread’s adverse selection component 
is significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 36: Adverse selection component (IBIS and SEAQ)
P a n e l  A. A d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  c o m p o n e n t  o n  IBIS
Portfolio Trade HS (96) GKN BLS MRR HS (97)
I Small 4.48 4.69 5.01 4.66 4.79
I Medium 65.01 39.31 46.72 49.18 51.96
I Large 67.82 40.82 48.81 51.69 53.15
II Small 4.98 4.81 5.09 4.81 5.01
II Medium 68.86 43.44 49.25 52.81 55.14
II Large 70.21 45.62 51.88 54.21 57.81
III Small 6.02 5.21 5.66 5.81 4.98
III Medium 69.98 45.39 51.21 54.48 56.09
III Large 71.22 47.42 53.67 56.58 59.98
P a n e l  B. A d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  c o m p o n e n t  o n  SEAQ 
Portfolio Trade
I Small 4.18 4.01 3.58 3.86 4.01
I Medium 49.18* 31.76* 35.17* 39.29* 43.02*
I Large 51.21* 32.18* 38.11* 41.88* 45.08*
II Small 5.11 4.51 4.22 4.01 4.06
II Medium 52.12* 33.26* 39.22* 41.04* 44.28*
II Large 53.02* 34.18* 41.02* 43.97* 46.64*
III Small 5.68 4.48 4.46 4.28 4.20
III Medium 54.18* 33.85* 39.22* 43.14* 45.29*
III Large 56.26* 34.82* 41.84* 45.19* 49.94*
The Table provides estimates of the adverse selection component of the spreads 
on IBIS and SEAQ (in percentage terms).
The HS (96) estimates are measured using the Huang and Stoll (1996) approach 
on the effective spread. GKN estimate is calculated using the George, Kaul and 
Nimalendran (1991) measure and expressed on the quoted spreads; BLS refers to 
the measure proposed by Booth, Sangpj? pnd Lin (1995) and expressed in terms 
of the effective spread; MRR is the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) 
methodology using the implied spread; while the HS (97) refers to the Huang and 
Stoll (1997) methodology.
An * or ** signify that the difference in the spread’s adverse selection component 
is significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 37: Adverse selection component (CAC and IBIS)
P a n e l  A .  A d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  c o m p o n e n t  o n  CAC
Portfolio Trade HS (96) GKN BLS MRR HS (97)
I Small 4.22 4.18 4.62 4.81 4.01
I Medium 77.42 47.19 56.26 60.19 60.92
I Large 82.14 51.62 57.46 62.05 62.14
II Small 4.62 4.18 4.29 4.45 4.52
II Medium 80.44 50.28 57.51 62.82 63.18
II Large 82.54 52.11 60.62 64.14 64.11
III Small 5.12 4.88 4.26 4.56 4.68
III Medium 81.11 51.22 60.81 64.71 63.92
III Large 84.09 52.14 62.02 68.42 65.18
P a n e l  B,. A d v e r s e  s e l e c t i o n  c o m p o n e n t  o n  IBIS
Portfolio Trade
I Small 4.85 4.02 4.18 4.29 4.15
I Medium 63.22 39.21* 44.12 49.91 50.86*
I Large 64.18* 38.18** 45.29* 51.28* 52.66*
II Small 5.06 4.29 4.41 4.56 4.18
II Medium 67.91 41.28 49.25* 51.08 54.08
II Large 68.09* 42.02* 50.28* 52.22* 55.61*
III Small 5.21 4.46 4.66 4.61 4.41
III Medium 69.12 43.08 51.81* 54.82 56.19
III Large 70.21** 42.84* 52.26* 55.22* 58.22*
The Table provides estimates of the adverse selection component of the spreads 
on CAC and IBIS (in percentage terms).
The HS (96) estimates are measured using the Huang and Stoll (1996) approach 
on the effective spread. GKN estimate is calculated using the George, Kaul and 
Nimalendran (1991) measure and expressed on the quoted spreads; BLS refers to 
the measure proposed by Booth, Sanger and Lin (1995) and expressed in terms 
of the effective spread; MRR is the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) 
methodology using the implied spread; while the HS (97) refers to the Huang and 
Stoll (1997) methodology.
An * or ** signify that the difference in the spread’s adverse selection component 
is significant at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence respectively using ASL.
Table 38: Correlation among the estimates of adverse selection
P a n e l  A. C o r r e l a t i o n  o n  CAC
HS(96) GKN BLS MRR HS(97)
HS (96) 1.00 0.52 0.66 0.72 0.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GKN 1.00 0.71 0.49 0.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BLS 1.00 0.51 0.76
(0.00) (0.00)
MRR 1.00 0.82
(0.00)
HS (97) 1.00
P a n e l  B. C o r r e l a t i o n  o n  IBIS
HS(96) GKN BLS MRR HS(97)
HS (96) 1.00 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GKN 1.00 0.79 0.52 0.61
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BLS 1.00 0.48 0.81
(0.00) (0.00)
MRR 1.00 0.86
(0.00)
HS (97) 1.00
P a n e l  C. C o r r e l a t i o n  o n  SEAQ
HS(96) GKN BLS MRR HS(97)
HS (96) 1.00 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.85
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GKN 1.00 0.82 0.50 0.72
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BLS 1.00 0.56 0.79
(0.00) (0.00)
MRR 1.00 0.89
(0.00)
HS (97) 1.00
The Table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between
the various measures of the adverse selection component 
The HS (96) refers to the Huang and Stoll (1996) approach; GKN 
refers to the George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) measure; BLS 
refers to the Booth, Sanger and Lin (1995) methodology; MRR is 
the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) approach; while 
the HS (97) is the Huang and Stoll (1997) methodology.
3.8 M otivations for the Results
To recapitulate, the results show that (a) quoted and effective spreads are 
higher on a dealership system, compared to both the pure order book system 
and the hybrid platform; (b) quoted and effective spreads on the hybrid 
system is significantly lower compared to the pure limit order book; and (c) 
the higher dealership spreads are not due to the adverse selection present in 
the market.
3.8.1 Higher Dealership Spreads
The possible explanations for the wider SEAQ spreads are higher (a) adverse 
selection, (b) inventory carrying, (c) processing costs, (d) higher realised prof­
its earned by SEAQ market makers, or (e) institutional factors and trading 
behaviour that influence liquidity provision and spreads.
The results obtained for the adverse selection component are consistent 
with those obtained by Huang and Stoll (1996) for the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
Our results show that limit order traders on CAC and IBIS tend to suffer 
from private information more than SEAQ market makers.
As stated earlier, the reason for lower adverse election component on deal­
ership markets can be attributed to trading practices, such as preferencing 
and internalisation, that give rise to long-term business relationships between 
traders and market makers. This relationship can best be explained in terms 
of a repeated game where reputation is of importance. In such a relation­
ship, it is quite difficult for informed traders to hide their private information 
from the market maker because there is a repeated use of the market makers’ 
services.
When investigating LSE market makers’ profits, Hansch et al. (1998) 
found that they made profits on small trades, broke even on large trades but
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lost money on medium-sized trades. This finding implies that market mak­
ers do not cover completely themselves against adverse selection when they 
accept to execute medium-sized orders. In doing so, they provide narrower 
spreads (for medium sized trades) when they should widen them to protect 
themselves from informed traders.
Inventory management on SEAQ has been analysed, in particular the 
pre-positioning and post-positioning of market makers, by Board and Sut­
cliffe (1995). The implication from such results is that dealership markets are 
flexible in terms of accommodating different types of trades, using inventory 
levels to accommodate the order flow. Applying the Ho and Macris (1985) 
argument, one can conclude that continuous deviation from the optimal in­
ventory level produces a cost to the market makers that has to be covered 
by wider bid-ask spreads.
However, the impact of inventory holding costs cannot be overestimated. 
Although inventory management is undoubtedly an essential part of a market 
maker’s operations, SEAQ market makers could hedge the inventory risk by 
either taking positions in the derivative markets; and/or make use of the Inter 
Dealer Broker system that provides market makers with a market where to 
adjust and properly manage inventory positions.
After having investigated adverse selection and inventory holding costs, 
we need to consider the level of competition in each system as a possible 
explanation for the differences in the spreads. Existing literature shows that 
the monopoly power of dealers can contribute in a significant way to the 
formation of spreads.
Firstly, both CAC and IBIS systems allow public traders to submit limit 
orders, increasing competition in these systems. In the case of IBIS, these 
public traders will compete with the quotes submitted by the designated deal­
172
ers (the kursmakler). On SEAQ, before the market reforms in 1997, public 
traders were not allowed to compete with the designated market makers.
Secondly, limit orders which were allowed on CAC and IBIS are intrin­
sically different from the market orders submitted on a dealership system 
and as such induce different trading behaviour. An impatient trader using 
limit orders must price such orders very aggressively for them to be executed. 
Moreover, using the free option hypotheses proposed by Copeland and Galai 
(1983) suggests that rapid changes in market conditions can make limit or­
ders to go stale and fast quote revisions must be entered; otherwise such 
orders will be picked off. This can explain why quote revisions on CAC and 
IBIS are much more frequent than on SEAQ, reflecting limit orders traders’ 
attempt to avoid staleness.
A related approach is based on the free options hypothesis, which could 
be at work on dealership markets in two contrasting ways. On one hand, 
if a market maker gains operational savings by not writing free options he 
should be in a position to share some of these savings with public traders 
by guaranteeing at least best execution. This result, however, depends on 
the market makers’ power. On the other hand, analysing the issue from a 
market-wide perspective, the market makers’ unwillingness to submit fre­
quent quote revisions and avoid giving free options to public traders, leads 
to less competition in quote revisions, resulting in wider bid-ask spreads.
Thirdly, the levels of commissions charged across the different markets 
should also be investigated. Indeed, if the commission levels are lower on 
SEAQ compared to both CAC and IBIS, this could partly explain the higher 
spread levels; in that case, market makers would be charging their clients less 
on commissions and charging them more in terms of spreads.
Although such an analysis could lead to some interesting results, this is
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hampered by lack of appropriate data that can produce a meaningful com­
parison across the different systems. In fact, after the so-called Big Bang in 
1986, the commissions charged by market makers were liberalised and each 
single market maker could charge his own commissions without any reference 
to any official commissions schedule. This state of affairs makes it difficult 
to compare commissions across the different trading systems since no general 
result could be obtained.
A more fruitful avenue is to consider the trading practices on dealership 
markets (such as preferencing and internalisation) can produce an important 
impact on spreads’ formation since they could be restricting competition in 
a number of ways. Such practices are possible on SEAQ but are of difficult 
implementation on CAC and IBIS.
Market concentration on SEAQ appears to be materially different from 
what obtains on CAC and IBIS. Data for the different market concentration 
indices is not homogenous over the three systems. SEAQ data is collected 
for the period January-February 1996, the Paris Bourse and the Deutsche 
Borse provided data for January 1996.
The largest three market makers on SEAQ are involved in over 50% of 
the total £-denominated volume. The market is even more concentrated 
when the number of trades is considered. An interesting feature is the fact 
that small orders appear to be mostly channelled to the biggest three market 
makers.
Figure 20 shows the concentration ratio for the first five dealers/market 
makers on the three markets. While the biggest five SEAQ market markets 
transact over 70% of the £-denominated volume, the biggest five CAC dealers 
transact 41% of the market (the Fff-denominated volume) and the respec­
tive biggest five IBIS dealers transact almost 30.5% of the DM-denominated
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volume. SEAQ is more concentrated than either CAC or IBIS and this level 
of concentration is expected to produce a direct impact on how the different 
market makers use quotes to compete for business.
To complement this analysis, an adjusted Herfindahl Index was imple­
mented to assess market concentration. Following Mclnish and Wood (1992), 
the Herfindahl Index is calculated in the following way:
concentration =  ^1 — p f'j /  ^(n — 1) P?
where Pi is the market share of each market maker or dealer and n is the 
number of market maker or dealers trading on the market. The Herfindahl 
Index for SEAQ is 0.532358 whereas the Index for IBIS reaches just 0.267629.
These results appear to show that, after controlling for variables that 
have been previously found to influence spreads, the lack of competition in 
the market for liquidity provision is one of the major reason influencing the 
level of trading costs on different trading systems.
3.8.2 Order Book vs. Hybrid Spread Differential
The results show that the hybrid system has consistently generated lower 
spreads compared to the continuous auction system. In view of this, insti­
tutional and structural differences between the two systems, such as cost of 
access, the market position and the market concentration in the two systems 
were analysed to search for possible explanations.
One major factor that could explain the spread differential is the level 
of market concentration on the two markets both in terms of the number of 
registered dealers trading on the two systems and the market share of the 
biggest dealers. The number of societe de bourse trading on CAC was over 
60 as of January 1996 whereas there were 118 dealers trading on IBIS in the 
period January-November 1996. The data for IBIS dealers shows that out of
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these 118 dealers, some 92 dealers had a market share of less than 1% in the 
period January-November 1996. These figures show that IBIS has managed 
to attract a higher number of dealers, possibly because the cost of access, in 
this case the fixed costs components, are lower on IBIS compared to those 
for CAC.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the market share data shows 
that concentration on IBIS is materially lower than on CAC. The Herfindahl 
Index, calculated in the same fashion as above, shows a value of 0.2514 for 
IBIS whereas the value for CAC reaches 0.35621, indicating that concentra­
tion is higher on CAC compared to IBIS. Figure 20 shows that the biggest 
three dealers on CAC have a market share of almost 30% whereas the biggest 
three on IBIS command 22% of the market share. These results imply that 
competition for the order flow is higher between IBIS dealers than CAC deal­
ers. This higher level of competition is expected to translate itself into more 
aggressive quoting strategies so as to attract order flow to the individual 
dealer.
From information provided by the Paris Bourse and the Deutsche Borse it 
appears that the cost of access to the CAC system is somewhat larger than 
that for IBIS. The Paris Bourse defines two types of traders: (a) traders 
who will only trade for customers in the capacity as brokers; and (b) traders 
who may act as dual-capacity brokers-dealers, generally called as societe de 
bourse. The fixed costs incurred by a broker to access the CAC is Ffr400,500 
per year; a societe de bourse incurs Ffr400,000 per year to become a member 
of the Paris Bourse and then pay Ffrl50,000 for every broker it employs with 
another Ffr200,000 being paid to cover the clearing of transactions. The fixed 
costs for an IBIS trader are, in absolute terms, lower than those on CAC; 
each IBIS trader pays an annual fixed cost of DM2,500 in order to access the
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system.
The structure of variable access costs is different in the two systems and 
appears to be more expensive on CAC. Trades on CAC carry the following 
trading charges: (a) trades smaller than 10,000 shares pay Ffr 13; (b) trades 
involving 10,000 to 20,000 shares pay Ffr 11; (c) trade sizes between 20,000 
to 30,000 shares pay Ffr9; (d) trade sizes between 30,000 and 40,000 shares 
pay Fff7; (e) trade sizes between 40,000 and 50,000 shares pay Ffr5; (f) trade 
sizes bigger than 50,000 shares pay Ffr3. In addition to the trade charges, 
the CAC traders have to pay Ffr2 for every order submitted on the book. 
On the other hand, the IBIS cost structure was based on a flat charge of 
DM3.5 for every trade transacted and there were no charges for submitting 
any order on the book.
Since most of the trades on CAC fall within the trade size band of 1- 
10,000 shares, the cost of an average CAC trade of Ffr 13 (together with the 
additional Ff2 for each order submitted) must be compared with the total 
transaction cost of DM3.5. The variable costs of access to the system tend 
to be marginally lower on IBIS compared to CAC, implying that suppliers of 
liquidity are expected to pay less on the IBIS system compared to the CAC 
system. In addition, the dual-responsibility dealers, who trade on behalf of 
customers and for their own account, face lower variable costs when using 
IBIS. In this sense, IBIS can be seen as a hit-and-take system, cheap in terms 
of processing costs.
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3.9 Conclusions
This Chapter analysed trading frictions and their sources in three different 
market microstructures: (a) a pure dealership system; (b) a pure order book 
driven platform; and (c) a hybrid trading system. Liquidity provision in these 
three systems is undertaken by different market participants. In addition, 
the institutional set-up (in terms of transparency, entry in the market, etc.) 
varies across these three systems.
The analysis employs comparable orders (by size) across the different 
trading systems and the conclusions that are drawn are based, exclusively, 
on these types of orders. The results obtained in this Chapter show that 
SEAQ market makers post spreads that are much wider than those posted 
by CAC and IBIS dealers. When effective spreads are investigated, we find 
that these are also wider on SEAQ compared with the other two markets. 
In addition, both the quoted spreads and the effective spreads on IBIS, for 
most trade locations, are the tightest when compared to all the other systems, 
implying that a hybrid system produces spreads that are narrower than both 
a dealership and an auction system. A closer analysis of trading shows that 
competition between different liquidity providers is highest on the hybrid 
system.
The evidence shows that, after controlling for variables that have been 
previously found to influence spreads, market-microstructure explains the 
absolute level of spreads generated on different market architectures. It is 
found that the order book-based and the hybrid systems generate lower bid- 
ask spreads than the dealership market.
The empirical results provide a confirmation of the Viswanathan and 
Wang (1998) hypotheses that a well-calibrated hybrid trading system domi­
nates both dealership and order book systems.
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The surprising result from this Chapter is that the hybrid system adopted 
for some time by the German Borse, IBIS, generated spreads which are gen­
erally lower than those on the order book-based system.
This result is important for policy makers and regulators because it shows 
that interacting the order book with designated dealers can actually improve 
liquidity and markets’ quality. The issue then becomes finding the right 
balance between the order book and the role of dealers and fine-tuning this 
balance is likely to be an arduous task.
The Chapter also shows that trade information is “digested” differently 
in different market microstructures and the strategic behaviour that results 
impact trading frictions in various ways. Mandatory market makers in a pure 
dealership system are likely to identify private information better than limit 
order trades on the order book or on a hybrid system. In fact, the adverse 
selection component is highest on the order book and lowest in the dealership 
system.
Mandatory market makers contribute to the price discovery process through 
their screening function for which they must be compensated through a 
higher spread. On the other hand, order book-based systems generate lower 
trading frictions but the risk of trading with informed traders is higher. These 
results indicate that, once more, there are different trade-offs in market de­
signs that should be fully addressed.
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C hapter 4. Spreads Dynam ics
4.1 Introduction
In the previous Chapter we have analysed the absolute levels of quoted and 
effective spreads in three different market microstructures, producing also an 
investigation of the adverse selection component in each market. A natural 
question that arises is how bid-ask spreads are formed in each trading system 
and which are the major factors driving the formation of spreads. For ex­
ample, are there any market microstructure-specific effects or are spreads in 
different markets responding to common factors? How do liquidity providers 
react to volatility in the market? Do market makers behave differently than 
limit order traders when volatility increases? How do they react when the ar­
rival of information intensifies? Can concentration in the market for liquidity 
provision account for the different spread levels?
In order to answer these questions, we start from the analysis undertaken 
in Chapter 3 and build on it so as to analyse the spread dynamics. In line with 
the previous Chapter, we use Paris Bourse’s CAC system to represent a pure 
limit order book, Deutsche Borse’s IBIS platform to capture the dynamics 
of a hybrid system and the LSE’s SEAQ market to represent a dealership 
market. Our aim is not only to investigate whether microstructure effects 
hold when controlling for the level of competition in each market, but also to 
understand how liquidity providers behave under different market conditions.
There are many institutional and market microstructure differences be­
tween automated screen-based trading systems on one hand and dealership 
systems (or floor-based trading) on the other. It is important to investigate 
whether these institutional designs can impact transaction costs; such an is­
sue is becoming central to traders and portfolio managers who transact across 
different markets in their bid to reach international diversification. In this
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Chapter, we shall focus the discussion on the impact that such differences 
may have on the spread, its intra-daily evolution and its components.
The emergence of screen-based systems, which is now being used by many 
Exchanges in some form or another, has led to a substantial body of theoreti­
cal and empirical work analysing, in some instances, the main characteristics 
of screen-based systems and, in other instances, comparing it with dealership- 
based trading. Most of these studies (for example, Glosten, 1994, Domowitz 
and Wang, 1994, Bollerslev, Domowitz and Wang, 1997) demonstrate that, 
under normal conditions and when information arrival is not too intense, the 
market quality characteristics of electronic trading is not any worse when 
compared to dealership systems (and floor trading systems). It has also been 
established that trading costs and market depth for small to medium sized 
traders are, on the whole, better when carried out on screen-based systems. 
For example, some empirical work shows that automated systems appear to 
incorporate trade information more rapidly than floor trading (designed as 
a dealership system). At the same time, there is evidence indicating that 
at times of intense information arrival, dealership-based systems are able to 
generate more efficient prices.
Market designs affect the way in which traders’ information is impounded 
in prices. When a liquidity provider, whether a limit order trader or a market 
maker, announces or posts quotes she is effectively providing a short option 
position. The time to expiration of such a position is equal to the time re­
quired to make revisions to the same quote. Such time differs across different 
trading systems.
In a dealership system, the quote can be seen as remaining valid only as 
long as the market maker decides to change it. Sometimes such action does 
not involve going through official channels, such as removing the quotes from
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the screen; in such systems, quotes are valid as long as “the breath is warm”.
This is not the case in screen-based trading where the limit order trader 
has to withdraw her quote, creating de facto an environment where quotes 
can be exposed for a longer period compared to a dealership system, increas­
ing the value of the short option position.
There Eire various channels through which the difference in quote setting 
behaviour can impact spread dynamics. Firstly, the mechanics of screen- 
based^ trading render quote revision costly and time consuming operations 
(relative to dealership systems). Secondly, limit order traders have to leave 
their quotes on the screen for a longer period, making them more vulnerable 
to traders with superior trade information. There is a higher probability of 
their quotes being “picked off” , effectively providing an incentive to liquidity 
providers to set higher spreads to compensate for potential losses they could 
incur by trading with traders holding superior information.
The dynamics driving the quote submission is not the only major differ­
ence across the different trading systems. The way information flows and the 
channels employed by traders to impound such information in prices are also 
different. Market makers are expected to have good information on the pre­
vailing market conditions since they enter into direct contact with traders, 
getting to know their identity and their trading styles and learning about 
their previous transactions. Market makers can learn from this process and 
the signals they receive through the bilateral negotiation with large traders 
will help them to adjust their inventory, and more importantly, the spread in 
anticipation of large orders. They may also anticipate a particular traders’ 
behaviour by estimating her inventory position.
Arguably, since dealership systems are, in general, not centralised but 
rather fragmented, these advantages can be toned down by the fact that in­
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formation collection and dissemination is not centralised, reducing the market 
makers’ feel of the market.
In comparison, screen-based trading is built on the notion of centralised 
markets where trade information is pooled at one place. For example, limit 
order traders generally have better access to real time fundamental infor­
mation given by price movements across several markets. Post trade trans­
parency is generally higher in screen-based systems compared to dealership 
platforms. For example, most screen-based trading systems publish market 
depth at different prices. However, limit order traders are isolated from each 
other and full information about traders’ identity and their previous trading 
is not known. In effect, these limitations could hinder their feel of the market, 
making limit order traders more concerned with asymmetric information.
In addition, given the nature of the interaction between liquidity providers 
and traders on both systems, the effect of asymmetric information is likely to 
be different. Traders recognise that the presence of information-based trading 
is likely to increase the bid-ask spread and reduce the volume and revenue 
from liquidity trading, making the provision of liquidity more problematic. 
This position has been argued by Benveniste et al. (1992) who show that 
dealership-based trading can reduce the effects of asymmetric information on 
the trading process.
To a large extent, the long-standing professional relationships that exist 
between market makers and traders in a dealership system are expected to 
induce cooperation among the two counter-parties, giving the market maker 
the added advantage of improved learning from trading and the extraction 
of better signals from successive orders.
These relationships, which cannot exist in an order book-driven system, 
are likely to act as a deterrent, limiting the traders’ ability to exploit their
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own superior information in a systematic way. Traders who are perceived to 
make substantial benefits at the expense of market makers are likely to get 
some form of sanction from the market making community
In conclusion, a market maker is able to receive a higher level of infor­
mation and hence can form a better view of the trading motivation, style 
and strategies of traders in the market. This implies that, everything else 
remaining constant, the quotes submitted by the market maker are likely to 
be more competitive and stable over the trading day.
This Chapter investigates (a) the impact exercised by market microstruc­
tures on the formation of the spread; (b) whether competition in the market 
for the provision of liquidity also matters to explain spreads levels, and (c) liq­
uidity providers’ quote setting behaviour under different market conditions. 
To reach the objective of disentangling the effects of market microstructures 
from other effects, that are presumed to impact the spread, we must employ 
a methodology that clearly separates the various effects.
We proceed as follows. First we investigate the intraday patterns of spread 
formation together with the evolution of trading over the day. We analyse 
how total volumes, number of trades and trade sizes vary across the three 
markets under consideration. Following this preliminary analysis, an inves­
tigation of the effective spread’s drivers is carried out, taking into consider­
ation both the arrival of news on the market and the concentration levels 
in the market for liquidity provision. We find that the hybrid type of trad­
ing appears to generate the lowest effective spreads and such result holds 
even after controlling for (public) news arrival and market competition. This 
means that market microstructure effects do matter in terms of explaining 
the levels of the effective spreads generated by the different markets.
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 goes through the literature
186
review and Section 3 provides the data and methodology. Section 4 presents 
the results obtained for the various models tested together with a discussion 
and Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Extant Literature
One simple approach to investigate the formation of spreads is to assume that 
traders submit orders for purely exogenous reasons. In this way, the model 
can focus exclusively on dealers’ behaviour during the process of suppling 
immediacy to (liquidity motivated) traders. The seminal work in this branch 
of the literature was proposed by Demsetz (1968), and Tinic (1968). Such 
models do not contemplate competition between dealers, in the sense that 
there is a single dealer providing liquidity to traders who submit their orders 
in an asynchronous fashion dictated by a pre-determined statistical processes.
In such a trading set-up, the dealer stands ready to accommodate the 
order flow arriving on the market. The major influence that the dealer is 
allowed to have in this strand of literature is limited to his quote setting 
behaviour: quotes are set in a way as to enable the dealer to equilibrate the 
stream of buy and sell orders. The main point here is an optimal behaviour 
adopted by dealers in order not to deviate from their preferred inventory level. 
These models consider only the inventory-effect (rather than the presence of 
superior information in the market). As a result, the spread exists in order 
to compensate the dealer for standing in the market as a permanent counter­
party for orders hitting the market. In this sense, the major contribution 
of the market maker is the reduction of search costs incurred by the trading 
community.
The issue of competition was neither considered by Amihud and Mendel- 
son (1980, 1982) who make use of a monopolistic price-setter (market maker)
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to show the optimal price setting policy under the assumption of profit max­
imisation. The main features of this behaviour are the following: (a) the bid 
and ask quotes are set in a way that will balance the volumes submitted by 
buy and sell traders; (b) the spread between the two sides will reach its mini­
mum and this leads to a maximisation of combined volume transacted in the 
market; (c) the market maker will keep in mind her preferred inventory posi­
tion, with deviations being materially costly; and (d) the securities’ volatility 
is not taken into consideration in determining quotes and their submission.
All these models leave out one major characteristic of the trading process: 
competition for the order flow. In a market microstructure context, competi­
tion can be introduced from two main sources: (a) competition coming from 
other market makers (or dealers) present in the market; or (b) limit order 
traders who submit orders that compete with the market maker for the or­
der flow. One way to model competition in the market place is to consider a 
game theoretic set-up in order to allow for strategic positions that dealers can 
adopt vis-a-vis (a) other dealers, and (b) limit order traders in the market.
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981 and 1986) and Ho and Stoll 
(1983) were the first proponents of models where competition is analysed; 
the major focus being on the dealers’ optimal bidding policy and how this 
influence market equilibria. In the former model, there is an analysis of the 
trader’s choice between limit orders and market orders where a trader has 
to balance expected price with order execution and faces a choice between 
submitting a limit order, that has no execution certainty, and a market order 
that gives the trader certainty of execution. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and 
Whitcomb (1981 and 1986) show that traders will not place limit orders 
close to the best spread but will submit a market order at a close price (worse 
that the best spread) which gives them execution certainty. In equilibrium,
188
the optimal spread is the product of two opposite forces: (a) the incentive 
to place limit orders below the market ask or above the bid that will only 
execute with some probability, and (b) the incentive to submit orders at the 
market price which guarantee execution.
In Ho and Stoll (1983) there is an investigation of the choice of the op­
timal bid and ask quotes with the major concern being competition in a 
centralised market. The approach adopted by this model tries to simplify 
the competition process by treating limit orders as equivalent to the posted 
quotes of dealers. The same approach was adopted by Biais (1993) who ar­
gues that a centralised market is characterised by firm orders that axe visible 
to all traders and where information about the orders flow is complete. On 
the other hand, a market where the posted quotes are effectively visible to 
only one trader (or a sub-set of traders) and information is incomplete can 
be modelled as a fragmented market. Biais models the former as an English, 
or progressive, auction while the latter is modelled as a sealed bid, or Dutch, 
auction.
The bidders’ strategic actions in the progressive and sealed bid auctions 
were first analysed by Vickrey (1961). Bidders in the English auction hold 
different reservation values (the price at which the bidder would be indifferent 
between trading and not trading), and each bidder will go on increasing her 
bids as the auction progresses until her reservation value is reached. The 
bidder will drop out of the auction when this reservation value is obtained 
and the last bidder standing in the auction will win. In this type of auction, 
the selling price is effectively set by the second best reservation value.
In the sealed bid auction, the price is lowered in successive rounds until 
a bid is received from one of the bidders, producing the winning bid. Hence, 
in the Dutch auction, each bidder has to base her bidding strategy on her
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(subjective) conjecture of the strategies of competing participants. As the 
price is lowered, a larger pool of bidders will participate in the auction and 
each bidder must weigh the benefit of allowing the price to fall further against 
the increasing probability that a bid will be submitted by another partici­
pant. The major result generated by Vickrey (1961) is the equivalence of the 
selling price in both forms of auctions: the well-known result of the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem. However, the price variance is higher in the English 
auction than in the Dutch auction.
Biais employs the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to show that the spread 
obtained in the two different market set-ups - whether centralised or frag­
mented - is the same in equilibrium; only the variance of the spread will be 
different. This result holds even if participants are risk-averse. Indeed, one of 
the model’s main assumptions is that all participants have different degrees 
of risk aversion, implying that traders’ private valuation of the security differ.
This model can be easily applied to the three markets being investigated 
here and this can help us in generating hypotheses about spread behaviour. 
Trading on CAC and IBIS is conducted via a screen based system that display 
the best quotes (the best five in the case of CAC and the best ten in the case 
of IBIS) and sizes on the two sides of the market. On IBIS, these prices are 
firm. All information is available from the screen to all market participants, 
with high pre- and post-trade transparency, making these systems examples 
of centralised markets. On the other hand, we can consider SEAQ as a 
fragmented market even though market makers submit their quotes on the 
screen. Notwithstanding this feature, we consider SEAQ to be a fragmented 
market because (a) these quotes were posted to show indicative prices, with 
traders having to solicit firm quotes by telephone from market makers, and 
(b) of the opaqueness of the post-trade transparency, especially for large
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trades. Given that not all traders shared the same information, SEAQ is 
best described as a fragmented market.
On the other hand, Viswanathan and Wang (1998) focus on the choice 
of market architectures that the customer takes in order to decide where to 
trade, with the decision being taken before the trader observes the order 
size (the model considers orders that vary from a minimum to a maximum 
size). The trading location decision is between a trading set-up that can 
take the form of (a) dealership, (b) order book, or (c) hybrid system. In 
the hybrid system, limit orders are only accepted for quantities that are 
smaller than some exogenously fixed level. The model makes extensive use 
of the “bid reduction” which is present in both the dealership market and the 
limit-order book but operates differently across these two market structures. 
The amount of bid reduction is increasing in the quantity obtained in the 
dealership market and is decreasing in the order book. This results in demand 
functions that are flatter in the book.
In the dealership system, there is a finite number of risk averse market 
makers that compete for the order flow. In equilibrium, the market makers’ 
trading strategies account for the pre-trading inventory positions, the pricing 
and order routing rules adopted by the Exchange. However, due to the 
flatter demand curve in the order book, price competition is fiercer in this 
system but this is partially offset by the presence of a zero-quantity price 
discount (or “zero-quantity spread”), not present in the dealership market. 
The model’s major results are the product of the trade-off between the bid 
reduction effect and the zero-quantity spread that work in different ways in 
the different trading platforms.
The main results can be described as follows: (a) for very small order 
size variation, a trader would always choose the limit-order market over a
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dealership market; (b) when the trader must make the choice on the trad­
ing location before the order size is observed, the limit-order book becomes 
the preferred location by all risk neutral customers; (c) when suppliers of 
order flow are risk averse, there is no dominance of the limit-order book over 
dealership market; (d) the dealership market becomes the preferred trading 
location when the variability in order sizes (i) is significant, and (ii) when 
there is a large number of market makers present in the market; and (e) when 
the dealership market is found to dominate the order book, a hybrid structure 
can further improve traders’ welfare on the exclusively dealer market.
The first result is obtained from the fact that the zero-quantity spread 
is relatively unimportant when the variation in the order sizes is low and, 
hence, a flat demand curve makes the book a better choice for this trader. 
For orders that can vary a lot in size, there is a greater amount of price 
variation associated with the multiple prices at which the orders are filled 
in a limit-order book. The added source of uncertainty tends to cause the 
risk averse customer to favour a dealership market. As the number of market 
makers increases, the demand function in a limit-order book becomes steeper 
while the demand function in a dealership market becomes flatter.
The model employs a trade size cutoff level (exogenously chosen) and or­
ders greater than this size cannot be executed in the book and must be routed 
to the dealership market. When the cutoff point is chosen appropriately, the 
hybrid limit-order book/dealership market generates higher trading profits 
for the customer than the pure dealership market.
The empirical work that has investigated the impact of market microstruc­
ture on spreads have considered the impacts generated by reforms in market 
systems. Two major market reforms carried out in the last few years and 
which have provided natural experiments for this type of literature were the
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reforms on NASDAQ and LSE. Barclay et al. (1997) find that the rule 
change, allowing wider scope for limit orders to be submitted to the market, 
narrowed the quoted and effective spreads by some 30% from the pre-reform 
trading. The biggest drop in transaction costs were actually registered for 
the widest spreads. The narrowing of the spread was not obtained at the 
cost of a lower liquidity; in fact, market depth was not materially affected 
after the rule change.
Naik and Yadav (1999) investigate the effects of the LSE reforms on (i) 
levels of the spread; and (b) intra-day patterns of the spread. The first result 
they obtain is that effective half spread of public investors has narrowed 
after the reforms and this improvement in trading costs has been much more 
marked than the corresponding change on NASDAQ and documented by 
Barclay et a l (1998). In addition, the change from obligatory to voluntary 
market making has produced another significant result: an increase in the 
“positioning revenue” earned by voluntary dealers from a change in the price 
of a stock while they carry the stock in their inventory. This implies that 
the overall gain of public investors in terms of the realised half-spread is not 
significantly different from zero.
The cross-subsidisation across trade sizes which characterised the deal­
ership system before the reforms has disappeared with the result that the 
average execution costs of small public trades has decreased whereas those 
for large public trades have increased. Finally, the inside half-spread has in­
creased very sharply in the first hour of trading, implying that market makers 
in a dealership system contributed significantly to price stabilisation during 
the market’s opening.
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4.3 D ata  and M ethodology
The data used in this Chapter for the analysis of spread formation is identical 
to the data used in Chapter 3. More information about the data, the sources 
and data type, is provided in that Chapter.
The pairing methodology used is also identical to the one used in Chapter 
3. In fact, we pair securities across the three different markets using a similar 
methodology to the one used in the previous Chapter. Table 39 shows de­
scriptive statistics for the firm characteristics in relation to the CAC-listed, 
IBIS-listed and SEAQ-listed securities.
The major objective is to devise a paired sample based on similar risk 
characteristics leaving institutional differences to explain the differences in 
the evolution of the spreads in the different trading platforms. We employ 
the Fama and French (1992) and the Heston et al. (1998) to pair securities 
across markets. Appendix B reviews both the Fama and French (1992) and 
the Heston et al. (1998) methodologies.
The first pairing exercise is based on the Fama-French (1992) framework 
and takes into consideration three major factors. First, paired securities 
across markets must be in the same industrial sector. Secondly, the securi­
ties were paired so as to minimise the “book-to market” values (Book Eq­
uity/Market Equity) and “size” (Market Equity) premia differences across 
the exchanges.
Having carried out the first pairing exercise, the second one is imple­
mented based on the Heston et al (1998) framework. The first condition is 
that paired securities must be in the same industrial sector and then pair­
ing took place in terms of minimising the Beta and ME differences across 
securities trading on different systems.
One of the most important issues that must be addressed in studies such
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Table 39: Firms’ characteristics of CAC-, IBIS- and SEAQ-listed
securities
P a n e l  A :  C A C - l i s t e d  s e c u r i t i e s
Market cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size
Portfolio I 1,528.62 
Portfolio II 3,816.52 
Portfolio III 15,701.06
2.81
3.58
3.02
0.98
0.97
1.08
41.92
49.28
63.58
P a n e l  B :  I B I S - l i s t e d  s e c u r i t i e s
Market cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size
Portfolio I 1,601.78 
Portfolio II 3,782.95 
Portfolio III 16,519.56
2.18
2.41
2.67
1.02
1.04
1.08
86.92
96.21
150.02
P a n e l  C: S E A Q - l i s t e d  s e c u r i t i e s
Market cap (in £m) ME/BE Beta Mean Price (£)
Firm size
Portfolio I 2,162.18 
Portfolio II 3,528.96 
Portfolio III 13,061.71
2.08
2.51
2.86
0.89
0.98
1.02
2.61
5.08
6.98
The three firm capitalisation categories were obtained on the basis 
of the firm’s market capitalisation as at the end of December 1995. 
Portfolio I contains firms with a market capitalisation of less than 
£2,500m; Portfolio II contains firms with capitalisation larger than 
£2,500m but lower than £5,000m; while Portfolio III has firms with 
a capitalisation larger than £5,000m.
Market capitalisation, ME/BE, beta and price were extracted from 
Datastream and refer to values obtained at the end of December 
1995. Reported statistics refer to mean values.
as this one, when different trading environments are being compared, is to 
devise a proper methodology that can separate the effect of the market mi­
crostructure from the effects generated by the general market environment, 
mainly the presence of private information, news arrival (which is related to 
the level of asymmetric information), and market concentration for liquidity 
provision. In each model tested, we shall take into consideration the effect of 
these variables and we shall try to control for them. Data for market concen- - 
tration was provided by the various Exchanges whereas news announcements, 
which in our case are earnings and dividend announcements, major changes in 
board composition and mergers and takeovers announcements, are obtained 
from the Financial Times.
4.4 Intraday Patterns
A starting point for this analysis is an investigation of intraday patterns in 
order to document some preliminary evidence on how spreads and volume, 
orders, order size, etc. evolve during the trading day. The intraday patterns 
of the evolution of quoted spreads, the size of orders executed, the number 
of trades and total volume transacted axe all factors that must be considered 
in order to have a more comprehensive analysis of transaction costs.
Intraday patterns are important because they indicate which are the peri­
ods with liquidity surpluses and and those characterised by liquidity deficits. 
The ability to obtain “good” prices from trading is a function of liquidity 
in the market and this is, in turn, related to the number of traders that 
congregate on the market to deal. There is ample evidence that traders are 
not present on the market all the time; rather markets experience substantial 
variations in terms of trading activity over the day.
A number of theories try to explain the reasons behind these patterns and
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how these intra day variations can arise endogenously. Some of the theories 
emphasise differences in the type of traders present in the market, building 
on the nature of the demand submitted by traders who are informed versus 
demand submitted by liquidity-motivated traders. The implicit idea behind 
such models is that superior information is time-sensitive, creating liquidity 
patterns over the trading day.
Other theories assume that traders act out of exogenously-determined 
factors. This is the case of Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990). The idea behind such models is based on the notion that 
trade concentration is beneficial to both liquidity-motivated traders - because 
they can get the best prices when liquidity is high - and to informed traders 
- because these can camouflage their activity and obtain better prices than 
when they trade in periods of low liquidity. It all depends on whether both 
sets of traders are allowed to choose the time at which they can trade. If these 
traders are allowed this freedom, then all traders will desire to trade when all 
other market participants are also active. Since this process produces some 
beneficial results - transactions axe at their cheapest - trade concentration 
takes place. These models predict that more traders will come to the market 
as volume increases and this lowers the spreads on markets.
But trade concentration is not always seen as beneficial in terms of reduc­
ing trading costs. One such model, proposed by Brock and Kleidon (1992), 
make the opposite prediction. In this model, there is no distinction between , 
informed and liquidity traders but it assumes that the motivation for trading 
depends on the traders’ need to adjust their optimal portfolio. The need for 
portfolio adjustments arise from the arrival of information and this will de­
termine the intraday patterns in trading activity in that information is being 
released continuously.
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The most important adjustments are likely to occur in two different peri­
ods: (a) when the market opens, and (b) when the market closes. In the case 
of the open, traders have to adjust their optimal portfolio to reflect the in­
formation they received in the overnight period when the market for trading 
was closed but the market of information was not. In terms of the market 
closure, market participants are assumed to correctly predict the market’s 
closing period and they have to adjust their portfolio in view of the period 
over which they cannot trade. These considerations led Brock and Kleidon 
(1992) to argue that opening and closing volumes will be higher than those 
over the rest of the trading days and by implication the spread will also be 
highest in these periods.
In terms of intraday patterns in volume, orders, etc. on the Paris Bourse, 
Biais et al. (1995) document that new orders tend to be submitted in the 
morning, near the market’s open. Likewise, small trades also tend to execute 
in the morning. These two results are important because they show which 
type of orders axe being used by traders to establish the security’s price when 
the market opens. Indeed, given the overnight period, in which trading does 
not occur, traders would need to establish a price conditional on all the price- 
sensitive information that has been generated during the overnight period. 
The Biais et al. (1995) results imply that this takes place through small 
orders and not through institutional investors’ orders. In fact, large orders 
(and order cancellations) tend to aggregate later on in the trading day, when 
the most substantial part of the price discovery process would have already 
taken place.
4.4.1 Hybrid System
IBIS presents some peculiar intra-day patterns, mainly due to the parallel 
trading for the same securities traded on IBIS and the Frankfurt Stock Ex­
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change (FSE). The 08:30:00 hrs to 17:00:00 hrs (local time) trading period 
over which IBIS is open could be sub-divided into three intervals, depending 
on whether the FSE is open or closed. The first period spans from 08:30:00 
hrs to 10:29:59 hrs; the second period from 10:30:00 hrs to 13:30:00 hrs; and 
the third period from 13:31:00 hrs to 17:00:00 hrs. The FSE is closed in the 
first and third time intervals while it is open during the second interval.
As shown in Figure 1 in Chapter 3, the quoted spread follows a U-shape 
in all the three time intervals but it is much more pronounced during the 
first and second periods. The mean quoted spread is very high at the open, 
touching a mean value of 0.6%, but decreases to 0.23% at around 09:45:00 
hrs, staying in that region for about 45 minutes. Then it shoots up to above 
0.30% in the period around 10:30:00 hrs when the FSE opens. Following the 
FSE’s open, the quoted spread decreases to, approximately, 0.20% increasing 
slightly around the time when the FSE closes and returning back to the 0.20% 
territory afterwards. Towards the end of the trading day, the spread increases 
again to touch 0.35%.
Figures 21(a) and (b) provide some additional light on patterns of trading 
behaviour. The number of shares traded together with the total volume 
executed follow, albeit in an opposite direction, very closely the intraday 
patterns of the quoted spread (Figures 21(c) and (d)). The number of trades 
executed and the mean volume increase and remain stable when the quoted 
spread is low during the day, except for the peak at the end of the trading 
day. The mean volume (in shares) transacted is particularly low immediately 
after IBIS opens and when FSE opens and at the time when floor trading is 
closing.
Figures 21(a) and (b) indicate that the mean size of the trades (in shares) 
and the mean trade size is fairly constant during the trading day. However,
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a closer look at the mean trade size indicates that it is relatively low between 
08:30:00 hrs and 10:30:00 hrs, when the FSE opens. This indicates that 
smaller trades are normally executed during this period, with medium and 
larger trades avoiding this time window when quoted spreads are relatively 
large compared to the spreads obtainable during the trading day.
4.4.2 Order Book
Figure 14 in Chapter 3 shows the intraday patterns of the quoted spreads 
for the CAC-traded securities for the sample matched with SEAQ securities 
and the sample matched with IBIS securities.
In terms of a general intraday pattern, CAC does not show the U-shape 
patterns seen for IBIS. The quoted spread for both samples is high at the time 
of opening reaching above the 0.50% region for the SEAQ-paired sample and 
0.40% for the IBIS-paired sample. The spread diminishes constantly and one 
hour after the open it reaches a stabilising point which is largely maintained 
till the close.
Figures 22(c) and (d) show that both the number of trades executed 
and the volume transacted follow a U-shaped pattern, which is much more 
pronounced for the number of trades. The number of trades when the system 
opens is substantially high with the mean volume (in shares) being relatively 
higher than at other times during the trading day, except for the close. The 
two U-shaped patterns touch the bottom during the 13:00:00 hrs to 14:00:00 
hrs. The mean volume transacted is much higher at the close than at the 
open while the number of trades executed at the close is very similar to that 
transacted at the open.
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Figure 21 .Trading characteristics on IBIS
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Figure 22. Trading characteristics on CAC
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Figure 23. Trading characteristics on SEAQ
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Analysing Figures 22(c) and (d) together indicate that the mean size 
must be lower in the opening compared to the close. In fact, Figure 22(b) 
confirms this intuition since at mean trade size at the open is around 0.08 
X NMS whereas just before closing the mean size reaches above the 0.16 X 
NMS. The mean (X NMS) size remains low until around 12:00:00 hrs and 
rises afterwards. This period coincides with the intraday pattern with the 
highest quoted spreads during the day (refer to Figure 14 in Chapter 3) and 
implies that larger orders tend to avoid times when spreads are wider during 
the day.
The very small size of trades executed at the beginning could be due, 
partially, to the opening algorithm used by the CAC whereby a call auction 
is implemented, after which trading is carried out as a continuous auction. 
These patterns, however, confirm the findings of Biais et al. (1995).
4.4.3 Dealership System
The quoted spread on the dealership system, SEAQ, does not follow any 
particular pattern except falling from the relatively high levels experienced 
in the initial period of the Mandatory Quote Period (the “MQP”) (See Figure 
15 in Chapter 3).
In contrast to what happens on the order book and the hybrid system, 
both the mean size of trades executed and the mean trade size are not par­
ticularly small in the initial stages of transactions. Figure 23(b) shows that, 
although the trade size at the very beginning is low, it recovers and within 
the first 30 minutes the mean size goes beyond the 1 X NMS size, a level 
which is reached only subsequently towards the end of the MQP. The same 
pattern is encountered in Figure 23(a) where the trade size in shares reaches 
a high level within a few minutes from the start, retreats during the day and 
increases again towards the end of the MQP.
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Compared to the trade sizes transacted on the order book and the hybrid 
system, trades executed on SEAQ are substantially higher, confirming the 
stylised fact that dealership systems attract larger trades than do continuous 
auction systems (Pagano and Steil 1995, and Schwartz and Steil, 1995).
In addition, the intraday quoted spread patterns for the three markets 
shows that using longer time intervals (for example when considering 30 
minutes) the quote changes appear to be smoother on CAC and IBIS than 
on SEAQ. A closer investigation of the data shows that best quote revisions 
occur with much more intensity on IBIS and CAC, especially on the former, 
than on SEAQ.
4.5 Em pirical R esults
This Section’s objective is to investigate the Exchange-specific and the var­
ious generic factors that are expected to influence the bid-ask spread in the 
three markets being considered. Following Benston (1978), Stoll (1978a, 
1978b) and Neal (1992), the bid-ask spread in a competitive market is mod­
elled to depend on common factors, namely inventory holding cost, adverse 
selection, order processing cost and trading activity, together with institu­
tional differences between the three markets in the following way:
% spreade/ J  = a 0+ a iM A +  a 2M B +  a 3PSj+(P0+/31MA + P2M b)VolSjd+ 
(Ao + Ai M a + X2M B)cr1jt_i + ((p0 + <Pi M A + <p2M B)T S  ^ t+ 
{ l o + h M A+ i 2M B)AdSSjt_1+(60+6iMA+62M B) S y N T 3jt_1+
(£o +  +  ^ M s p S y N T ^  +  a AT I M E jt +  eajt (20)
The spread^ i s  the mean effective spread calculated for each security s 
on market j  at time interval t as follows:
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where p [z] is the transaction price for trade z and vt [z] is the mid price 
which existed at the time when the i th transaction took place and S B it is a 
binary value that takes on the value of +1 if the trade is a buy and -1 if it is 
a sell.
In (20) above, M a , M b and M e  are intercept dummy variables to cap­
ture the market on which the order is executed ((a) M arket a takes a value 
of 1 if trading occurs on CAC and 0 everywhere else; (b) M arke ts  takes a 
value of 1 if trading occurs on IBIS and 0 everywhere else; and (c) M arketc  
takes a value of 1 if trading occurs on SEAQ and 0 everywhere else); PSj is 
the transaction price for each security at the beginning of the period under 
consideration (January 1996); T S Sj t is the trade size expressed as a frac­
tion of the NMS calculated for each market; is the security’s return
volatility calculated using the mid-quote in each market; VolSjd is the total £- 
denominated volume transacted in the security in each trading day; AdSSj t~i 
refers to the adverse selection component of the effective spread; S y N T Sj t-1 
is the systematic number of trades executed for each security (explained be­
low); U S yN T Sjt-1 is the unsystematic number of trades (explained below); 
while T IM E jt  is a dummy variable to account for the time of the day effect.
In order to decompose the total number of trades, T r Sjt , into the sys­
tematic part (the expected component of the number of trades) and the 
unsystematic part (the surprise component of the order flow), we use the 
following model:
N
T r Sj t= a  +  p 1aljt_1+P2T r Sj t_i+P3A sysj t_1+P4AdSsjt-i  +  @5 Tk,t+^t
k=1
(21)
S B i t  (Vt M -  Vt M) 
vt \i]
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where er^_! is the return volatility in interval t — 1; T r ajt- 1 and Asyaj t~\ 
are the number of trades and trade imbalances, respectively, in the previous 
interval; while AdSSj t~ 1 is the adverse selection component of the effective 
spread (measured as explained below) and Tktt is a dummy variable to control 
for the time of the day effect.
After obtaining the expected number of trades, conditional on the trading 
activity in the previous interval (each interval is of ten minutes each, as 
explained below), we compare the figure with the actual number of trades to 
obtain the surprise component of the trading variable.
The period under consideration is January to February 1996, allowing a 
common time framework for the securities across the three different markets. 
The trading day in each market is divided into sub-periods of 10 minutes 
each; the effective spread and the independent variables under consideration 
are calculated (as averages in each interval) over these sub-periods.
The percentage effective spread, rather than the quoted spread, is used 
to obtain a common measure of transaction costs across markets. Given the 
different trading architecture and the subsequent negotiation that takes place 
on SEAQ, using the quoted spread would not capture the real differences in 
expected transaction costs across markets.
Processing costs and adverse selection costs are variables that, while ex­
pected to influence the bid ask spread, are not directly observable. The 
proxy which is normally employed to capture processing costs is the securi­
ty’s price since the average processing cost is a function of transacted price. 
Total processing cost is considered to be a fixed cost, with average costs 
per transaction falling with the level of transacted price. A negative sign is 
expected.
Adverse selection costs are expected to exert a substantial impact on the
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total spread. Since asymmetric information costs are not directly observed, 
a proxy is employed in the form of the adverse selection component obtained 
in Chapter 3. For every trade, the George et al. (1991), Booth et al. (1995), 
Huang and Stoll (1996), Madhavan et al. (1997) and the Huang and Stoll 
(1997) methodologies were employed. As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
the different measures of the adverse selection are heavily correlated and 
hence the choice of the final measure to be employed in the model is not too 
difficult. In the final analysis, it was decided that the Booth et al. (1995) 
was the most appropriate since the component is measured using the effective 
spreads. However, the other measures were also run in turns to investigate the 
robustness of the results obtained using the Booth et al. (1995) methodology. 
A positive sign is expected.
The other cost component that must be considered is related to inventory 
which liquidity providers (especially if these are mandatory dealers) must 
carry in order to meet traders’ orders. Inventory cost is directly related to 
the holding period of inventory and inventory costs axe expected to increase 
as the holding period increases. This means that having a security for which 
the holding period is long implies that position cannot be reversed easily 
and this is bound to increase inventory costs. Information about the mean 
holding period can be obtained for SEAQ market makers but this type of 
information is not available for CAC and IBIS trading. Hence, the proxy to 
be used is the daily £-value of trading volume and it is computed for each 
day included in the sample period. It is expected that positions taken in 
securities with high £-value volume are not difficult to reverse, even within 
one particular day, resulting in a reduction of total inventory costs. As such, 
a negative sign is expected.
The proxy used for the dealers’ risk aversion is captured by the security’s
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price volatility; in this way, a dealer trading in a high volatile stock is ex­
pected to post wider spreads and lower spreads in low volatile securities. The 
problem lies in identifying the proper measurement for the security’s volatil­
ity in the presence of a bid-ask spread. A number of studies, most notably 
those of Stoll (1978) and Neal (1992), use stock returns and option returns 
respectively. In view of the recent evidence of negative serial correlation, and 
spurious variance, this measurement is better avoided.
The analysis covered by Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966), Cohen, Maier, 
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979, 1981) and Roll (1984) indicate that the bid- 
ask spread induces negative serial correlation in returns measured from stock 
prices. According to French and Roll (1986), the existence of the spread 
produces spurious variance, while sometimes it causes an overestimation of 
the true mean returns.
Furthermore, Glosten (1987) demonstrates that the problems of negative 
serial correlation, spurious variance and excessive mean returns are caused by 
the relative magnitudes of the two components of the spread (the gross profit 
component and the adverse selection component) and the spread’s width. 
Glosten (1987) shows that the gross profit component leads to transacted 
price’s volatility around the true price while the adverse selection component 
(which reflects new information) causes the volatility in the true price. Hence, 
it is the gross profit component that induces problems of spurious volatility, 
bias in the mean return and causes negative serial covariance. In view of this 
analysis, the proxy used is the volatility of the mid quote calculated in each 
sub-period over the entire trading day. A positive sign is expected.
The different institutional characteristics across the three markets are 
taken into account through a set of dummy variables in line with Grossman 
and Miller (1988) in the following way: (a) M arket a takes a value of 1 if
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trading occurs on CAC and 0 everywhere else; (b) M arkets  takes a value of 
1 if trading occurs on IBIS and 0 everywhere else; and (c) M arketc  takes a 
value of 1 if trading occurs on SEAQ and 0 everywhere else. To avoid mul- 
ticollinearity, M arketc  is dropped leaving its impact to materialise through 
the intercept. In addition to the intercept dummy variable, slope dummy 
variables are introduced to capture the major difference between the typol­
ogy of trading on (a) pure order book system and (b) hybrid systems on one 
hand and dealership systems on the other.
There is no theoretical basis to form any a priori functional form for 
the model. A number of studies (Benston and Hagerman, 1974, Stoll, 1978) 
use a log linear functional form that would appear to eliminate the skewness 
in a number of independent variables. Given the difficulty in deriving an 
acceptable a priori functional form, a Box-Cox transformation is used so as 
to leave the data determines the optimal functional form.
4.5.1 General Results
Results for the model estimated in (20) are provided in Table 40. The Box- 
Cox parameters were first obtained from a nonlinear least squares procedure. 
The parameters are all less than 1 and they carry statistically significant t — 
statistics, implying that there is an effective departure from linearity. After 
the Box-Cox coefficients were found and the data transformed accordingly, 
Ordinary Least Squares estimates were obtained.
Following Hausman, Lo and Mackinlay (1992), it is expected that the 
results contain time-varying variance with one major reason being the differ­
ence in the calendar time between transactions. Under these circumstances, 
OLS estimates are consistent but standard errors must be computed tak­
ing into account autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. In view of this, the 
standard errors were adjusted in order to obtain the Heteroscedastic and
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Autocorrelated Consistent errors following the methodology of White (1980) 
and Hansen (1982).
The results show that, in line with the findings of Chapter 3, market 
microstructure appears to have an impact on the formation of the spreads. 
The M arket  dummy variables carry negative signs, confirming that the bid- 
ask spreads are lower on both the order book and the hybrid system when 
compared to a dealership system. Furthermore, the IBIS’s dummy variable 
has a larger negative value compared to the CAC dummy variable, confirming 
the earlier conclusion reached in the previous Chapter. Furthermore, the 
Wald test rejects the hypothesis a[BIS =  o f AC, showing that a hybrid trading 
mechanism does bear an impact on the level of transaction costs. This means 
that even after controlling for a number of different factors, indicated by 
the literature to bear an influence on transaction costs, we still find that 
the hybrid trading system produces lower spreads than both the dealership 
platform and the pure limit order book.
Furthermore, we find that the coefficients of the return volatility for the 
dealership system is approximately 20% of the size of the coefficients for the 
order book (Ao +  Ai) and about 30% of the adjustment that takes place on 
the hybrid system (A0 +  A2). The estimated coefficient for the dealership 
system has very low significance, implying that market makers do respond 
to changes in market volatility by updating their quotes but such a result is 
not very strong.
On the other hand, liquidity providers on order book-based systems ad­
just the quotes much more aggressively when return volatility intensifies. 
This result supports the view that mandatory market makers, by virtue of 
the direct contact they maintain with traders, are better able to decompose 
market volatility into (a) volatility due to the arrival of private information
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Table 40: Relationship between market structures and intraday 
spreads
Entire sample 
Effective HAC 
spread t-stat
CAC sample 
Effective HAC 
spread t-stat
IBIS sample 
Effective HAC 
spread t-stat
SEAQ sample 
Effective HAC 
spread t-stat
Intercept 0.2265 11.13 0.2312 8.65 0.1275 9.20 0.3216 4.36
a C A C -0.0891 -5.70
«[BIS -0.1076 _ . -4.96
Ao 0.0181 1.82 0.0914 4.21 0.0461 5.83 0.01781 1.89
Ai 0.0865 4.46
A2 0.0415 2.85
^0 -0.0097 -2.07 0.0815 6.09 0.0364 7.98 -0.0058 2.26
<Pi 0.0889 7.98
<P2 0.0382 4.24
7o 0.0161 1.62 0.0481 7.12 0.0219 2.85 0.0189 1.95
7i 0.0528 8.25
72 0.0316 5.26
<^0 -0.0358 -4.02 0.0218 4.52 0.0122 2.02 -0.0218 2.91
61 0.0301 6.49
62 0.0224 2.08
f 0 0.0156 1.96 0.0628 7.61 0.0491 6.65 0.0192 2.06
t l 0.0382 4.98
0.0211 2.91
R2 42.58 36.42 41.51 34.17
The Table shows empirical results for the model tested as follows:
%  s p r e a c P /^  — a o  +  & i M a  +  o l ^ M b  +  o t z P s j  +  ( P o  +  P i M x ) V o l Sjd - \ -  
(Ao +  A iMx)(T2aj t_i +  (<p0 +  ip iM x^S sjt  +  (7o +  l iM x )A d S aj t- \
+(<$o +  8 iM x)SyN TSjt- i  + (£0 +  £{M x)U  S y N T Sjt~ 1 + a ^T IM E jt  + £ijt
where speJ-[ is the effective spread, M a , M b and M e  are intercept dummy variables to 
capture the different markets (CAC, IBIS and SEAQ); Psj is transaction price; T S sjt is 
trade size expressed in NMS multiples; is the security’s return volatility; Vol3jd
is the total £-denominated volume transacted in each trading day; AdSsj t - 1 refers to 
the adverse selection component; S y N T ^ t - i  refers to the systematic number of trades; 
U S yN T Sjt- i  refers to the unsystematic order flow; while T I M E j t  is a dummy variable 
to account for the time of the day effect.
which is likely to have a long term impact, and (b) volatility driven by noise 
trading which is expected to have a short term impact. The evidence ob­
tained here confirms that spreads posted by mandatory market makers axe 
less sensitive to return volatility implying that these dealers do contribute 
towards the stabilisation of prices on markets.
The variable used to capture adverse selection have positive signs but 
the statistical significance varies substantially. On the dealership system, an 
increase in the level of adverse selection does not automatically lead the com­
munity of market makers to widen the spread. This result, however, does not 
obtain on the order book-based systems. In fact, in both the pure limit order 
book and the hybrid trading system, an increase in the level of asymmetric 
information leads to an immediate response in terms of spread updating to 
provide better “defences” against the presence of informed traders.
Similarly, we find some interesting results when considering the trade 
size which, as previous literature indicates, can also serve as a proxy for the 
information content of each trade. The results show that on the dealership 
system, effective spreads narrow as trade size increase whereas the opposite 
takes place on both CAC and IBIS. This result implies that the average 
liquidity provider in these two markets is not entirely efficient in separating 
larger orders that effectively carry information from those that are submitted 
for liquidity reasons.
Of particular interest is the response of the spreads to the level of trad­
ing activity in the market, measured by the number of trades executed. It 
appears that an increase in the systematic component of the order flow de­
creases the spreads on the dealership market but increases spreads on screen 
based trading platforms. On the other hand, an increase in the unsystematic 
part of the order flow leads to a material widening of the spread in both
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the pure limit order book and the hybrid trading system. The first result - 
dealing with the effect of systematic order flow - seems to confirm, for the 
dealership market, the results obtained in a number of price formation mod­
els that hypothesize the reduction of the level of asymmetric information 
present in the market. Such a result is obtained because trading reveals pri­
vate information. Some other models achieve the same result but the channel 
is different: a higher level of activity assure traders of the non-existence of 
superior trading information.
The result obtained here, in terms of the unsystematic part of the order 
flow, goes contrary to these models implying that as trading increases, gen­
erating an update in the beliefs about the presence of private information, 
liquidity providers across markets widens their spreads. However, manda­
tory market makers do not update their spreads as aggressively as limit 
order traders do on order book based systems. As argued above, market 
makers are in a better position to identify whether a surge in activity is due 
to liquidity reasons or whether it is driven by the arrival of information.
Finally, and as was expected, the price level has a negative sign while 
the activity variable which proxies for the holding period, £-denominated 
volume, also carries a negative sign (as expected). The latter result implies 
that average processing costs and inventory-related costs tend to be lower for 
higher priced securities.
4.5.2 Market Concentration
Following the first round of results, we augment the regression model in 
order to take into consideration the impact of (a) market concentration, and 
(b) news arrival on the market in order to identify better whether market 
microstructures will still bear an influence on the level of the spread after 
controlling for these factors.
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The main difficulty in this type of work lies in the fact that liquidity 
characteristics, such as depth and breadth, are not only influenced by the 
trading mechanisms adopted by single Exchanges. One has also to consider 
(a) the level of competition between dealers and other liquidity providers 
allowed in the market place, and (b) traders’ self-reinforcing beliefs where 
liquidity begets more liquidity.
The level of competition in the market for the provision of liquidity is 
influenced by a number of factors which are largely determined directly by 
each single Exchange, rather than a direct and immediate consequence of a 
certain market microstructure model. For example, Madhavan (1992) shows 
that with free entry and equal access to the market, a dealership system will 
produce an identical outcome to the one obtained in an auction platform.
The main issue is, therefore, the access to information and the entry costs 
imposed by every single Exchange.
Restricting access to the trading floor, or the screen, is a decision that 
must be taken by each Exchange (or better, the stakeholders of the Exchange) 
largely independently of the type of trading platform adopted. One of the 
main policy-oriented questions made in the past few years, and which has 
led to major reforms, is whether there will be an appreciably positive effect 
on competition by allowing public traders to the market to compete with 
designated market makers.
The technology used, the amount of pre- and post-trade transparency, the 
entry fees, order submission and cancellation fees, etc., are all factors that 
determine the amount of competition allowed in the market. As such, these 
factors must be fully considered, in conjunction with the trading mechanism, 
in order to determine the impact on the level of trading costs.
Having said this, one major issue that must be considered is the endo-
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genity in the measure of the level of competition in the market. There are 
two main problems with this type of analysis: (a) obtaining useful data on 
market concentration has proved to be historically difficult, and (b) the issue 
of endogenity will always “threaten” the validity of the results obtained.
However, in view of the issues raised above it seems reasonable to inves­
tigate whether the market microstructure effect remains robust when con­
trolling for the level of competition in the market. We obtain data from the 
three Exchanges being considered that allows us to construct the Herfindahl 
Index as explained in Chapter 3 to provide us with an estimate of the level 
of concentration in the market for liquidity provision.
The model being investigated is given by:
% SP i j d ~  OLq+CXiM a +  OL2MB +  Oi^P3j - \~ (P 0- \ -P 1M A  +  P 2^ b ) y ° h j d ~H
(Ao +  Al M A +  ^ 2^ B ) ^ a j d  +
(Co + CiMa + C2 M B )H ISjd + 04 N  E W  S 3jd+ a 5D A Y  jd+£sjt  (22)
In (22) above, spreadfj-d is the mean effective spread calculated for each 
security s on market j  for every trading day d\ M A, Mb  and M e  are intercept 
dummy variables to capture the market on which the order is executed in 
the fashion of model (20) above; PSj  is the transaction price for each security 
at the beginning of the period under consideration (January 1996); Volsjd is 
the total £-denominated volume transacted in the security in each trading 
day; a 3jd is the security’s return volatility calculated using the mid-quote 
for each trading day in each market; T rsjd is the number of trades executed 
for each security on each trading day; H ISjd refers to the Herfindahl Index 
(explained below) which is calculated for every security and for every trading 
day; N E W S Sjd is a dummy variable to capture the days when any major 
news (earnings and dividend announcements, takeovers, change in boards,
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etc.) has been announced; while DAYjd is a dummy variable to account for 
the day-of-the-week effect.
The variable that is assumed to capture the level of competition in the 
market is the Herfindahl Index. Following Mclnish and Wood (1992), the 
Index is calculated in the following way:
concentration =  ^1 — £ * ) / [ ( » - ! > £ * ]
where Pi is the market share of each market maker or dealer (for every 
security included in our sample) in each trading day and n  is the number of 
market maker (or dealers) present on the market.
While we can calculate the Herfindahl Index for trading on LSE for the 
entire month of January 1996, we can only estimate the Index for the CAC- 
listed and IBIS-listed securities using selective days in the month of January 
1996. In particular, we have obtained data with daily levels of concentration 
for the period (a) 10 January to 24 January 1996 (11 trading days) for CAC- 
listed securities, and (b) 16 January to 31 January 1996 (12 trading days) 
for IBIS-listed securities.
Table 41 shows estimates for the model in (22). The major result we 
are mostly interested in is the market microstructure variable; in particular, 
whether there is still any such effect on the spread differentials after control­
ling for the level of market concentration. The results obtained here indicate 
that the microstructure effect on spreads is robust to the introduction of the 
variable to capture competition in the market. In fact, the intercept dummy 
variables for both order book-based systems remain negative (a reduction of 
the spreads from the dealership level) and retain their statistical significance.
In addition, the Wald test rejects the hypothesis that a f AC =  a^575 
implying that, even when the level of competition in the market is explic­
itly taken into consideration, the hybrid trading system still emerges as the
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Table 41: Relationship between market structures and daily spreads
Entire sample CAC sample IBIS sample SEAQ sample
Effective HAC Effective HAC Effective HAC Effective HAC
spread t-stat spread t-stat spread t-stat spread t-stat
Intercept 0.1415 9.51 0.2608 8.12 0.1418 7.25 0.3528 5.13
a f AC -0.0606 -4.58
«iB,S -0.0752 -6.52
Q3 -0.0164 -4.41 -0.0057 . -2.57 -0.0018 -2.72 -0.0072 -2.07
A» -0.0391 -6.51 -0.0251 -2.15 -0.0296 -5.14 -0.0356 -6.38
Ai 0.0168 4.49
02 0.0112 4.06
Ao 0.0211 1.82 0.0456 4.82 0.0392 2.85 0.0218 1.76
Ai 0.0350 5.12
A2 0.0215 4.52
<$0 -0.0119 2.28 0.0181 4.85 0.0115 2.18 -0.0211 2.21
61 0.0302 4.26
62 0.0218 3.16
Co 0.0118 1.87 0.0218 2.06 0.0296 2.51 0.0125 1.86
Cl 0.0154 2.16
Cl 0.0226 2.66
R2 46.98 42.81 46.22 41.56
The Table shows empirical results for the model tested as follows:
% sp^l = Qq 4- o l\M a  +  ol2M b  4 - ot.$PSj 4 " (Po 4 " P\Ma 4- p 2Mb)VolSjd
4-(Ao 4- Ai M a  4- A2M b )&^ jd 4- (<$0 4- ^1 M a  4- ^2 M b ) T t ajd 
+(Co 4" Ci^a 4- C2MEt)HISjd 4  a^NEWSsjd 4- cz^DAYjd +  eSjt
where sp eJ-d is the effective spread, M a , M b  and M e  are the intercept dummy variables to 
capture the different markets (CAC, IBIS and SEAQ); Psj is the transaction price; V olSjd is 
the total £-denominated volume; (T2s -d is the security’s return volatility for each trading day; 
T rsjd is the number of trades executed on each trading day; H Isjd is the Herfindahl Index 
for every trading day; NEWSgjd  is a dummy variable to capture days with major company- 
specific news; while D A Y ^ is a dummy variable to account for the day-of-the-week effect.
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Table 42: Tests for the coefficient estimates of spreads determinants
P a n e l  A: I n t r a - d a y  s p r e a d s
W ald Test x 2 Test
a f AC = a[BIS 49.22* A0+A1 = 0 20.18*
Ai =  A2 21.26* ^0+^2 =  0 18.19*
7i =  72 28.94* 7o +  7i =  0 25.14*
Si =  S2 1.62 7o +  72 =  0 22.01*
Ci =  £2 25.72* — 0 21.26*
<$0 +  62 =  0 19.86*
P a n e l  B: M e a n  d a i l y  s p r e a d s
W ald Test x 2 Test
cjCAC _  a I B I S  8 21* A0+A1 =  0 16.56*
Ai =  A2 9.26* Ao+A2 =  0 14.25*
6i  =  62 1.52 7o +  7i =  0 19.22*
Ci =  C2 10.86* 7o +  72 =  0 16.15*
+  — 0 18.26*
6q +  82 =  0 19.21*
The Table shows the results for the Wald Test and the x 2 Test
for a number of hypotheses from the two models estimated.
An * indicates significance at the 1% levels.
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platform that generates the lowest transaction costs.
4.6 Conclusions
This study investigated (a) whether market microstructure really matters in 
terms of transaction costs when competition in the market for the provision 
of liquidity is directly taken into consideration, and (b) liquidity providers’ 
quote setting behaviour under different market conditions.
The major result is that market microstructure effects can explain the 
absolute levels of transaction costs paid by traders. Traders on a hybrid 
mechanism face the lowest costs and this result holds even when we con­
trol for (a) the level of market concentration in liquidity provision, and (b) 
company-specific news. These results provide a preliminary confirmation of 
the Viswanathan and Wang (1998) hypothesis that a hybrid structure dom­
inates both a pure dealership system and order book-based system.
In addition, some other results were obtained that can shed some light 
on liquidity providers’ quote setting behaviour. First, spreads on a dealer­
ship system are less sensitive to market volatility than both the order book 
and the hybrid systems. This result can be interpreted in the light of the 
market maker’s position, allowing them to decompose better volatility into 
(a) volatility due to the arrival of private information, likely to have a long 
term impact, and (b) volatility driven by noise trading, which is expected to 
have a short term impact.
It is also relevant to point out that spreads on both the order book and 
the hybrid system are more sensitive than those on a dealership system to 
the level of trading activity in the market, and particularly to the systematic 
component of the order flow. Indeed, a market maker is able to receive 
higher levels of price-sensitive information by entering in contact directly with
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traders and hence can form a better view of traders’ motivation, strategies 
and styles. This implies that, everything else remaining constant, the quotes 
submitted by a market maker are likely to be more stable over the trading 
day.
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Chapter 5. Price Efficiency and Order Flow  
D ynam ics in a Hybrid M arket
5.1 Introduction
The provision of liquidity in different market microstructures is carried out by 
different dealers - limit order traders in order book-based systems and mar­
ket makers (mandatory or voluntary) in dealership-based systems. Which 
type of liquidity provision set-up generates the most efficient prices, taking 
into consideration market depth and breadth, is an empirical question of 
substantial importance. The issue of price efficiency, understood as the devi­
ations of transaction prices from the security’s true value, is strictly related 
to excessive short-term price volatilities which, in turn, is related to trading 
mechanisms. It is evident that investigating price efficiency and volatility 
is important since risk averse traders are assumed to care about price and 
execution uncertainty.
It is expected that strategic behaviour between traders differ across differ­
ent market microstructures which would, in turn, generate different volatil­
ities in the systems. Recent developments in market microstructure have 
analysed the interaction of different traders in the market, such as informed 
traders and liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, Easley and O’Hara, 
1992, Lyons, 1995), traders with heterogeneous beliefs (Morris, 1994), and 
traders that herd on specific types of information (Froot et a l , 1992). Such 
considerations are important for the analysis of the order flow, its size, fre­
quency and direction and impact on price stability.12
If the presence of a market maker is found to dampen excessive price
12 The analysis of intradaily volatilities has already received a substantial level of atten­
tion through theoretical and empirical research (Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb, 
1978, Goldman and Beja, 1979, Roll, 1984, Kyle, 1985, Hasbrouck, 1988, Hasbrouck and 
Ho, 1987, Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, Foster and Viswanathan, 1988, Stoll, 1978).
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volatility, then this will improve the market’s quality (generating less ineffi­
cient prices) and will, in turn, increase traders’ participation in the market, 
leading to higher volumes transacted.
Furthermore, the issue of price discovery process and order flow dynam­
ics in parallel markets (operated by the same Exchange) has already at­
tracted extensive theoretical attention. For example, Pagano (1989) investi­
gates trading across multiple markets and shows that traders select the most 
suitable market to submit their order to on the sole basis of the maximum 
expected utility ex ante. One major result obtained by Pagano is based on 
the idea of self-fulfilling aspect of trading: agents will trade when they ex­
pect the market to be deeper. Furthermore, when transactions costs across 
the two markets on which the security trades are not equal, Pagano shows 
that larger trades may migrate to the market with the highest fixed costs, 
provided such a market appears to be deeper. This result is rooted in the im­
pact of transaction costs on the trading positions of large and small traders. 
For the large traders, going to the most expensive but deeper market, means 
that they will incur a loss from transaction costs but this loss is outweighed 
by market depth which minimises the price impact due to a higher liquidity 
value.
Another model is by Seppi (1990) where a trader is given the choice 
between trading in the “upstairs” or going to the “downstairs” market. In 
this model, a liquidity trader may use the “upstairs” market if he can credibly 
signal to the market maker that his trade is not information-based.
Grossman (1992) explores a similar trading set-up, where the “down­
stairs” market is an open-order trading environment whereas in the “up­
stairs” prices are negotiated bilaterally. Going to the “upstairs” market 
entails additional search cost but these are offset by decreased volatility re­
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suiting from the fact that market makers on the “upstairs” market axe better 
informed and are therefore in a better position to intermediate between the 
different traders. Due to the different costs in these two markets, in equi­
librium trading may take place on both the “upstairs” and “downstairs” 
markets.
In this Chapter we are also interested in analysing order flow dynamics 
in parallel markets. One major study investigating several aspects of order 
flow dynamics was carried out by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) when they 
analyse order flows on the Paris Bourse. Although this work is not directly 
related to the issue of parallel markets, the evidence presented in this work 
provides a good background on how limit orders and market orders interact 
together.
Biais et al. (1995) find that in a pure limit order book environment, the 
conditional probability that traders submit limit orders, instead of hitting 
the quotes (with a market order), is larger when (i) the spread is wide, 
or (ii) the order book is not very deep. On the other hand, liquidity is 
consumed through traders who tend to hit the prevailing quote when the 
spread is very narrow. Prom this evidence, the authors conclude that traders 
provide liquidity at times of liquidity shortages (when such an exercise is 
really valuable) and consume liquidity at times when liquidity is in surplus. 
Furthermore, at times of liquidity deficits, and to obtain time priority in these 
adverse market conditions, traders on the Paris Bourse place limit orders very 
quickly.
We investigate the various issues using the experience of the LSE which, 
in October 1997, changed its trading environment, for the most liquid se­
curities (the FTSE 100 securities), from a pure dealership mechanism to a 
hybrid trading system based on an order book and voluntary dealers pro­
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viding liquidity off the book. The trading regime change was expected to 
improve transparency in the market and enhance the bargaining power of 
investors vis-a-vis dealers, leading to lower trading costs of public investors. 
One major consequence resulting from these changes was that the obligations 
of mandatory market makers, enforced prior to the reform, ceased to exist. 
Today, dealers for the FTSE 100 index securities are entirely voluntary in 
terms of liquidity provision.
In some Exchanges, „dealers are under a specific obligation to provide 
price stabilisation. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, defines 
one of the specialist’s “affirmative obligations” as the “maintenance of a fair 
and orderly market”. Hence, the specialist must contribute towards price 
stabilisation through his quotes and trading behaviour. On the other hand, 
dealers on the LSE are under no such obligation, prompting the question 
whether dealers provide price stabilisation even if they are not obliged to do 
so.
In view of these changes, this Chapter investigates (a) which type of 
liquidity provision set-up, in a hybrid trading system, generates the highest 
price efficiency, taking into consideration market depth and breadth, (b) the 
strategic interactions between the limit order book and the dealers, and (c) 
how the order flow behaves at times of price uncertainty.
Such analysis has been hampered by the fact that most Exchanges have, 
until recently, adopted one trading system and hence the price discovery 
process for a particular security could not be compared across different trad­
ing mechanisms. To investigate these issues,we use the FTSE 100 index’s 
securities listed on the LSE, which axe now traded on two parallel trading 
systems - an order driven system and a dealership system. This environment 
provides an ideal place for the analysis of transaction price efficiency, trading
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behaviour on the two systems and the strategic interaction between them.
The Chapter finds that prices on the dealership system track the securi­
ty’s true price more efficiently. The results provide a useful insight into the 
contribution made by dealers towards price stabilisation. The results should 
lead to a re-evaluation of the dealers’ role in promoting orderly markets. The 
Chapter also provides a dynamic analysis of market making, in the sense that 
the role of dealers is investigated under various market conditions, mainly 
adverse conditions, for example when price volatility increases.
The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some 
institutional characteristics of the LSE and of trading for the FTSE 100 secu­
rities taking place on the dealership system and SETS. Section 3 provides the 
literature review and attempts to capture the price discovery processes tak­
ing place on competing market microstructures. Section 4 investigates price 
efficiency through a model that takes into consideration the order flow, time 
between trades and trade sizes while Section 5 analyses trading behaviour on 
order book and dealership systems. Section 6 summarises and concludes.
5.2 Institutional Design
As from 20 October 1997, the constituents of the FTSE 100 index trading 
on the LSE started trading on two parallel systems - the new order book 
system, the Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service (the “SETS”) system, 
and an off-book, dealership-based system which succeeded the old telephone 
dealing system (the old SEAQ system). The dealership mechanism is based 
on “voluntary market makers” that stand ready for bilateral trades but are no 
longer obliged to provide quotes through the publicly available quote-display 
system.
Hence, the new trading environment provides traders with a choice where
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to trade: traders can either submit/hit limit orders electronically or they can 
trade directly with dealers supplying liquidity off-book. In such a system, 
price formation and liquidity dynamics are decided by market forces rather 
than through any regulatory requirements imposed on market makers.
Before the introduction of SETS, market makers were bound to provide 
firm quotes in the Mandatory Quote Period (MQP) which covered the trading 
period from 08:30:00 hrs to 16:30:00 hrs. This arrangement changed for 
trading in the FTSE 100 securities when SETS was introduced and the MQP 
for these securities now tracks the trading period over which trading can be 
executed on SETS.
Different types of orders can be submitted to SETS system, such as (a) 
“limit orders” which specify the size, price and expiry time; (b) “execute 
and eliminate” which axe similar to the “at best” order, but with a limit 
price specified; (here the order will execute, in full or in part, at no worse 
than the specified price); (c) “fill or kill” where orders only execute in full 
immediately, or are totally rejected and may include a limit price; and (d) 
“at best” where participants are allowed to enter orders that will be executed 
immediately at the best possible price. No limit price is specified on the “at 
best” type of order while a “limit order” will either be executed in full or in 
part immediately, or will sit on the order book (until the expiry date/time, 
or until they are deleted) waiting for an order to match.
At present, the minimum order size which can be entered in the order 
book is 1 share. The arrangement for the minimum order size was changed 
in June 1998. Up to that date, the minimum order size was 1000 shares for 
stocks with price below £5 and 500 shares for all others. The maximum order 
size is 20 times Normal Market Size (NMS).
Securities traded on SETS are categorised for the purposes of certain rules
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according to a system based on NMS.13 NMSs are reviewed quarterly by the 
LSE. The tick size in SETS is set in bands depending on securities’ prices in 
the following way - (a) a price below 500 pence will have a tick size of 0.25 
pence; (b) prices from 500 pence to 1000 pence will have a tick size of 0.5 
pence; (c) prices over 1000 pence will have a corresponding tick size of 1.0 
pence.
The opening algorithm on SETS is by means of a call auction, which is one 
major difference compared to the dealership system. In the period covered, 
the SETS system started accepting orders from 08:30:00 hrs up to 08:50:00 
hrs with orders having the possibility of deletion. At exactly 09:00:00 hrs 
all order on the book are frozen temporarily while the uncrossing algorithm 
is run. No additional orders may be added or deleted until the uncrossing 
process for that security is complete. This algorithm calculates the price at 
which the maximum volume of shares in each security can be traded.
Any remaining unexecuted orders are left on the book for execution during 
the normal trading period. It normally takes about three minutes to complete 
uncrossing for all SETS securities. Once the uncrossing process for each 
security is complete, continuous automated execution in that security begins 
and orders can be entered and deleted as before.
In the continuous trading session, orders are submitted to the order book 
with the identity of the trader held anonymous. As soon as the order is 
executed, the trade is automatically reported to the LSE and the market is 
informed immediately that the trade has taken place. Only member firms 
involved in the trade discover the traders’ identity once their orders match. 
The rest of the market is not informed which member firms were involved.
13 Each security’s NMS is equivalent to the average institutional trade size in that par­
ticular security and is calculated in accordance with a formula which takes into account 
the value of customer turnover over the previous 12 months and the closing price of the 
security at the end of the latest calendar quarter.
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Figure 24. Daily aggregate volume for the FTSE 100 securities
Figures 24-26 and Table 44 provide some insights as to the different trades 
which are being channelled to SETS and the dealership system. The Figures 
show how aggregate volume flow mainly to the dealership system during 
the opening period. In addition, the number of trades transmitted to the 
dealership system is also much higher than those sent to the order book.
The preliminary statistics refer to the transacted volume in the period 
June-October 1998. In this period, the SETS system transacted approxi­
mately 36% of the total order flow for the FTSE 100 components.
Table 44 shows that the dealership system dominates the auction system 
for the small order size and for the large order size, whereas medium sized 
trades are being channelled to the SETS system. This is, to a certain extent, 
a curious result in so far as the dominance for the smaller sizes is concerned. 
Given that dealers provide substantial depth and breadth to the market, 
using their inventory to accommodate large orders, the fact that trades bigger 
than 50,000 shares axe transacted through the market making system comes 
as no surprise.
However, the order book-driven system is assumed to provide a com-
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Figure 25. The mean trade size for FTSE 100 securities
Table 43: A sam ple of securities from th e  FTSE 100 index used for 
analysis
Top 10 securities by volume B ottom  10 securities by volume
Security Name Security Name
1 AstraZeneca 11 Associated British Food
2 Barclays Bank 12 Alliance &; Leicester
3 British Telecom 13 Hays
4 BP Amoco 14 Kingfisher
5 HSBC Bank 15 Land Securities
6 Glaxo Wellcome 16 Misys
7 Lloyds TSB Bank 17 Reckitt & Colman
8 Rentokil Initial 18 RMC
9 Shell Transport 19 Schroders
10 Unilever 20 Severn Trent
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Table 44: Typology of trades being executed on SETS and SEAQ 
(July  - O ctober 1998)
T r a d i n g  o n  DS T r a d i n g  o n  SETS
Trade size Volume % of Total Volume % of Total
on DS Order Flow on SETS Order Flow
0-499 1198260 27.50 109182 2.54
500-999 562819 12.92 105681 2.43
1000-1999 407766 9.36 234059 5.37
2000-4999 240643 5.52 379898 8.72
5000-9999 103841 2.39 259376 5.95
10000-19999 91473 2.10 224902 5.16
20000-49999 92459 2.12 171684 3.94
50000-99999 51910 1.19 41781 0.96
=>100000 73300 1.68 8661 0.20
Total 64.78 35.22
The Table shows the total volume in each trade size group transacted on the 
order book and on the dealership system during 1 June - 31 October 1998.
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Figure 26. Number of trades for FTSE 100 securities
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Table 45: Descriptive statistics for a sample o f FTSE 100 securities 
used for the analysis
Market Mean Mean Number
Capital. Price of daily trades
£ millions (pence) SETS DS
T o p  10 b y  v o l u m e
AstraZeneca 24,914 2170 208 245
Barclays Bank 19,583 1209 260 548
British Telecom 41,673 783 345 1555
BP Amoco 86,905 831 394 551
HSBC Bank 41,997 1248 267 565
Glaxo Wellcome 74,979 1761 359 607
Lloyds TSB Bank 46,478 712 370 1144
Rentokil Initial 12,978 345 173 103
Shell Transport 36,716 351 338 647
Unilever 46,255 550 228 368
B o t t o m  10 b y  v o l u m e
Associated British Food 4,561 592 102 146
Alliance &; Leicester 5,165 848 97 450
Hays 4,302 831 93 119
Kingfisher 6,478 516 167 187
Land Securities 5,806 874 112 164
Misys 4,148 404 113 128
Reckitt h  Colman 3,245 956 93 121
RMC 2,146 752 62 46
Schroders 3,120 981 105 142
Severn Trent 3,558 1046 88 91
The Table provides descriptive statistics for a sample of FTSE 100 index
securities. “Market Capital.’’ is the market capitalisation on 30 June 1998;
“Mean Price” is the average security price over the period from June to 
October 1998.
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petitive advantage over the dealership system for smaller trades (at least in 
terms of execution costs) and hence it was expected that these trades would 
go through the limit order system.
It is suspected that this result, where small, retail-oriented orders are 
directed to the dealership system rather than the order book, is due to the 
specific institutional design introduced by the LSE and which remained in 
place up to June 1998 whereby the Minimum Order Size on SETS was fixed at 
500 shares for some securities and 1000 shares for other, effectively excluding 
smaller orders (presumably made by retail investors) to be directed on SETS.
In addition, the presence of the so-called Retail Service Providers (the 
“RSPs”) who receive orders from retail investors could also provide an ex­
planation for this result. In fact, most of these RSPs, in many cases, form 
part of financial institutions that also have dealers (the previous market mak­
ing firms) within the same organistion. This could give rise to a situation 
where, for orders that do not explicitly state that execution should be car­
ried through the order book, RSPs sent these orders to their in-house dealers 
for execution there. Given that dealers are bound by the best-execution 
rules, investors will be give the same prices by the dealer as they would have 
obtained had these orders been executed in the order book.
Having said this, the evidence produced here may be consistent with the 
results obtained by Hansch et al. (1998) who found that pre-1997 market 
makers made profits on small trades, broke even on large trades but lost 
money on medium-sized trades.
5.3 E xtant Literature and H ypotheses
This Section attempts to capture the basic characteristics of the order book 
and dealership markets used by the LSE, taking into consideration (a) the
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information available in each system when the price of a transaction is set; 
(b) the type of orders submitted in each market mechanism; and (c) the 
strategic behaviour between different traders in the market.
The objective is to go through the theoretical literature that is most rel­
evant in order to understand the major characteristics of the price discovery 
process in the two systems and the trading behaviour so as to produce hy­
pothesis to be tested in the following Section.
As stated above, the continuous auction system provides information of 
the order flow arriving in the order book except that the identity of the 
trader submitting the order is withheld. It is expected that prices aggregate 
information about the entire order flow arriving on the order book system.
On the other hand, the dealership system is based on bilateral negotia­
tions between the trader and the market-maker and this is private informa­
tion. Each market maker does not know the order flow being directed to 
other dealers operating on the dealership system. On the other hand, the 
market maker receives two pieces of information: (a) the identity of the trader 
willing to enter into a transaction, hence providing invaluable information to 
disentangle liquidity-motivated from information-motivated trades; and (b) 
the order flow and the prices being formed on the SETS system.
On top of this, the SEAQ dealers are bound by the “best execution” 
arrangements which state that the best prices for transactions smaller than 
1 X NMS are dictated by the best ask and bid prices generated by the SETS 
system. Trades larger than such a size are subject to negotiation.
The model we consider here is based on the familiar framework used in 
the rational expectations literature. There are two assets, cash and a single 
risky asset which has a stochastic liquidation value. There are two types 
of agents - the “traders” who arrive on the market through an exogenous
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stochastic process and the “dealers” (who are called “market makers” on the 
dealership system) who provide liquidity.
Traders are assumed to have a negative exponential utility function of 
the form:
u(Wi) = —e~pWi (23)
where Wi is the final period wealth of trader i and p > 0 denotes the 
coefficient for the absolute risk aversion. It is expected that traders maximise 
the expected utility of the final period wealth.
It is assumed that the risky asset traded has a true value of V  which may 
be high VH or low VL, each with a probability of 0.5.
The realisation of Vh and Vl are known exclusively to a risk-neutral 
informed trader, who is present on the market with probability $  and who 
places a market order to buy or sell an amount that maximises his expected 
profit.
With probability 0  a liquidity-motivated trader arrives on the market 
and places a market order to buy or sell one unit of the risky asset, each with 
a probability of 0.5. Denote p  as the price at which the trade takes place, 
ei as the investor’s initial share endowment, c* as the investor’s initial cash 
position and A* as the number of shares purchased.
Suppose that the prior distribution of the unknown asset value, V, is 
normal with mean p and precision p. Assume also that informed traders are 
price takers and they have information set denoted by Q.
They receive a signal, q, drawn from the normal distribution with mean 
V  and precision 7r. In this case, trader i views V  as normally distributed 
with mean Vo =  E[V  | =  p r  4- g(l — r) where r  =  p/(p  +  7r) and variance
(p-t-TT)-1.
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The informed trader will submit an order to trade that is a Unear function 
of the price in the foUowing way:
Ai(p) =  & -  fap  (24)
where ^  =  p(p+ ly i and fa  =  p(p+17r^ -i • The latter reflects the trader’s risk 
aversion and the uncertainty regarding the private information he obtains. 
In addition to the informed traders, the T > 0 uninformed traders will trade 
for liquidity-related reasons with uninformed trader d submitting to the 
market.
The aggregate excess demand from the traders will be a function of the 
price as follows:
S(p) =  EArAi(p) +  ETs<l (25)
Denote p* as the market-clearing price in such a set-up (this must be 
identical to the Walrasian price) and we have:
P* =  V0 +  C (26)
where
Etq  -  £ we,
which is equivalent to the noise term capturing the impact of the unin­
formed trading and the hedging of endowment risk.
5.3.1 Dealership Market
We consider a model for the quote driven mechanism where prices are set by 
M  risk-neutral and competitive market makers who stand by to satisfy the 
order flow and provide Uquidity by acting as a counter-party to traders.
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The market makers will provide the bid and ask prices, which are regret- 
free prices, at which they will execute the order flow. As in Madhavan (1992), 
these quotes are assumed to be firm, meaning that they can only be changed 
after the individual order is transacted.
However, in order to capture the linkages that exist in hybrid markets 
between the order book and the dealership system, we consider the market 
maker as behaving in a way that conditions his prices not only on the in­
formation he obtains from his own order flow but also on the information 
emerging from the order book (publicly available). This is consistent with 
the view that observing the evolution of the order book will generate signals 
about the asset value and will be used by the market maker in setting his 
own quotes for bilateral trades.
This mechanism is represented as a two-stage game, on the lines of Mad­
havan and Panchapagesan (2000), where in the first stage market makers de­
termine the firm quotes and in the second stage the trader chooses whether 
to submit the order given the quotes provided by the market maker. We 
also assume that the market maker trades for his own account in order to
(a) hedge the risk of his inventory, and (b) to maintain an optimal inventory 
level. We denote his trade by q where q > 0 represents market maker pur­
chases and q < 0 denotes market maker sales. By observing the order flow 
on the order book, the market maker can generate the statistic F  which pro­
vides an additional noisy signal about the informed trader’s private signal. 
The statistic F  is represented by -
The market clearing condition implies that E(p) + q = 0 and hence the 
prices, pf*, formed in the continuous dealership (cd) that will clear the market 
will be as follows:
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p f= p ' + K-q (27)
w h e r e  K  =  (£& > ■
The unconditional variance of pf* around the true value of the asset is 
given by (28):
Var [pf* -  Vo] =  Var[Q +  2KiCov((, qi) +  k^Var [qj (28)
5.3.2 Order Book System
As in Madhavan (1992), the order driven system is characterised by dealers 
who engage in competition by submitting a set of price-quantity combinations 
such that the quantity demanded at each price is the desired order quantity 
conditional upon that particular price clearing in the market. Hence, in the 
order driven system the execution price is only known after the trade has 
been executed and the price depends on liquidity in the market at any point 
in time.
Consider the limit order placed on an auction market. This type of order 
will be executed with a probability (j> in which case the trader i will get the 
share, paying price and pay the cost of transmitting the order c j  and the 
cost involved with settlements, etc., denoted by cf.
In the case that the limit order does not get executed, the trader will not 
get the share but will have to pay the cost of transmitting the limit order 
book, c f .
Hence the trader’s payoff structure is:
<P (Pi -  cf -  cf) + (1 -  <P) ( - c f )  (29)
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Empirical evidence shows that the probability, 0, of a trade executing 
depends on the trade size since market depth decreases with trade size.
The market depth is unknown at any point in time (depending on the 
limit orders submitted) and is assumed to be a random variable, which is 
distributed uniformly on {0,1,...Z}. Each trader makes a decision as to the 
optimal size for the order to be submitted, knowing that each order executed 
leads to a payoff of Wi (Wi — Pi — c j — cf)  and each order not transacted 
leads to a loss of (—c j ) .
The decision as to the optimal size to be transmitted is found in the 
following way. Suppose that a trade size j  is transacted. Then the total 
payoff is given as:
= { w D - c r (j  - D )  i f  j > D  (3°)
The expected payoff would be:
E (*,) =  w jP (D  > j )  +  w ^  -  cT d
0 - 1 -  +  1 ^ Z  +  1
Z  + l
Now
w (Z + l ) - 12cT~\^W + cT\ (31)
2 (Z  +  1) (E (tf,+1) -  E (# ,)) =  (2Z + 1) w -  cT -  (2j  + 1) (w + cT)
r s j
and the expected payoff is largest when j  = j ,  where:
j=  max jo, Zw ° ) (32)
 ^ w + c1 J
In this model, the quantity traded in the continuous auction system is
different from the quantity transacted in a dealership market, with the differ­
ence being due to market liquidity at the time when the order is transmitted
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to the market. This suggests that in an auction market, market depth is a 
fundamental statistic and the trader will have to monitor closely the depth 
of the order book before submitting any order.
Following Kyle (1989), we define depth (the liquidity parameter) in the 
continuous auction market, </?, as:
1
where 7  refers to the behaviour of dealers with 7  > 0 meaning that dealers 
sell when prices rise and buy when prices fall.
The derivation for the prices on the auction system is based on the con­
struction of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium by solving for each trader’s best 
response given the strategies adopted by other traders submitting the orders 
in the order book.
As in Madhavan (1992), we assume that trader i arriving at time U be­
lieves that the limit order traders adopt the following strategy:
<Pj(Pi) = 7 i(V i~P i) (33)
In equilibrium, we have:
~Pi) + j .  =  0 (34)
It follows that in such a mechanism, the price, p “  that will clear the 
market will be formed as follows:
P“ =  P’+V Ji (35)
The unconditional variance of around the true value of the asset is
given by:
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Var [p“  -  V0] =  Var[C] +  2<piCov(CJi) +  $ V a r  [j*] (36)
5.3.3 H ypothesis Tested
To recapitulate, we have that the unconditional price volatility on the deal­
ership is given by:
V ar  [pf* -  V0] =  Var[(\ +  2aiiCov((, q{) +  K?Var [qj
whereas the unconditional variance on the order book is provided by:
V ar [p™ -  Vq] =  Var[(] +  2(piC o v (( ,ji) +  <p?Var [j*]
The variance relative to the asset’s true value (price efficiency) in each 
trading system is the product of (a) the noise, produced by trading, around 
the Walrasian price, (b) the variance of the trades generated by liquidity 
providers, and (c) the covariance between the liquidity providers’ trades and 
those submitted by liquidity traders. The question as to whether price volatil­
ity (around the true value) is higher on an order book or a dealership system 
becomes an empirical one since we need to investigate the strategic behaviour 
of dealers on the dealership system and the limit order traders on the order 
book.
The issue of price efficiency, as used in this Chapter, is strictly related to 
short term price volatilities. As Stoll and Whaley (1990) argue, volatility in a 
market microstructure set-up is generated from three major sources - (a) the 
trading behaviour of investors, especially the strategic interaction between 
informed and liquidity investors, bound to produce trading pressures; (b) 
the arrival of public information on the market; and (c) the channels used 
by market participants to provide immediacy to the market.
241
Strategic behaviour that takes place in the submission of limit orders 
to the order book, between limit order traders and liquidity traders, can 
exacerbate short term price volatility in such a trading platform. Order 
submission strategies axe expected to influence short term price volatility. 
For example, an over-reliance of market orders in an order driven system 
will produce different price impacts than a strategy based on strategic limit 
orders that continuously hit the best prices on the other side of the book.
On the other hand, a dealer on the market have a better view of the evo­
lution of the price discovery process since she does not only have the public 
order book to look at, but has also her own order flow from which informa­
tion can be extracted. In addition, such a dealer can build long-standing pro­
fessional relationships with traders, contributing towards extracting clearer 
signals from the trading process.
If dealers, in the process of maintaining an optimal inventory position, 
post quotes that axe asymmetric (buying when the stock price is low and 
selling when the price is high) relative to the perceived true economic price 
of the security, then the covariance between the dealers’ trades and the noise 
produced by liquidity traders will be negative.
On the other hand, Handa and Schwarz (1996) argue that liquidity shocks 
transmitted to the system will attract more limit orders to the system and 
hence liquidity will be supplied when it is mostly needed. They argue that 
under these circumstances, the net gain obtained from supplying liquidity is 
greater than the risk of being picked off by the informed traders present in 
the system. This influx of limit orders in the system will cause short-term 
volatility to decline.
Even within the subset of limit orders, aggressively priced limit orders axe 
likely to produce different impacts than similar orders submitted by patient
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traders. In this sense, the depth, breadth and resilience of the order book 
axe fundamental features that must be analysed.
Hypothesis l o • The competition in the price-quantity schedule that takes 
place in an order driven system allows for strategic behaviour between liq­
uidity providers, distorting short term prices. On the other hand, voluntary 
dealers ’ trading pattern leads to quotes that are asymmetric relative to the per­
ceived true economic price of the security resulting in a negative covariance 
between dealers’ trades and the noise produced by liquidity traders. Hence, 
price efficiency will be higher in a dealership system.
Hypothesis 1a : When there are short-term price fluctuations, limit order 
traders will find it more profitable to submit limit orders to the order book, 
supplying liquidity when it is mostly needed. This influx o f limit orders will 
enhance market liquidity, causing short-term price volatility to decline. This 
process will generate higher price efficiency in the order driven system.
5.4 Price Efficiency
In this Section we empirically investigate the efficiency of prices generated 
by the order book and dealership trading and attempt to answer the ques­
tion which competing microstructure, in a hybrid set-up, leads to highest 
efficiency.
The investigation will be divided into two parts. In the first place, given 
the hybrid nature of the LSE’s trading environment, we assume that SETS 
and the dealership systems are closely linked with each other in a way that 
prices in the two systems cannot diverge for a long period of time. Any pricing 
divergences are short-lived and are mainly due to market microstructure 
reasons, such as lack of transparency, lack of liquidity, pricing errors, etc.
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We obtain the true “system-wide” price that would emerge from a com­
bined order flow. The true “system-wide” price, which is unobservable due to 
the splitting of the order flow over the two systems, is obtained via a Kalman 
smoothing technique.
In the second stage, we investigate price volatility in the dealership and 
the auction systems around the “system-wide” true price, making use of 
variance ratios, to test price efficiency on the two competing market mi­
crostructures.
The transaction prices on SETS and the dealership system (henceforth
“DS”) systems can be modelled in the following way
p f 5 =  m( +  & ~  N (0, <x|) (37)
p fETS = m t + w t u t ~  N (0, <x£) (38)
where m t is the true “system-wide” price that is expected to emerge if the 
two trading systems where perfectly linked and complete pre- and post-trade 
transparency obtains, is the pricing error occurring on DS while u t is the 
pricing error occurring on SETS. For the purpose of this Chapter, testing for 
price efficiency in the two systems can be obtained by testing whether the 
variance of the pricing error is larger than that of u t.
5.4.1 M ethodology
E xisting  E m pirical M odels Various methodologies could be adopted to 
analyse the case when a financial asset trades in parallel markets. One such 
technique is employing a “benchmark price”, such as the price at a relatively 
quiet trading period in the day (such as the price obtained at 13:00:00 hrs) or 
the price at the close which is the period when it is assumed that all relevant 
information, realeased during the trading day, would have been impounded 
in the price. The researcher can then compare the price volatility on SETS 
and DS around this benchmark price.
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Another approach would be employing mid-quotes but such a technique, 
although presenting the benefit of simplicity, poses a number of problems. 
First, there are substantial doubts on the validity of the mid-quote as a proxy 
for the true price (see Hansch et ah, 1999, and Reiss and Werner, 1996). 
Secondly, it is very difficult to obtain a valid mid-quote for a security trading 
on two different trading mechanisms, using completely different trading rules. 
Any such mid-quote would have to take into consideration aspects of depth 
and breadth of the market so as to make the statistic significant across the 
two trading systems. Thirdly, since dealers do not disseminate their quotes 
in a central location it is very difficult to obtain their quotes. In fact, the 
LSE data set only provides quotes from the order book.
Besides these ad hoc models, there are other, more robust, methodolo­
gies that have been used to investigate the price discovery process aimed at 
measuring the contribution made by each market to the security’s price dis­
covery process. On the econometric level, the major models employed have 
been the so-called common factor models, where the price series of the same 
securities on the different markets share a common factor, perceived to be 
the true value of the security.
It is assumed that each trading location goes through a process of collect­
ing, interpreting and analysing price-sensitive news; in this way each market 
contributes to the security’s price discovery. Intermarket arbitrage is ex­
pected to keep the prices in the different locations from deviating from each 
other in the long term, allowing deviations to exist for only very brief peri­
ods. The main source of these deviations is mainly market frictions. In fact, 
disequilibria in these models occur because traders in different markets can 
process news at different rates. In econometric terms, the transaction prices 
in each of the different locations are cointegrated 1 (1), meaning that these
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price series share one common stochastic factor which is typically referred to 
as the efficient price. It is this common component which is the source of 
any permanent movement in the transacted prices obtained on the different 
markets.
The two major empirical methodologies applied in this field are the Has- 
brouck (1995) model, known also as the Information Sharing Model, and 
the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) model, known as the Permanent-Transitory 
Model. Although these two models differ in the way they capture the price 
discovery process taking place in the different trading locations, they can be 
considered as complimentary, rather than substitute models. In fact, they 
can provide similar results when certain conditions hold. The two models 
employ the vector error correction model (VECM) of price discovery as their 
basis. While the Information Sharing model of Hasbrouck (1995) considers 
the contribution of each trading location to the variance of the innovations 
of the efficient price, the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) model captures the 
components of the efficient price and the error correction process.
When the residuals in the price series generated by the different markets 
are uncorrelated then the two models will produce similar results; but if a sig­
nificant level of correlation exists then results will differ. In fact, Hasbrouck 
(1995) incorporates contemporaneous correlation in the model (through the 
Cholesky factorisation), but Gonzalo and Granger (1995) not contemplating 
such a measure. However, the benefit of the Hasbrouck’s model to deal with 
contemporaneous correlation comes at a cost: prices must be ordered. This 
can be a problem if the high frequency data at the disposal of the researcher 
is not temporally ordered which is the case with a number of fragmented 
markets.
One major difference between the Hasbrouck (1995) and the Gonzalo and
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Granger (1995) models is the way in which price discovery is defined. The 
former defines price discovery as the variance of the innovations to the effi­
cient price (common factor) while the latter perceives the process in terms of 
an error correction process, generating permanent shocks leading to disequi­
librium. Whereas each market’s contribution to the price discovery process 
is defined by Hasbrouck as the market’s contribution to the variance of the 
common factor, in Gonzalo and Granger is defined as a function of the mar­
kets’ error correction coefficients.
5.4.2 Cointegration and common factors
Both the Information Sharing and the Permanent-Transitoy models consider 
two integrated 7(1) price series, Pt — ( p i t ,P 2 t ) 'with the differential being the 
error correction term, i.e., zt =  (5Pt =  P it ~ P 2t, with /? =  (1, — 1)'representing 
the cointegration vector. The following VECM represents the starting point 
of the two models:
k
A Yt = a&Yt-i + 5 3  A jA Y t-j +  et (39)
j=l
which can be decomposed into the long run relationship between the price 
series on the different locations - ctj3Yt- i  - and a short run dynamics factor - 
S jL i A jA Y t_j - driven by market frictions and other imperfections. In the 
VECM model, a  is error correction vector and et is a zero-mean vector of 
serially uncorrelated innovations with covariance matrix ft such that
a = ( o l  p u ,c 2 \
V per 1&2 &2 )
o\ (ctj) is the variance of £\t {£21) and p is the correlation between £\t and
£21-
Hasbrouck (1995) transforms (39) into a vector moving average (VMA):
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AYt = #(£)<•,
and its integrated form:
(40)
(41)
where ^(L) and \J/*(L) axe matrix polynomials. The long run impact of 
innovations, due to news, on each of the price series in the different trading 
locations is represented by 4/(l)st. Denoting T =  (Ti, Y2) as the common 
row vector in T (l), then equation (41) becomes
where t — (1, l)'is a column vector of ones.
Hasbrouck (1995) suggests that the increment T e t in equation (42) is 
being driven by news arriving on the market and represents the change that 
is permanently impounded into the price. Transitory effects, such as bid-ask 
bounces and inventory adjustments, are not considered.
If market innovations are uncorrelated across markets, then in the Has­
brouck (1995) model the matrix Q will be diagonal and YDT will have two 
terms: the first (second) represents the contribution to the common factor 
innovation from the first (second) market. The information share of market 
j  is defined as:
The relative information share of market j  is the square of its common 
factor component weighted by its variance.
(42)
r n r
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In Gonzalo and Granger (1995), the common factor is modelled as a 
combination of the variables Pt, such that f t = TPt , where T is the common 
factor coefficient vector and orthogonal to the error correction coefficient 
vector a. In this sense, f t may be expressed in terms of either price, i.e. 
Pit and p2t and the error correction term, zt with f t being 1(1). In this 
sense, the Gonzalo and Granger model decomposes the common factor into 
a combination of two prices. Moreover, because the size of zt is almost surely 
small relative to pa, ft  s evolutionary process is dominated by pa.
When we have informationally linked markets, it is expected that a\ and 
<j\ have similar values and this scenario the results obtained by Hasbrouck 
(1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) are similar. However, if price inno­
vations across the different markets are significantly correlated, then the two 
models generate different results. The way Hasbrouck (1995) model deals 
with this problem is to use the Cholesky factorisation in order to eliminate 
the contemporaneous correlation.
Hasbrouck (1995), using one-second interval sampling of the quotes, re­
ports that the upper and lower bounds in his study of price discovery be­
tween NYSE and off-NYSE quotes are almost the same. For this type of 
high frequency data, problem posed by contemporaneous correlation is not 
significant. However, it is expected that for lower frequency datasets the 
contemporaneous correlation between innovations across markets is likely to 
pose a problem. Studies using lower frequency data sets report significant 
differences between the upper and lower bounds. Mentioning one example, 
Huang (2000), employing one-minute intervals for Yahoo Inc. to investigate 
the price discovery between ECNs and various NASDAQ dealers finds that 
the lower and upper bounds Eire 80% and 31% respectively.
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K alm an Sm oothing As mentioned above, one major requirement of the 
Hasbrouck methodology is ordered data which means that trades must have 
strict sequentiality. As we shall see, this is one major problem in the dataset 
provided by the LSE and is mainly due to (a) the competitive dealership 
nature of the DS, and (b) the trade reporting regime. As such, the only 
source of the lack of sequentiality comes from the off book trades but becomes 
a major issue for our purpose.
We can refer to two notions of data sequentiality: (a) the first one refers 
to the microstructure adopted by the Exchange; while (b) the second has to 
do with the reporting regime adopted by the Exchange which will, in turn, 
influence the data sets available to the researcher. In markets where (a) 
securities trade through the presence of a single market maker, as is the case 
of the NYSE, and (b) liquidity is provided through a screen-based system 
based on the public order book, produce one single price at each point in 
time (given that only one order is executed at each point in time) and hence 
data sequentiality is obtained automatically. This is the case with the SETS 
system.
However, in a competitive dealership market where a number of dealers 
complete for the order flow and negotiate trades simultaneously in a frag­
mented market there is likely to be different prices for the same security at 
each point in time. This is the case with the DS on the LSE. On this sys­
tem we could have a situation where several orders for the same security are 
transacted at different prices at the same point in time because information 
is not centralised and negotiation takes place in a bilateral fashion between 
each dealer and trader. Furthermore, the LSE allows dealers to report their 
trades within three minutes from the order’s execution which means that 
data collected by the LSE could be intrinsically non-sequential.
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Given these problems, it is unlikely that the Hasbrouck (1995) model will 
produce a good estimate of the common factor - the security’s true price - 
which is an important aspect of our analysis. We need an econometric model 
that preserves the time series properties of the price series without the need 
to have data sequentiality as a necessary condition. One such model was 
proposed by Lai and Koopman (1999) where the time series properties are 
modelled explicitly without the need of data sequentiality.
In view of such constraints, we attempt to calculate the “system-wide” 
true price at each point in time and compare the price volatility on SETS 
around this true price with the dealership’s price volatility around the same 
price.
In line with Madhavan et al. (1997) we write the transaction price dis­
covery process, for every security, as follows:
Pt,i =  m t +  s tti +  et,i £t,i ~  N(0,a*) i = l , . . . ,N t (43)
m t = m t- i  + v t + <;t qt ~N (0,cr*) £ =  l , . . . ,n  (44)
where p tyi is the transaction price at time t for trade z, st>* is the half­
spread and £t,i is the pricing error in the transaction price. On the other 
hand, m t is the fundamental (true) price, vt is the price-relevant information 
released by the order flow while <;t refers to the disturbances generated by 
the information coming from other sources besides the volume transacted.
The transaction price discovery process is given by the evolution of the 
true price, mt, and the factors that impact on the half-spread. In turn, the 
true price at period t  is the lagged value of the fundamental price adjusted 
for information from the order flow and from other sources. The disturbances 
£t)i and qt are normally distributed and independent of each other.
In the model used (explained below), there is the implicit assumption that 
spreads have one component - adverse selection - while the inventory com­
ponent and the order processing component are not modelled. As explained
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above, Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983) suggest 
that the rebalancing of the inventory held by the dealers is a cost that must 
be covered by the bid-ask spread. However, Hansch et at. (1999) and Reiss 
and Werner (1997) show that this component is not of particular importance 
to London dealers who can rebalance using the inter-dealer market resulting 
in low risk from inventory holdings.
Additional structure is needed to calculate the “system-wide” price in 
that (i) the information impounded from the order flow, and (ii) the factors 
affecting the spreads must be specifically modelled. In line with Koopman 
and Lai (1999), we specify the half-spread at time t on the z-th trade to follow 
the following process:
$t,i ~  dt,i(T^n -|- >£^ .£7) X =  Xt^ i
where
^ _  f 1 if trade is buyer-initiated 
t,%  ^ —1 if trade is seller-initiated
while (rtn  +  >cxCl) represents a cubic spline regression with parameter
vectors n  and 17.
The explanatory variables r t and k x are vectors based on the time-of-day 
effect t  and the trade size x t)i respectively.
Following the literature introduced by Copeland (1976) and Easley and 
O’Hara (1987 and 1992) we assume that the order flow, the trade size, the 
order persistency and the time interval between successive trades are factors 
that signed information about the true value of the security. In addition, 
we follow Hasbrouck (1991) in that the order flow is assumed to be serially 
correlated because of order fragmentation and price stickiness.
In particular, if we allow the vector qt = (<7i , * , qs,t) to contain the 
lagged trade volumes multiplied by the binary variable dt>i, we allow for 
serial correlation in the following fashion
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Qj,t ~  E(qjtt | qj-i,t, Qj-3,t—) — qj,t ~  @iqj-i,t ~ @2qj-2,t ~  Qzqj-z,t--- (45)
With this structure, we model the information contained in the order flow 
as follows
s
vt = qt^  = ^2 (46)
3= 1
where, as explained above, qjtt =  d t- jn  %t-j and A =  (Ai,..., A5) is
a fixed unknown vector of coefficients.
We write the model in (43) and (44) in a state space framework with the
following transition and measurement equations:
a t =  Qtoct-i +  n t7 x +  0 trjt r}t ~N (0 ,(r2 )  f = l , . . . , n  (47)
Pt,i — +  £t,i 0,<7g) i — 1,..., AT* (48)
where the a t is the m x l  state vector which follows a vector autoregressive 
process with transition matrix f2t, explanatory matrix 11* and selection matrix 
Qt for the disturbance term 77*. The parameter vectors 7 ^ and 'yx allow the 
inclusion of the fixed effects in the model. The matrices *,/?* and the 
vectors 4>*i, X t,i are assumed to be deterministic and known.
The time-of-day effect in the spread and the trade size effect are mod­
elled as regression spline functions with a number of knots which can be
determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to obtain fit and 
parsimony in the model, with the lowest AIC value being chosen as the most 
appropriate one.
Following the Lai and Koopman (1999) technology, the model used has 
four knots for the time spline and three knots for the size spline to take into
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account the maximum trade sizes observed in both the order book and the 
dealership systems.
In this state space model, the volume effect vt is modelled through 11*7 * 
while the regression effect X t^ x is used to model the spread. The state 
vector is the scalar m t and it is modelled as a nonstationary process with the 
initial state requiring a diffuse prior condition, that is
ol\ ~  N { 0, ac} (49)
where k is assumed to have a value of 106.
The Kalman filter uses the past vector observations of Pi,,..Pt to evaluate 
the minimum mean squared linear estimator of the state vector a t+iwith 
a t+1 =  E (a t+1 | p it...pt) and variance matrix by Yt+i =  var(a t+1 | p it...pt)- In 
this way, the Kalman filter runs to evaluate one-step and multi-step predic­
tions of the state vector. It will also obtain one-step ahead prediction errors 
together with their variances.
Lai and Koopman (1999) use the following technology, which is also 
applied in this work. Define atji =  E (a t+i \ P t-i) and atti =  E (a t+i I 
Pt-uPt,i,...Pt,i-i) with Ytji =  var(at+i \ Pt- 1) andK^ =  var(a t+1 \ Pt-uPt,i,...Pt,i-i) 
for i =  2,..., N t, where Pt =  {pi,i, -,P t,N t}- The filtering equa­
tions are then given by
=  Qtji d” N tjZ t j  jt,i
Yt,i+1 = ytl, -  NtiiZ jN l j
where
jt,i =  Pt,i
Zt, = Kt,Yti,K~l + 
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for i =  l , ..., yt and t =  1, ...,n.
Minimum mean squared linear estimators using all observations Pn are 
evaluated by a smoothing algorithm which require output of the Kalman 
filter.
Following Harvey (1993), Koopman and Durbin (1998) and Koopman 
and Lai (1999), we know that some of the elements of these matrices and 
vectors may be unknown and these elements are collected in the vector w  
and estimated by maximum likelihood
1 n Vt j 2-LogL{w) =  constant — — Y '' log Zt)i +  (50)
2  t = t 0  i = l  ’ Z t '*
The disturbances in the model are normally distributed while the variance 
of r)t can be expressed as a ratio of the variance of et which is referred to as 
the signal-to-noise ratio, given as
$  = t f / r l  (51)
and iJj is estimated by numerically optimising the likelihood function.
5.4.3 Variance Ratios
Following the calculation of the true “system-wide” price, we proceed to 
measure the price volatility on DS and the order book system (SETS) around 
the fundamental price calculated from the state space model.
Denoting and <rj as the variance of the price discovery process on DS 
and SETS respectively, we can calculate Var[]n(mt)— l n ^ f 5)] and Far[ln(rat)— 
In (p?ETS)\.
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The conventional variance ratio, given by a%/cr\ is defined as:
_  Var[ln(mt) — In(pfETS)] 
Var\\n(mt) — ln(pf5)]
(52)
Ronen (1997) indicates a number of econometric problems that could 
severely impact the validity of these conventional variance ratios and which 
are of interest for this work. Mainly (a) over-lapping observations, (b) cross
return series are likely to induce biases in variance ratios and a Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) technology has been found to deal effectively 
with these problems. This methodology has been used by Madhavan and 
Panchapagesan (2000) in another context.
Specifically, given N  stocks, the 2N  x 1 vector could be formed in the 
following way:
where is the DS system pricing error, EiiW denotes the SETS system 
pricing error, i?iiSy denotes the true variance of the “system-wide” price and
variance ratios for individual securities while we employ the Wald statistic
~ X2(N) to test the null hypothesis that the variance 
ratios are jointly equal to unity.
The variance ratios are run for the whole trading period except for the 
opening 15 minutes and the closing 15 minutes. Empirical and theoretical
stock correlations, and (c) serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the
“0 1 , £  A - l ^ l . a y
(53)
Ai is the variance ratio of the pricing errors ( |f )  for stocks i =  1,..., N .
We use the Lagrange Multiplier to test the null hypothesis of unity
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research (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987, Stoll and Whaley, 1990) indicate 
that these trading periods are qualitatively different from the rest of the 
trading day and would merit a separate analysis which is beyond the scope 
of this Chapter. Hence, in order not to bias our results, we opted to remove 
the impact of the opening and closing periods.
5.4.4 Results From Variance Ratios
The results from the variance ratios technique are shown in Tables 46-51. The 
ratios for the most-heavily traded securities (top 20 securities by volume) are 
shown separately from those in respect of the least-traded securities (bottom 
20 securities by volume).
When the 20 top and bottom securities by volume are considered as a 
group, we find that the price efficiency on the order book system around the 
true “system-wide” price is lower than that observed in the dealership market. 
This result is confirmed when the entire FTSE 100 securities are analysed. 
In addition, the result finds confirmation when (a) trading sub-periods, and
(b) different trade sizes are considered.
All trades on both the order book and the dealership system, except 
the trades flagged as being part of a “Worked Principal Agreements” , have 
been used for (a) the calculation of the “system-wide” price, and (b) the 
transaction prices used to calculate the variance ratios. As described in 
Appendix F, trades from the dealership system could be reported to the LSE 
within three minutes from their execution. In view of this, the time of trades 
from the dealership system were randomly changed by 20, 60, 90, 120, 150 
and 180 seconds.
The main result emerging from the sample of the 40 securities considered 
is that price efficiency is higher on the dealership-based system, although 
there are individual securities for which this result does not hold. Only
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Table 46: Variance ratios for different trading periods for the top
FTSE 10 securities (by volume) for all trades up to  2 NMS (See
Appendix F)
Security
9:15 - 10:00 10:01 - 11:01
T r a d in g  P e r io d  
13:00 - 14:00 14:01-15:00 15:15 -16:15
1 1.311* 1.345* 1.302* 1.298 1.358*
(4.761) (5.122) (4.552) (4.436) (5.276)
2 1.296* 1.291* 1.219 1 .3 1 5 * 1.3014*
(4.868) (4.674) (3.189) (4.918) (4.722)
3 1.474* 1.291* 1.315* 1.285* 1.308*
(6.895) (5.608) (5.652) (5.116) (4.955)
4 1.002 1.021 0.963 0.958 1.025
(1.959) (2.148) (1.822) (1.741) (1.832)
5 1.351* 1.327* 1.298* 1.351* 1.382*
(5.108) (4.613) (4.687) (5.201) (5.571)
6 1.391* 1.318* 1.284* 1.116 1.351*
(5.215) (5.527) (5.211) (4.201) (5.691)
7 0.942 0.963 1.003 1.024 1.046
(1.827) (1.858) (1.976) (1.981) (2.151)
8 1.3282* 1.364* 1.023 1.371* 1.316*
(5.225) (5.351) (2.248) (5.721) (5.162)
9 1.376* 1.339* 1.297* 1.496* 1.383*
(5.277) (6.131) (4.877) (6.551) (5.139)
10 0.979 0.982 1.013 1.026 1.048
(1.759) (1.727) (2.118) (2.258) (2.488)
Top 20 1.365* 1.345* 1.292* 1.396* 1.411*
(5.61) (4.84) (4.18) (5.91) (6.18)
Following the calculation of the true “system-wide” price, volatility on SEAQ and SETS 
around the fundamental price. Denoting cr| and as the variance of the price discovery 
process on SEAQ and SETS systems respectively, we have Var\\n(mt) — ln(p^5)] and 
Var\\n(rrit) — ln(pf‘E'T5)] as the variance of the pricing errors on the two systems, where 
m t is the true “system-wide” price and p ^ s  and p f£'T5 are given by:
P?S =  wit +  f  t ?rW (0,<j|)
pSETS = mt + (Jt Ut~N( 0, a l)
We employ a Generalised Method of Moment to estimate A =  [ln^tM^pP3) / '
The Lagrange Multiplier test (in parantheses) the null hypothesis of unity variance ratios
for individual securities while we employ the Wald statistic (in brackets) to test the null
hypothesis that the variance ratios are jointly equal to unity._______________________
Table 47: Variance ratios for different trading periods for the bottom
FTSE 10 securities (by volume) for all trades up to 2 NM S (See
Appendix F)
Security
9:15 - 10:00 10:01 - 11:01
T r a d in g  P e r io d  
13:00 - 14:00 14:01-15:00 15:15 -16:15
11 1492* 1.458* 1.291* 1.498* 1.415*
(4.481) (4.706) (4.044) (5.465) (5.173)
12 14415* 1.215 1.024 1.311* 1.358*
(4.786) (2.812) (2.495) (5.634) (5.941)
13 1458* 1.348* 1.297* 1.505* 1.486*
(5.631) (5.831) (4.658) (6.957) (4.993)
14 1.012 1.422* 1.315* 1.571* 1.475*
(2.154) (5.996) (5.531) (4.841) (4.771)
15 1.395* 1.485* 1.316* 1.428* 1.291*
(4.131) (4.115) (5.312) (4.767) (5.207)
16 1.505* 1.524* 1.412* 1.458* 1.368*
(5.224) (5.275) (4.496) (4.299) (5.203)
17 1.533* 1.569* 1.405* 1.512* 1.598*
(4.526) (4.978) (4.124) (5.170) (5.610)
18 1.548* 1.509* 1.412* 1.514* 1.478*
(5.142) (4.102) (5.775) (3.959) (4.904)
19 1.0119 1.023 1.011 1.1674 1.126
(2.157) (2.173) (1.998) (2.183) (1.967)
20 1.486* 1.391* 1.363* 1.414* 1.514*
(5.117) (4.567) (4.761) (2.245) (5.732)
B ottom  20 1.425* 1.392* 1.326* 1.406* 1.469*
(6.01) (5.66) (4.95) (5.76) (5.81)
Following the calculation of the true “system-wide” price, volatility on SEAQ and SETS 
around the fundamental price. Denoting cr| and cr^  as the variance of the price discovery 
process on SEAQ and SETS systems respectively, we have Var[\n(mt) — ln(pP5)] and 
Var\ki(rnt) — as the variance of the pricing errors on the two systems, where
m t is the true “system-wide” price and pES and p fETS are given by:
p ? s  =  m t +  Zt €t~N(0,o-{) 
pSETS = mt + Ut Ut~N (0 ,a l)
We employ a Generalised Method of Moment to estimate A =  ^variin^tM^pP^Y"
The Lagrange Multiplier test (in parantheses) the null hypothesis of unity variance ratios
for individual securities while we employ the Wald statistic (in brackets) to test the null
hypothesis that the variance ratios are jointly equal to unity._______________________
Table 48: Variance ratios for different trading periods for the top 10
securities (by volume) for "Customer" trades up to 2 NMS (See
Appendix F)
Security
9:15 - 10:00 10:01 - 11:01
T r a d in g  P e r io d  
13:00 - 14:00 14:01-15:00 15:15 -16:15
1 1.342* 1.362* 1.298* 1.311* 1.414*
(4.741) (4.822) (4.572) (4.619) (4.916)
2 1.342* 1.348* 1.272 1.327* 1.366*
(4.862) (4.913) (3.891) (4.715) (4.954)
3 1.495* 1.379* 1.341* 1.325* 1.414*
(6.343) (5.972) (5.419) (4.948) (5.277)
4 1.162 1.178 1.102 1.108 1.168
(2.086) (2.287) (1.940) (1.854) (1.951)
5 1.371* 1.365* 1.312* 1.328* 1.412*
(5.446) (5.029) (4.618) (5.392) (5.468)
6 1.499* 1.358* 1.325* 1.284* 1.466*
(5.553) (4.608) (4.149) (3.474) (5.461)
7 1.383* 1.107 1.163 1.296 1.419*
(4.145) (1.978) (2.104) (2.109) (4.491)
8 1.574* 1.476* 1.294* 1-486* 1.465*
(5.625) (4.698) (2.394) (5.092) (4.641)
9 1.582* 1.549* 1.391* 1.418* 1.446*
(5.621) (5.529) (4.694) (4.976) (5.173)
10 1.326 1.156 1.098 1.289 1.315
(4.173) (1.831) (2.256) (2.404) (3.649)
Top 20 1.519* 1.462* 1.385* 1.416* 1.482*
(6.174) (5.154) (4.451) (4.982) (5.281)
Following the calculation of the true “system-wide” price, volatility on SEAQ and SETS 
around the fundamental price. Denoting <r| and as the variance of the price discovery 
process on SEAQ and SETS systems respectively, we have Var\\n(mt) — ln(pf>5)] and 
Var\\n(m t) — l n ^ f ^ 5)] as the variance of the pricing errors on the two systems, where 
m t is the true “system-wide” price and pES and p fETS are given by:
p?s = m t + Zt
pSETS = m t _irUt (Jt~iV(0, a l)
We employ a Generalised Method of Moment to estimate A =
The Lagrange Multiplier test (in parantheses) the null hypothesis of unity variance ratios
for individual securities while we employ the Wald statistic (in brackets) to test the null
hypothesis that the variance ratios are jointly equal to unity._____________________
Table 49: Variance ratios for different trading periods for the bottom
10 securities (by volume) for "Customer” trades up to 2 NMS (See
Appendix F)
Security
9:15 - 10:00 10:01 - 11:01
T r a d in g  P e r io d  
13:00 - 14:00 14:01-15:00 15:15 -16:15
11 1.615* 1.564* 1.416* 1.452* 1.489*
(5.431) (5.013) (4.359) (4.891) (4.976)
12 1 4 4 8 * 1.371* 1.329 1.416* 1.461*
(5.159) (3.031) (3.689) (4.983) (5.404)
13 1.564* 1.483* 1.396* 1.415* 1.464*
(6.570) (5.685) (5.021) (5.391) (5.581)
14 1.264 1.326 1.266 1.398* 1.384*
(2.322) (4.161) (2.962) (4.518) (4.424)
15 1.387* 1.396* 1.312* 1.367* 1.382*
(4.453) (4.436) (4.136) (4.338) (4.613)
16 1.421* 1.414* 1.308* 1.364* 1.395*
(5.831) (5.687) (4.246) (4.634) (5.208)
17 1.584* 1.519* 1.464* 1.529* 1.613*
(5.679) (5.366) (4.445) (5.173) (6.047)
18 1.613* 1.595* 1.518* 1.591* 1.608*
(5.923) (5.221) (5.125) (5.267) (5.986)
19 1.424* 1.386* 1.223 1.412* 1.362*
(4.412) (4.342) (2.154) (4.353) (4.121)
20 1.518* 1.503* 1.419* 1.461* 1.491*
(6.179) (4.923) (5.132) (4.421) (5.516)
B ottom  20 1.541* 1.524* 1.454* 1.482* 1.516*
(6.478) (6.105) (5.336) (5.909) (6.063)
Following the calculation of the true “system-wide” price, volatility on SEAQ and SETS 
around the fundamental price. Denoting cr| and cr  ^ as the variance of the price discovery 
process on SEAQ and SETS systems respectively, we have Var[]n(rrit) — ln^f*5)] and 
Var\\n(m t) — lnfpf'5'7’5)] as the variance of the pricing errors on the two systems, where 
m t is the true “system-wide” price and p ES and p f ETS are given by:
p f 5 =  mt +  f* f rW (0 ,<T|) 
pfETS = m t + u t u t~N( 0, a l)
We employ a Generalised Method of Moment to estimate A =  ^
The Lagrange Multiplier test (in parantheses) the null hypothesis of unity variance ratios
for individual securities while we employ the Wald statistic (in brackets) to test the null
hypothesis that the variance ratios are jointly equal to unity.______________________
Table 50: Variance ratios for different trade size groups for the top
10 securities (by volume) using " Customer" trades up to  2 NMS
(See Appendix F)
Security
< 0.25 NMS
T r a d e  s iz e  
0.25 NMS - 0.5 NMS 0.50 NMS - 1 NMS 1 NMS - 2 NMS
1 0.961 1.387* 1.392* 1.411*
(2.259) (4.827) (5.262) (5.816)
2 0.978 1.361* 1.374* 1.392*
(2.908) (4.718) (4.861) (5.137)
3 0.989 1.478* 1.486* 1.413*
(2.061) (5.742) (5.787) (5.238)
4 0.885 1.251 1.185 1.165
(2.016) (2.199) (1.865) (1.783)
5 0.978 1.354* 1.361* 1.425*
(2.526) (4.916) (4.988) (5.214)
6 0.984 1.426* 1.448* 1.489*
(2.341) (4.431) (5.136) (4.301)
7 0.964 1.061 1.084 1.122
(2.871) (1.903) (2.024) (2.028)
8 0.982 1.417* 1.366* 1.497*
(2.736) (4.479) (4.102) (5.458)
9 1.018 1.344* 1.466* 1.547*
(2.403) (3.278) (4.994) (5.708)
10 0.965 1.074 1.271 1.247
(2.802) (1.768) (2.168) (2.312)
Top 20 1.016 1.368* 1.412* 1.518*
(2.744) (4.956) (4.281) (5.051)
Following the calculation of the true “system-wide” price, volatility on SEAQ and SETS 
around the fundamental price. Denoting cr| and cr^  as the variance of the price discovery 
process on SEAQ and SETS systems respectively, we have Var[ln(ra*) — ln ^ f55)] and 
Var[]n(mt) — ln(pfET5)] as the variance of the pricing errors on the two systems, where 
mt is the true “system-wide” price and pES and p fETS are given by:
p?s = m t + ft~N(0 ,cr|) 
pfETS = m t + u t u t~N(0, a l)
We employ a Generalised Method of Moment to estimate A =  j i n ^ d 6')
The Lagrange Multiplier test (in parantheses) the null hypothesis of unity variance ratios
for individual securities while we employ the Wald statistic (in brackets) to test the null
hypothesis that the variance ratios are jointly equal to unity._______________
Table 51: Variance ratios for different trade size groups for the bot­
tom  10 securities (by volume) using "Customer" trades up to 2
NM S (See Appendix F)
Security
< 0.25 NMS
T r a d e  s iz e  
0.25 NMS - 0.5 NMS 0.50 NMS - 1 NMS 1 NMS - 2 NMS
11 1.106 1.405* 1.467* 1.597*
(2.581) (4.829) (4.141) (5.596)
12 0.997 1.142 1.225 1.434*
(2.901) (2.879) (2.554) (4.778)
13 1.052 1.348* 1.471* 1.607*
(2.761) (4.971) (4.769) (6.124)
14 0.982 1.426* 1.546* 1.637*
(2.205) (5.139) (5.661) (4.957)
15 1.021 1.448* 1.441* 1.461*
(2.231) (4.237) (5.448) (4.881)
16 1.081 1.497* 1.506* 1.518*
(2.349) (4.402) (4.604) (4.701)
17 1.163 1.517* 1.531* 1.672*
(2.634) (4.197) (4.221) (5.294)
18 1.146 1.489* 1.536* 1.608*
(2.246) (4.201) (4.914) (5.051)
19 0.961 1.057 1.243 1.311
(2.208) (2.225) (2.445) (3.235)
20 1.068 1.405* 1.467* 1.574*
(2.181) (4.476) (4.875) (5.129)
Bottom 20 1.068 1.386* 1.446* 1.545*
(2.154) (4.795) (5.068) (5.989)
Following the calculation of the true “system-wide” price, volatility on SEAQ and SETS 
around the fundamental price. Denoting and cr£ as the variance of the price discovery 
process on SEAQ and SETS systems respectively, we have Var[\n(mt) — ln^f*5)] and 
Var[\n(mt) — ln(p^jE7-r‘5)] as the variance of the pricing errors on the two systems, where 
rrit is the true “system-wide” price and pES and p fETS are given by:
p?s = m t + £t W O . a j )  
pfETS = m t + u t v t~N( 0, a l)
We employ a Generalised Method of Moment to estimate A =  ) -^ lnfcP5)}^
The Lagrange Multiplier test (in parantheses) the null hypothesis of unity variance ratios
for individual securities while we employ the Wald statistic (in brackets) to test the null
hypothesis that the variance ratios are jointly equal to unity.
one security (Schroders) from the group of the lowest-traded segment shows 
that price volatility on the order book system is not statistically significantly 
higher than the dealership system. However, when the top 10 securities 
by volume are considered, we find that the order book trading for three 
securities (BP Amoco, Lloyds TSB Bank and Unilever) does not cause higher 
volatilities when compared to trading via the dealership mode. It should be 
noted that these results do not change when the variance ratios are run 
using the sample of dealership trades with time stamps randomly changed 
as explained above.
The number of securities for which price volatility is not statistically 
significantly higher on the order book decreases with the trading activity 
(by volume). For securities with high volume transacted (for example, the 
securities listed in the top 20 by volume), it is expected that the order book 
is “thicker” compared to less traded securities and hence market and limit 
orders can be executed at reasonable prices. For the less traded securities, the 
risk of a “thin” book increases and orders can produce substantial impacts. 
In terms of price stabilisation, market making appears to be more useful for 
the latter group than the former.
These results provide evidence that dealers are indeed providing the nec­
essary liquidity that can stabilise prices during the trading process. The 
provision of liquidity through limit order traders, who submit orders to the 
book, does not seem to be achieving the same outcome in terms of price 
stabilisation.
These results acquire more importance when considering that the deal­
ership system is, in fact, attracting a higher number of trades and a bigger 
volume for execution. Existing literature has shown that volatility is posi­
tively related to number of trades executed and volume transacted. Given
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that the dealership system attracts the biggest number of orders and volume, 
it was expected that higher volatility would result on such system.
In the case considered here, however, the dealership system appears to be 
more robust in that it can transact higher volumes with lower price volatility 
than the order book and this evidence shows that dealers do indeed provide a 
useful service in terms of the stabilisation of short-period price fluctuations.
Having said this, our results do not indicate whether dealers are providing 
the socially optimum amount of price stabilisation. Arguably, competitive 
dealers, as is the case on the LSE, will not provide the socially optimal level 
of price stabilisation - price stability is an externality and as such dealers 
can free ride on each other’s efforts with each market maker taking into 
consideration only her own private benefits.
R obustness Check The validity of the results obtained in this Section de­
pends on the ability of the Kalman filtering methodology in finding the cor­
rect estimates of the security’s implicit efficient price. The Kalman method­
ology has been presented in this Chapter as a possible improvement over the 
Hasbrouck (1995) model given that part of the data (the trades data on the 
DS) suffers from lack of sequentiality and this is likely to impact the esti­
mates of the efficient price. One way to compare the methodology proposed 
in this Chapter and the Hasbrouck (1995) model is an analysis of the resid­
uals of the two price series - the one on the order book and the other on the 
dealership system - with respect to the estimates of the common factor.
Tables 52-55 reproduce descriptive statistics for the residuals calculated 
through the two models. In general, the mean of the absolute value of the 
residuals together with the variance of the residuals is smaller when the 
common factor is calculated by the Kalman filtering technology than when 
the Hasbrouck (1995) methodology is used. Thus we can conclude that, at
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least for the data sample used in this work, the residuals obtained from the 
former model behaves better than those generated by the Hasbrouck (1995) 
model.
5.5 Trading Behaviour in a Hybrid Market
After investigating price volatility on the two trading systems, the next ques­
tion that needs to be addressed is how the order flow behaves at times of 
price uncertainty - will higher levels of volatility induce a higher number of 
limit order traders to come in the book or will the order flow migrate to the 
dealers?
To a large extent, the choice between the trading systems is not an exoge­
nous factor for our underlying analysis of price volatility. These behavioural 
patterns could well be relevant in terms of inducing a certain level and pat­
tern of price volatility mainly because a trader has a choice of either going 
on the auction system or the dealership system.
The final choice between the two systems depends on the terms of trade 
offered at that particular point in time. Hence, it is assumed that liquidity, 
transaction costs, immediacy and market resilience are all important aspects 
that influence the trader’s decision of where to trade. Hence, the attractive­
ness of each market architecture for the different traders must be ascertained 
to get evidence about the types of trades being transacted in the two systems.
5.5.1 Choosing the Trading Venue
As in Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Madhavan and Cheng (1997) we assume 
that the price impact of a trade in an auction market is increasing in the trade 
size. The trading costs on SETS are captured as
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Table 52: Mean residuals on DS using the Hasbrouck (1995) and
Kalman filtering methodologies
Mean of etyi Variance Skewness Kurtosis
A s t r a Ze n e c a
( i ) 0.5573 0.5309 -0.1979 5.8131
(2) 0.4916 0.4288 0.0868 3.9779
B a r c l a y s  B a n k
(1) 0.5951 0.5874 -0.2077 6.1037
(2) 0.5535 0.5166 -0.0924 4.2364
B r it is h  T e l e c o m
( i ) 0.5350 0.4096 0.1899 6.1805
(2) 0.4719 0.4116 -0.1833 4.2887
BP A m o c o
( l ) 0.6018 0.5733 -0.2137 6.2781
(2) 0.5269 0.4596 0.0930 4.2643
HSBC B a n k
(1) 0.5637 0.5175 0.1972 5.7758
(2) 0.5080 0.4643 -0.0879 4.0297
G l a x o  W e l l c o m e
(1) 0.5748 0.4657 -0.2108 6.1944
(2) 0.5109 0.4931 0.0937 4.296
L l o y d s  TSB
(1) 0.6241 0.6198 -0.2273 6.6776
(2) 0.5887 0.7447 -0.1021 4.6827
R e n t o k il  In it ia l
( i ) 0.6608 0.6795 -0.2346 5.8934
(2) 0.5928 0.6271 0.1046 5.7974
S h ell  T r a n s p o r t
( i ) 0.6620 0.6307 -0.2351 6.9059
(2) 0.6034 0.5263 0.1065 4.8826
U n il e v e r
( i ) 0.7812 0.7142 -0.2774 8.1490
(2) 0.7301 0.6368 -0.0289 5.9079
The Table reports summary statistics for the residuals of the price series on the
dealership system with respect to the security’s efficient price. Two different
methodologies have been used: (a) the Hasbrouck (1995) model denoted by (1)
in the Table, and (b) the Kalman filtering model denoted by (2).
Table 53: M ean residuals on SETS using the Hasbrouck (1995) and
Kalman filtering methodologies
Mean of |etf<| Variance Skewness Kurtosis
A s t r a Ze n e c a
(1) 0.5128 0.4098 0.1892 5.2641
(2) 0.4822 0.4425 -0.1962 5.6828
B a r c l a y s  B a n k
(i) 0.5384 0.5152 0.1986 5.5272
(2) 0.5135 0.4712 0.3154 4.4538
B r it ish  T e l e c o m
(i) 0.4922 0.4894 0.1816 4.0534
(2) 0.4629 0.4248 0.2843 4.6147
BP Amoco
(l) 0.5538 0.4505 -0.2043 5.6851
(2) 0.5169 0.4143 0.3175 5.4831
HSBC B a n k
(i) 0.5295 0.5165 0.1879 3.2303
(2) 0.4984 0.4682 -0.3024 2.2365
G l a x o  W e l l c o m e
(i) 0.5364 0.5432 0.2016 4.6093
(2) 0.5207 0.5279 0.3198 5.5165
L l o y d s  TSB
(i) 0.6290 0.5856 0.2173 5.0468
(2) 0.6076 0.5509 0.2486 5.9230
R e n t o k il  In it ia l
(i) 0.6080 0.6045 -0.1243 6.2422
(2) 0.5815 0.6136 0.3572 5.0434
S hell  T r a n s p o r t
(i) 0.6192 0.6156 0.2247 6.2536
(2) 0.5918 0.5831 -0.0635 5.1331
U n il e v e r
(1) 0.7088 0.7246 0.2652 7.3792
(2) 0.7161 0.6472 0.0499 6.2111
The Table reports summary statistics for the residuals of the price series on the 
order book system with respect to the security’s efficient price. Two different 
methodologies have been used: (a) the Hasbrouck (1995) model denoted by (1) 
in the Table, and (b) the Kalman filtering model denoted by (2).
Table 54: Mean residuals on DS using the Hasbrouck (1995) and
Kalman filtering methodologies
Mean of \et,i\ Variance Skewness Kurtosis
ABF
(1) 0.6174 0.5686 -0.2157 6.3362
(2) 0.5558 0.4873 0.0946 4.3359
A l l ia n c e  & Le ic e s t e r
(i) 0.6478 0.6176 -0.2264 6.6530
(2) 0.5906 0.5277 0.1007 4.6177
H ays
(1) 0.5715 0.5851 -0.2070 6.0828
(2) 0.5144 0.4486 0.0908 4.1624
K in g f is h e r
(1) 0.6560 0.6249 -0.2329 6.8431
(2) 0.5744 0.5010 0.1014 4.6480
L a n d  S e c u r it ie s
(i) 0.6035 0.5749 -0.2143 6.2957
(2) 0.5428 0.4734 0.0958 4.3924
M isy s
(1) 0.6473 0.6166 -0.2298 6.7519
(2) 0.5787 0.5047 0.1021 4.6821
RECKITT & COLEMAN
(1) 0.6977 0.6647 -0.2477 7.2785
(2) 0.6307 0.5502 0.1113 5.1042
RMC
(1) 0.7203 0.6862 -0.2557 7.5138
(2) 0.6462 0.5636 0.1141 5.2291
SCHRODERS
(1) 0.7216 0.6874 -0.2562 7.5274
(2) 0.6577 0.5736 0.1161 5.3220
S e v e r n  T r e n t
(1) 0.8515 0.8112 -0.3023 8.8824
(2) 0.7958 0.6941 0.1405 6.4397
The Table reports summary statistics for the residuals of the price series on the 
dealership system with respect to the security’s efficient price. Two different 
methodologies have been used: (a) the Hasbrouck (1995) model denoted by (1) 
in the Table, and (b) the Kalman filtering model denoted by (2).
Table 55: Mean residuals on DS using the Hasbrouck (1995) and
Kalman filtering methodologies
Mean of |et>i| Variance Skewness Kurtosis
ABF
(1) 0.5512 0.5480 0.2033 5.6588
(2) 0.5183 0.4756 0.3184 4.4956
A l l ia n c e  & Le ic e s t e r
(1) 0.5788 0.5754 0.2136 5.9417
(2) 0.5521 0.5066 0.3391 4.7879
H ays
(i) 0.5292 0.5261 0.1953 5.4324
(2) 0.4976 0.4567 0.3057 4.3158
K in g f is h e r
(1) 0.5954 0.5919 0.2197 6.1115
(2) 0.5557 0.5099 0.3413 4.8193
La n d  S e c u r it ie s
(i) 0.5477 0.5445 0.2021 5.6226
(2) 0.5251 0.4819 0.3226 4.5543
M isy s
(i) 0.5874 0.5840 0.2167 6.0300
(2) 0.5598 0.5137 0.3439 4.8553
RECKITT & COLEMAN
(i) 0.6332 0.6295 0.2336 6.5004
(2) 0.6102 0.5600 0.3748 5.2923
RMC
(1) 0.6537 0.6499 0.2412 6.7104
(2) 0.6251 0.5737 . 0.3840 5.4218
SCHRODERS
(1) 0.6549 0.6511 0.2416 6.7227
(2) 0.6363 0.5839 0.3908 5.5181
S e v e r n  T r e n t
(1) 0.7728 0.7683 0.2851 7.9327
(2) 0.7699 0.7065 0.4729 6.6770
The Table reports su m m ary  statistics for the residuals of the price series on the 
dealership system with respect to the security’s efficient price. Two different 
methodologies have been used: (a) the Hasbrouck (1995) model denoted by (1) 
in the Table, and (b) the Kalman filtering model denoted by (2).
^SETS = a SETSXi +  eSETS (54)
where the price impact is given by r)fETS, Xi is a vector of variables while 
efETS is the disturbance term.
On the other hand, the price impact on the dealership system will, es­
pecially for larger trades, reflect the negotiation process that is expected to 
take place between the trader and the dealer. In such a process the trader’s 
reputational capital (built through repeated business with the same dealer) 
will be one major factor in the determination of the price.
In essence, if the trader, in the course of the negotiation, credibly signal 
that he is liquidity motivated, then he is expected to obtain a better deal 
from the dealer. This argument is similar to the Seppi (1990) model in which 
the price impact of a trade decreases with the probability that the trade is 
liquidity motivated. A similar argument can made based on the business re­
lationships that are built in a dealership market between dealers and traders. 
These relationships are likely to act as a screening device used by dealers to 
disentangle hquidity-motivated from information-motivated traders.
For the dealership system, we capture these ideas by the following rela­
tionship
rjf s =  a DSX , -  T, +  (55)
where T* captures the dealers’s information about the trader’s identity 
and trading strategy.
The major econometric problem in analysing the choice of trading venue 
is given by the fact that while trader i knows his own reputational capital, 
T», this variable is not known by the econometrician. Given this lack of 
knowledge, 55above is reduced to
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(56)
where is given by —Y; -f e f5.
Having stated the different price impacts generated by a trade on the two
systems, we need to analyse the trading location decision made by the trader. 
Surely, the trader will trade on the system that provides the best execution 
given the size of the trade he wants to trade.
Denoting the information set available to trader i as and f \  as the cost 
differential between trading on SETS and DS, given as
and substituting equations 54 and 55 into 57 we can write the cost dif­
ferential between the two systems as
Equation 58 is the criterion function used by trader i to decide where to 
trade. It can be written as
where — (Xi) and (3 is a vector of coefficients.
Hence, if the price impact of a trade pushed through the auction system is 
higher than the respective price impact generated by a trade on the dealership 
system, then the trader would opt to trade on DS rather than SETS. Hence, 
if we denote the choice of trading venue as TJ we can obtain the trader’s 
decision rule as
Ti =  E  -  r)Ps | (57)
r, = [aS£TS -  c*DS] Xi +  Ti (58)
r, = p z i  +  Ti (59)
1 i f  Ti > 0 
0 i / r j < 0
272
To analyse the trading behaviour on the two systems we need to specify 
the variables the trader uses in choosing between the two systems. These are 
captured by the criterion function in equation 60.
In this Chapter, the criterion function is measured as follows
r  z i t  — P o  +  Pi Qzit +  / ? 2 ^ z i t - l  +  P l s z i t - l  +  P ^ z i t - l  +  P b ^ z i t - l  (60)
where, for every security z , qi is the trade size in terms of NMS multiples, 
k is the imbalance in the order book on SETS immediately before a trade 
takes place, s* is the “best” spread on the order book immediately before 
each trade, 6* is the breadth of the order book before each trade and cr?t_1 
refers to the volatility calculated as the variance of the mid quotes formed 
on SETS in the interval before a trade is executed.
The imbalance measure on the order book in SETS, /*, is calculated every 
1 minute in the following way
ENb vP — ^ Na V s»=i » Z^j=i vj
E fe i Vi + E 3w! v f  ( }
where VP and V f  are the Black-Scholes option values of the buy limit 
orders and the sell limit orders respectively, entered into the order book 
before the trade is executed. This statistic measures the level of asymmetry 
in the order book.
The order imbalance is measured through a revised technology employed 
by Harris and Panchapagesan (1999). The underlying idea for such a mea­
sure, and the reason why the Black-Scholes formula is used in such a case, is 
given by the intuition that a limit buy order entered into SETS provides the 
market with a free put option while a limit sell order constitutes a free call 
option.
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In measuring the imbalance, we only take into account limit orders that 
are placed on the book within 10 ticks away from the best prices available 
on the book. All “execute and eliminate”, “fill or kill” and “at best” trades 
are removed from the system.
One central problem in the calculation of the order book asymmetry is 
attaching a time to maturity to each limit order. A limit order placed on the 
book could follow different execution paths and this is expected to complicate 
matters.14
Also, the time to maturity is influenced by the trading strategy followed 
by the trader: a limit order priced far away from the best prices is likely 
to remain on the book much more than a limit order which is aggressively 
priced. Jarnecic and Mclnish (1997) use random maturities (for example, 5 
minutes and 30 minutes) and disregard the type and size of the order placed. 
Lo, Mackinlay and Zhang (1997) employ a survival technology to estimate 
the time to expiration for each limit order.
In this Chapter, we follow a revised version of the linear approach used by 
Harris and Panchapagesan (1999) to calculate the expected time to removal 
(time to maturity) of the limit order in the following way:
M Tiz =  OLi +  (31 * System Time* +  (32 * Order Si ze* +  (33 * Queue Length*
+/?4*Time to Close* +  /35*Order Arrival Rate* +  /36*Pr ice Position* (62)
where the subscript 2 defines the security z.
System time is the time (in minutes) already spent by the limit order 
in the SETS’s order book. Order Size is in NMS multiples and the Queue
14The order could (a) be entirely filled and removed from the system; (b) partially filled 
and the unfilled part remains in the system; (c) cancelled by the trader who submitted it; 
or (d) its position changed by the system as other, more aggressively priced, limit orders 
are introduced.
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Length refers to the size, always in NMS multiples, of other limit orders 
preceding the particular limit order. Price Position is the position of the 
limit order with respect to the market and the Order Arrival Rate captures 
the relative market order flow in the 30 minutes preceding the sampling time. 
Time to Close is the length of time until the end of the trading day.
For the calculation of the Black-Scholes valuation, we take the risk-free 
rate as the annualised rate of the 3-month government bonds; the strike 
price is the limit price of the order; and the annual volatility is computed 
by multiplying the daily return volatility in the day preceding the order’s 
submission.
The spread, s, on the order book is calculated in the usual way -
  Pait pbjt /f> o\
Stt I p c L i t + p b i t ] /  2
where pan and pbn are the best ask and bid prices at time t respectively.
On the other hand, the breadth of the order book, 6j, is calculated as
b f‘k = pat *Q ai (64)
b f'd = pbi *Qbi (65)
where Qai is the quantity of shares being asked at the best ask and Q6* 
is the quantity of shares offered at the best bid.
The methodology followed is as follows. All orders submitted to the SETS 
system are employed taking the time when such orders have been placed in 
the order book. On the other hand, all trades on the dealership system, 
except those flagged as being “Worked Principal Agreements” are utilised, 
again using the time of their execution for this analysis. The asymmetry 
in the order book, best spread, market breadth and volatility are calculated
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over the ten minutes preceding (a) the order submission to the order book, 
or (b) the trade’s execution on the dealership system. Finally, in view of the 
possible problems in time stamps for the dealership system, trades’ times 
were randomly changed by 20, 60, 90, 120, 150 and 180 seconds.
The coefficient estimates obtained from the probit model sire shown in 
Table 56. The trade size coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level 
using the Wald chi-square test and is positive, providing a confirmation that 
as the trade size gets larger, trades are channelled to the dealership system 
rather than facing the limit order book on the auction system. Coupled 
with this, we have the important result that the probability of a trade being 
directed to the dealership system increases as the volatility in the trading 
system increases.
These two results, when analysed together, provide a very important 
message related to the concept of immediacy in the market. Immediacy 
refers not only to the ability to trade promptly, but also to the ability to 
trade at prices that are reasonable under current market conditions. This 
leads us to another important concept, that is the supply of liquidity in depth, 
which is the ability of traders to execute their orders quickly, possibly also in 
large sizes. These characteristics are important for large traders and during 
adverse market conditions, such as the case when price volatility increases.
On the other hand, we find that the tighter the spread on the book 
the more likely it is for traders to direct their orders to the order book for 
execution there. This evidence is consistent with similar results obtained so 
far in the literature.
More importantly, we find that the (signed) imbalance of the order book 
is informative and it appears to be influencing the trader’s decision as to 
where to transmit the order. This is contrary to most theoretical models
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that suggest that limit order imbalances axe uninformative. In this case, we 
find that the asymmetries in the limit order book have some predictive power 
as to where the trader will direct his order.
These asymmetries may well reflect market sentiment or the presence of 
informed traders. The results show that traders appear to be trading in front 
of the heavy side of the market. An example of such traders are the quote 
matchers discussed in Amihud and Mendelson (1990) and Harris (1990). The 
results here are very much in the same spirit of Harris and Panchapagesan 
(1999) but they analyse whether order book asymmetries can indicate the 
likely direction of future price changes.
5.5.2 Order Book D epth and Volatility
Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) empirically analyse the order flow dynamics 
on the Paris Bourse and find (a) different ways in which liquidity is supplied 
and consumed by traders, and (b) how the two sides of the market interact. 
For example, in such a pure limit order book environment, the conditional 
probability that traders submit limit orders, instead of market orders, is 
larger when (i) the spread is wide, or (ii) the order book is not very deep. 
On the other hand, liquidity is consumed through traders who tend to hit the 
prevailing quote when the spread is very narrow. From this evidence, Biais 
(1995) conclude that traders provide liquidity at times of liquidity shortages 
(when such an exercise is really valuable) and consume liquidity at times 
when liquidity is in surplus. Furthermore, at times of liquidity deficits traders 
on the Paris Bourse adopt a very aggressive behaviour in submitting limit 
orders, partly to obtain time priority in such adverse market conditions.
It is of interest the way market orders interact with limit orders in such 
a centralised market. Generally speaking, these orders manage to obtain 
liquidity at relatively low cost. The main results stemming from the analysis
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Table 56: Estimates of the probit model
P a n e l  A: 
Coefficient
B u y  t r a d e s  
Estimate X2 P value Log likelihood
-5662.25
Pi 0.71 (0.076) 16.55 0.001
p t -0.32 (0.055) 5.56 0.005
p 3 -0.15 (0.032) 3.01 0.032
Pa 0.12 (0.074) 1.81 0.219
05
P a n e l  A:
0.39 (0.027) 
S e l l  T r a d e s
9.22 0.001
R 2 = 14.68 
-5981.22
Pi 0.79 (0.058) 15.82 0.001
p 2 -0.30 (0.061) 5.82 0.001
Pz -0.24 (0.044) 4.91 0.005
Pa -0.14 (0.091) 1.52 0.294
05 0.34 (0.024) 7.85 0.001
R 2 = 15.86
The Table reports the coefficient estimates of the probit model with 
asymptotic standard errors in the parentheses. In Panel A, we provide 
the results for the buy orders while in Panel B we have the results for sell 
orders. The probit model estimated is the following:
Pr[Vi = l \ Z i) =  fl{(3Zi)
where ft is the cumulative standard normal distribution, TJ is the 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the trade takes place on the 
dealership system and 0 if the trade is executed on SETS. Zi is a vector 
of independent variables, while (3 is the vector of unknown coefficients. 
The linear combination of 0Zi is given by
T it =  0 O +  P iQ it  +  0 ^ i t - \  +  @ 3Si t - l  +  +  @ 5a i t - l
where g* refers to the trade size in terms of NMS multiples, U is the 
imbalance in the order book on SETS immediately before each trade,
Si is the “best” spread on the order book immediately before each 
trade, 6* is the breadth of the order book and refers to the 
volatility calculated as the variance of the prices formed on SETS.
are: (a) large market orders (larger than the depth at the quotes submitted) 
are only partially executed; (b) the remaining part of the market order which 
is unexecuted is converted into a limit order; (c) following a market order 
coming on the market, there is a high probability that the next order will 
come in to provide liquidity to the market order; (d) the evidence shows that 
substantial monitoring from outside the book, on the state of affairs in the 
book, takes place with traders investigating and waiting for advantageous 
trading opportunities to submit their orders.
A related question of interest for the purpose of this Chapter is how 
depth on the order book responds when price volatility increases. There are 
competing arguments regarding the relationship between price volatility and 
market depth. Ahn et al. (1999), for example, find that market depth rises 
subsequent to an increase in transitory volatility while transitory volatility 
declines subsequent to an increase in market depth.
These results appear to be consistent with the Handa and Schwartz (1996) 
model. Ahn et al. (1999) also find that when transitory volatility arises from 
the ask (bid) side, investors will submit more limit sell (buy) orders than 
market sell (buy) orders and conclude that this result is consistent with the 
presence of limit order traders placing orders that will supply liquidity.
However, the Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Handa and Schwartz (1996) 
and Ahn et al. (1999) results are obtained in stand-alone trading systems 
where limit orders and market orders can only be placed in one system. But 
what will happen to market depth on the order book and the mix of limit 
orders and market orders when two systems compete with each other for 
the order flow? For example, at times when price volatility increases, will 
liquidity move to the order book where limit order traders will provide the 
necessary liquidity or will they “take refuge” in the dealership system, where
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voluntary market makers will provide the liquidity demanded by traders?
To investigate this question, we analyse whether intraday volatility has 
an impact on the depth in the order book. For the purpose of this Chapter, 
depth is defined both (i) as the number of orders at pre-specified ask and bid 
quotes and (ii) as the size of the orders at pre-specified ask and bid quotes. 
The trading day is divided into 90 5-minute intervals to cover the entire 
trading day and we estimate the following relationship for each security in 
the sample using GMM:
89
Depth zt= a  +  (31Depthzt_1+ 02cr2zt_1+(33T rzt-i+l34Asymzt_1+ '^2(35D T kj+Et
k=1
(66)
where Depthzt is the depth on the order book (using both (i) as the 
number of orders at pre-specified ask and bid quotes and (ii) as the size of 
the orders at pre-specified ask and bid quotes) at time interval t, is 
calculated as the volatility of the mid quotes formed on the SETS system, 
T rzt is the number of trades executed on the SETS system during interval t, 
A sym zt- i  is the asymmetry in the order book in interval t  — 1, while DTk,t 
is a dummy variable to control for the time of the day effect.
The above relationship is estimated using GMM for each security in the 
sample and heteroskedastic and autocorrelated consistent t-statistics are ob­
tained. Tables 57-58 report the cross-sectional means of the estimates and 
the t  — sta tistics , together with the number of securities from the FTSE 100 
index that have statistically significant coefficients.
The results show that, after controlling for the time of the day effect, an 
increase in mid quote volatility in the order book system leads to a decrease 
in the depth of the order book. The decrease seems to be more substantial 
when the depth up to 2 NMS is considered. This result is consistent with
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Table 57: Estim ates for the relationship between (buy) depth on the
order book and return volatility
D e p t h Pi f t f t f t
P a n e l  A: N u m b e r  o f  l im it  o r d e r s
Best ask 0.751 -0.032 -0.24 0.192
(10.14) (-3.21) (-5.88) (4.29)
[81] [82] [78] [84]
Up to 2 X NMS 0.919 -0.038 -0.28 0.252
(8 .21) (-4.15) (-7.52) (4.86)
[79] [79] [80] [86]
P a n e l  B: S iz e  o f LIMIT ORDERS
Best ask 0.701 -0.041 -0.32 0.4101
(12.78) (-5.81) (-9.61) (6.52)
[82] [81] [84] [85]
Up to 2 X NMS 0.882 -0.045 -0.36 0.4671
(11.41) (-5.68) (-7.81) (6.56)
[83] [86] [85] [86]
The Table reports coefficient estimates for the following model:
D zt =  ol +  P iD zt-1 +  P2° 2zt-1 +  PtTr-zt +  P±Azt-1 +  i P$
where Dzt is the depth on the order book at time interval t, < 7 z t-1 
is the volatility calculated as the mid quote variance formed on 
SETS, T rzt is the number of trades executed on SETS during 
interval t, A zt- \  is the level of asymmetry in the order book 
during interval t  — 1 while T^t is a dummy variable to control 
for the time of the day effect.
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages for the 100 stocks 
included in the FTSE 100 index.
Average t  — statistics axe in parantheses; the number of firms 
with statistically significant coefficients are shown in brackets.
Table 58: Estimates for the relationship between (sell) depth on the
order book and return volatility
D e p t h 0x 02 03 04
P a n e l  A: N u m b e r  o f  l im i t  o r d e r s
Best bid 0.722 -0.026 -0.35 0.211
(9.75) (-3.18) (-4.22) (3.74)
[79] [86] [78] [80]
Up to 2 X NMS 0.821 -0.042 -0.42 0.422
(10.41) (-5.25) (-7.76) (5.86)
[81] [85] [82] [86]
P a n e l  B: S iz e  o f LIMIT ORDERS
Best bid 0.811 -0.041 -0.39 0.422
(12.56) (-6.28) (-7.72) (4.52)
[78] [80] [86] [84]
Up to 2 X NMS 0.898 -0.054 -0.48 0.557
(12.88) (-6.61) (-8.75) (6.61)
[79] [86] [82] [85]
The Table reports coefficient estimates for the following model:
Dzt = a + PiDzt-i + P2a2zt-i + P{Drzt + pAAzt~i + Ylb=i PsTk,t + £t
where Dzt is the depth on the order book at time interval t, 0-^-1 
is the volatility calculated as the mid quote variance formed on 
SETS, T rzt is the number of trades executed on SETS during 
interval t , A zt- 1 is the level of asymmetry in the order book 
during interval t  — 1, while Tk}t is a dummy variable to control 
to control for the of the day effect.
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages for the 100 stocks 
included in the FTSE 100 index.
Average t — statistics  are in parantheses; the number of firms 
with statistically significant coefficients are shown in brackets.
the view that as volatility increases traders submit less limit orders on the 
SETS system, and is contrary to the one found by Ahn et al (1999).
After estimating the impact of price volatility on the market depth in the 
order book, we proceed to analyse whether at times when price volatility is 
high, traders converge to the dealership system. It has already been found 
that an increase in volatility reduces the depth in the order book, but does 
this mean that trading activity increases on the dealership system?
In order to analyse this question, we estimate the following relationship 
for each security in the FTSE 100 index using GMM:
89
DTrades*zt= a  +  (31a2zt_1+P2Depthzt_1+P3A2t- i + ^ 0 4Tk>t+£t (67)
k=l
where DTrades*zt is the difference between the normalised number of 
trades transacted on the dealership system and on the order book system at 
time interval t, is the return volatility of the prices formed on the SETS 
system, Depthzt~i is the depth on the order book at time interval t  — 1, A zt-1 
is the asymmetry in the order book in interval t — 1, while TJt>t is a dummy 
variable to control for the time of the day effect.
The results, shown in Tables 59-60, provide evidence in favour of the 
argument that as volatility increases more traders converge to the dealership 
system for the market maker to execute their orders. In an Exchange that 
provides trading choices to different traders and as uncertainty in the trading 
process increases, a higher number of traders choose to migrate towards the 
dealership system.
The results shown in Tables 57-60 put together show that in these ad­
verse market conditions, traders are not encouraged to provide liquidity on 
the order book through limit orders, with the order flow migrating to the 
dealership system for execution there. This also means that voluntary mar-
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Table 59: Estim ates for the relationship between the order flow (buy-
side) on DS and SETS systems and return volatility
L e v e l  o f  m a r k e t  a c t iv it y P i P2 P3
P a n e l  A: A l l  s e c u r i t i e s  in  FTSE 100 in d e x
Number of trades 0.066 -0.691 -0.254
(6.96) (-7.12) (-3.81)
[87] [80] [84]
P a n e l  B: T o p  20 s e c u r i t i e s  in  FTSE 100 in d e x
Number of trades 0.051 -0.442 -0.122
(5.24) (-9.61) (-3.66)
[18] [18] [17]
P a n e l  C: B o t t o m  20 s e c u r i t i e s  in  FTSE 100 in d e x
Number of trades 0.079 -0.862 -0.229
(6.42) (-9.82) (-2.96)
[19] [19] [18]
The Table reports coefficient estimates for the following relationship: 
D T;t =  a  -f -f p 2Dzt- 1 +  PzAzt- 1 +  Y^k=1 PaTk,t +  £t
where DT*t is the difference between the normalised number of trades 
transacted on the dealership system and on the order book system at time 
interval t, cr^ t_ 1 is the volatility of mid quotes formed on the order book; 
Dzt~ 1 is the depth on the order book at time interval t  — 1, while A zt-1 
is the asymmetry in the order book during interval t — 1 and Tkft is a 
dummy variable to control for the time of the day effect.
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages for the 100 stocks included 
in the FTSE 100 index.
Average -^statistics are in parantheses; the number of securities with
statistically significant coefficients are shown in brackets.
Table 60: Estim ates for the relationship between the order flow (sell
side) on DS and SETS systems and return volatility
L e v e l  o f  m a r k e t  a c t iv it y Pi P2 A
P a n e l  A: A l l  s e c u r i t i e s  in  FTSE 100 in d e x
Number of trades 0.0741 -0.754 -0.298
(6.44) (-9.22) (-6.82)
[87] [82] [85]
P a n e l  B: T op 20 s e c u r i t i e s  in  FTSE 100 in d e x
Number of trades 0.052 -0.582 -0.185
(5.92) (-9.06) (-4.12)
[17] [18] (18]
P a n e l  C: B o t t o m  20 s e c u r i t i e s  in  FTSE 100 in d e x
Number of trades 0.082 -0.881 -0.289
(6.62) (-7.98) (-3.89)
[18] [19] [18]
The Table reports coefficient estimates for the following relationship:
— ol +  +  0 2 ^z t-i +  PzAzt-1 4- S fcli Pa Tk,t +  £t
where DT*t is the difference between the normalised number of trades 
transacted on the dealership system and on the order book system at time 
interval is the volatility of mid quotes formed on the order book;
Dzt~ 1 is the depth on the order book at time interval t  — 1, while A zt - i 
is the asymmetry in the order book during interval t — 1 and T^t is a 
dummy variable to control for the time of the day effect.
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages for the 100 stocks included 
.. in the FTSE 100 index.
Average ^-statistics are in parantheses; the number of securities with
statistically significant coefficients are shown in brackets.
ket makers are contributing to the trading process in a different way: they 
are providing liquidity when liquidity is really needed in the market, in this 
case when high price volatility leads to a shortage of liquidity provision.15 
This result appears to be stronger for the bottom decile of the securities 
included in the FTSE 100 index.
5.6 Conclusions
This Chapter investigates price efficiency and order flow dynamics generated 
in a hybrid trading system where trading fragments between two systems: 
(i) an order book based system that opens with a call auction and contin­
ues through a continuous trading mode; and (ii) a dealership system where 
voluntary market makers stand by to accommodate the order flow.
There are three major questions asked: (a) which trading system produces 
prices that track the true asset’s value more efficiently; (b) are dealers making 
any contribution to price stabilisation; and (c) what are the major order 
flow dynamics when traders can choose to trade in two different trading 
platforms. We use high frequency data from the LSE, a marketplace where 
the most liquid securities (the FTSE 100 index securities) are now traded on 
two different market microstructures.
Price efficiency in the two systems is measured as the deviation of the 
price on the order book and the dealership system from the true “system- 
wide” price that is calculated using a state-space model using the information 
content in the order flow and the past values of the price.
The major result shows that the dealership system generates the highest 
price efficiency and this result is stronger for securities in the bottom decile
15 The evidence presented here ties in with empirical evidence on how the order flow 
behaves in Bund contracts traded on two parallel trading systems, namely the LIFFE 
system and the the DTB system. Indeed, Franke and Hess (1995), Pirrong (1996) and 
Shyy and Lee (1995) find similar results for trading in futures trading.
286
of the FTSE 100 index, implying that the presence of dealers produces a 
positive impact on price stabilisation. The dealership system appears to 
be more robust in that it can transact higher volumes with higher price 
efficiency. The results indicate the dealers’ ability in finding a more accurate 
price discovery, contributing to the short-term stabilisation of prices.
In order to investigate further the issue of price efficiency, we also analysed 
market depth and order flow dynamics in the two systems under adverse 
market conditions, namely when price volatility is high. This is done to 
analyse how the order flow behaves during uncertain times and to investigate 
whether it is dealers or limit order traders that provide liquidity when it is 
mostly required.
The results find that, in a hybrid market microstructure, market depth on 
the order book decreases when return volatility increases leading to a higher 
proportion of the order flow to migrate towards the dealership system. This 
contrasts with existing literature that has found that periods of high volatility 
attract limit orders to the order book.
This Chapter’s objective is not to suggest that one market design is nec­
essarily superior to another under all circumstances. It is clear that, given 
the existence of different traders’ types, with heterogenous motivations and 
different sizes, no one system will fit all the requirements. This explains the 
emergence of hybrid trading systems in many Exchanges. The main objec­
tive for future research remains the analysis of the different trade-offs that 
exist between the different trading systems and which are central to traders’ 
strategies.
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Appendix A: Institutional design of Euro­
pean equity markets
This Appendix provides the institutional design used by the four markets 
analysed in this paper over the period from January to June 1996. In many 
cases, there have been a number of significant reforms in these markets which 
were carried out after June 1996 which are not considered in this study.
7.1 SEAQ-I
SEAQ-I was launched by the LSE in 1986. Its trading architecture resembles 
the one used by SEAQ for UK securities in that it is based on the competing 
market makers system and as such was classified as a dealership market. 
There is no official mechanism by which international securities are listed on 
SEAQ-I since securities do not make a formal request for an official listing 
and are quoted only if one or several London market makers agree to make 
a market in such securities. Transactions may be carried out 24 hours a day 
and trades are normally executed within the best limit price range.
The ‘Guide to International Equity Markets’ (1994) published by the 
LSE states that market makers for securities listed on SEAQ-I are under 
a contractual obligation to display continuous two-way firm prices for the 
same securities. Each security is allocated a minimum marketable quantity 
(MMQ), which represents the smallest size for which firm prices must be 
provided.
The LSE also established the Mandatory Quote Period (MQP) which 
refers to the period over which two-way prices for the MMQ must be dis­
played. The MQP for French and Italian cross-quoted securities is estab­
lished between 09:00:00 hrs and 16:00:00 hrs which is the period over which 
the Paris Bourse and the IE are opened for business.
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10:00:00 hrs to 17:00:00 hrs (local time). Orders were accepted between 
08:30:00 hrs and 10:00:00 hrs but they were only executed at the opening 
through a call auction, after which continuous trading starts. Orders were 
posted in the CAC by the societes de bourse, the corporate dual-capacity 
intermediaries operating on the Paris Bourse. However, these intermediaries 
have no obligation to provide liquidity.
The societes de bourse have access to the entire limit order book during 
the pre-opening period including the codes identifying the member firms plac­
ing orders while non-members see the five best limit prices on their screens. 
During the pre-opening period a theoretical price is computed and displayed 
continuously on the screens.16
Orders were executed according to the price and time priority rules. Dur­
ing the continuous trading period, limit orders are executed before market 
orders and any new order gives rise to a new transaction price if there is a 
compatible opposite order on the order book. This matching of orders pro­
duces an environment where most of the orders are excuted at either the best 
ask or the best bid quotes.
Market orders, on the other hand, are executed after limit orders have 
been transacted and their execution takes place on the limits of the order 
book. Unsatisfied market orders are entered in the book at the price at which 
the market orders were partially executed.
One characteristic of the Paris Bourse which has been often referred to is 
the level of pre-trade transparency it offers. During the continuous auction 
period, all Bourse members have a full breakdown of the central order book
16Jacquillat and Gresse (1995) appear to suggest that providing a full breakdown of 
the limit order at the pre-opening period to the societes de bourse is expected to produce 
equilibrium prices at the open. The opening price is usually the result of using all limit 
orders placed on the order book at 10:00hrs in order to maximize the number of shares 
exchanged.
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while non-members have access only to the five best limit prices.
In reality, however, the actual order book could be deeper due to the 
presence of hidden orders which are normally used by investors willing to 
transact a large trade without experiencing the price impact which is nor­
mally produced by a block trade executed in an auction market.
A hidden order contains both a disclosed quantity (at least equal to 10 
times the security’s trading lot) and a hidden quantity which loses the time 
priority. The hidden part becomes visible only when it is executed, partially 
or fully. The Paris Bourse believes that these trades represent 20% to 40% 
of the disclosed quantity for active securities.
In addition, block trading has been facilitated in other ways. Out-of-CAC 
trades are allowed by the Paris Bourse.
Post-trade transparency has been reduced significantly over the last few 
years to protect the large societes de bourse when trading as a principal. The 
member codes of the parties involved in a transaction are suppressed when 
trade information is published. Trade reporting to the Bourse, including 
block reporting, is immediate. If two member firms are involved, both must 
file a declaration. Trade publication has also been delayed in the following 
way: (a) trades between 1 and 5 times the NBS have a two hour publication 
delay; and (b) trades exceeding 5 times the NBS are only published the 
following morning.
Principal trades in the top 53 stocks which exceed the Normal Block 
Size (the ‘NBS’ which is around 2.5% of average daily trading volume in 
the preceding three months) are not bound to satisfy orders in the central 
book and can be transacted within the weighted average CAC spread (the 
fourchette moyenne ponderee which, according to the Paris Bourse’s rules, is 
‘based upon the average prices that are formed, after weighting of prices by
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number of shares, by the interaction of buy and sell orders that are posted 
on the central market’) rather than the narrower fourchette.
The presence of hidden orders severely limit pre-trade transparency on the 
Paris Bourse while the post-trade transparency is additionally constrained 
by the two hour delay for trades in the 1 X NBS - 5 X NBS trade size bracket. 
It should be pointed out that publication of trades executed on SEAQ-I of 
similar sizes is immediate. For larger trades in the 6 X NMS - 75 X NMS trade 
size bracket executed on SEAQ-I there is a one hour delay while the Paris 
Bourse only publishes these trades in the following morning. Under these 
transparency regimes, the SEAQ-I has certainly achieved a higher post-trade 
transparency than the Paris Bourse.
7.3 Italian Exchange
Like the Paris Bourse, the IE utilises an automated order-driven and screen- 
based system with no designated market makers. From 08:00 hrs to 09:30 hrs 
(local time), the Exchange allows market participants to submit and cancel 
orders but no trades are executed. During this period, the system contin­
uously calculates a theoretical price based on the orders which have been 
submitted. This price is made visible to the authorised market participants 
and its calculation is based on a set of four hierachical requirements with the 
second, third and fourth requirements being resorted to when there is more 
than one theoretical price.
The theoretical price is normally the one that maximizes the number of 
orders matched at the opening; if the same quantity is matched with different 
prices then the system calculates the theoretical price which minimizes the 
difference between the amount demanded and the amount supplied.. If no 
single price is yet determined, the system will produce the price nearest to
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the ‘reference price’ that is a weighted average of the price at which the 
final 10% of the traded volume in the previous trading session was executed. 
Finally, if there are still two or more possible prices, the system will choose 
the highest price.
The validation of orders takes place between 09:30:00 hrs and 09:40:00 
hrs. During these ten minutes, no new orders can be placed and existing 
orders cannot be adjusted or cancelled. From 09:40:00 hrs to 09:55:00 hrs, a 
call auction takes place for each security at the theoretical price established 
by the system. Following the opening call auction, trading resumes as a 
continuous auction from 10:00:00 hrs to 17:15:00 hrs.
The societa1 di intermediazione mobiliare (SIM), most of which are dual­
capacity intermediaries with the possibility of trading for their own account, 
have full access to the limit order book, including the identity of the traders 
submitting the orders, both before the continuous auction starts and during 
continuous trading. Data providers have access to the five best limit prices 
which are displayed on the screen. In this sense, the pre-trade transparency 
regime used by the Exchange is identical to the one used by the Paris Bourse.
Market orders are always executed after limit orders and the price prior­
ity and time priority rules are applied. The IE also allows hidden orders but 
it imposes no condition as to how much is to be disclosed and how much can 
remain hidden. This decision is entirely in the hands of the party submitting 
the order. The only obligation which existed during the period under consid­
eration was for the disclosed segment of the order to be identified as forming 
part of a hidden order. This obligation has ceased on 1 January 1998.
The major difference between the IE and the Paris Bourse is how block 
trading is executed. All block trades, which are defined as trades larger than 
20% of the average daily volume executed over the previous 3 months, are
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transacted off-the-floor with no obligation to satisfy the central limit order 
book. In addition, these block trades are not obliged to be executed within 
the weighted average spread and can be executed at any price. The block 
trade (and any other off-floor transaction) must be reported to the IE within 
90 seconds of its execution with the trade price published separately from 
the other prices formed on the IE.
Trade publication is immediate for non-block trades and delayed by one 
hour in the case of block trades. In view of this publication regime, the IE 
can be said to possess a higher level of post-trade transparency compared to 
the Paris Bourse.
7.4 D eutsche Borse
Trading on the Deutsche Borse is fragmented between floor trading (with 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange being the major player in terms of floor trad­
ing) and the Integriertes Borsenhandels- und Informations-System (IBIS), 
the electronic trading system which has now been replaced by the XETRA 
system. Launched in 1991, IBIS became a major player in German trading. 
In fact, some 60% of the volume transacted for the DAX 30 securities used to 
be transacted on IBIS (Pagano and Steil, 1995). IBIS had 234 bank and non­
bank members at the end of 1994 (Oesterhelweg, Schmidt and Treske, 1996). 
There were three types of traders on IBIS: (a) the Kursmaklers, specialist 
brokers-dealers who could carry out proprietary trading; (b) the Freimak- 
lers, independent brokers who could carry proprietary trading; and (c) bank 
traders, that could also do proprietary trading.
Trading took place between 08:30:00 hrs and 17:00:00 hrs and the system 
allowed dealers to quote indicative prices before trading starts. Entries were 
in round lots of 500 shares for the most active securities and 100 shares for
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the less active ones. Most of the entries were quotes, implying that most 
market participants act as market makers even if there is no obligation for 
them to provide two-way quotes throughout the trading day.
Up to six quotes on each side were allowed and, based on these entries, 
the system maintained an open book. The system, unlike the screen-based 
systems used by the Paris Bourse and the IE, was not able to automatically 
execute matched orders. A transaction is executed when the highest ranking 
bid or ask price displayed on the screen is electronically accepted by a market 
participant.
In principle, the transaction occured at the best bid or best ask. The 
system provides for trades bigger than the size of the best bid or ask to 
be executed by electronically accepting lower ranking bids or offers. Given 
this trading architecture, execution risk was minimised since there is limited 
uncertainty regarding the transaction price, the volume or the execution 
time.Trading was anonymous, with the identity of the parties to the trade 
becoming public at 15:30 hrs when the system provided confirmation of the 
transactions executed in the previous 24 hours.
The Kursmakler or Freimakler charged a transaction fee (called Courtage) 
in the case of a transaction which is makler-initiated. The fee amounted to 
0.04 % of the market value in the case of DAX stocks and 0.08% in the case 
of non-DAX securities.
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A ppendix B: Pairing M ethodology
Fama-French (1992) analysed all nonfinancial securities on NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ over the period 1963-1990 and tried to find the variables that 
influence average returns.
They found that the univariate relation between Beta and average returns 
was weak, whereas the univariate relations between average returns and four 
variables - size (ME), Earnings-Price ratio (E/P), Book Equity to Market 
Equity ratio (BE/ME) and leverage - were strong. The findings from the 
multivariate tests which are of interest to this Chapter are two; namely, 
(a) Beta is flat and does not explain the cross-sectional average returns; 
and (b) combining together ME and the BE/ME absorbs the role of both 
leverage and E/P. Fama and French’s results show that securities’ risk is 
multidimensional, with one dimension being provided by ME while the other 
dimension is provided by the BE/ME ratio.
In addition, Davis et al. (1998), using securities listed on the NYSE 
between 1929 and 1997, reinforced the findings of Fama-French (1992) and 
ranked the proxies for risk with the value premium (BE/ME) being more 
robust and stronger than the size premium.
It could be argued that the Fama and French (1992) and the Davis et 
al. (1998) results are not necessarily relevant when European securities are 
considered. Such a sample contains cross-country observations and, hence, is 
bound to have cross-country and institutional differences of interest and these 
two factors could diminish the role of both ME and BE/ME as proxies for 
securities’ risk. Hence, in terms of this study, the pervasive risk factors have 
to explain average returns not only within but also across different countries.
This suspicion finds some confirmation in the results obtained by Heston 
et al. (1998) when they tested the Capital Asset Pricing Model within the Eu­
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ropean contest. The authors study 2100 securities in 12 European countries, 
a mixture of stocks included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) and some additional small stocks, during the period 1980-1995. The 
major result from their work suggests that, contrary to the Fama-French ev­
idence for US securities, both ME and Beta have distinct roles in explaining 
average returns in these European markets.
They show that for European securities, beta has no cross-sectional rela­
tionship with size and as such portfolios that vary independently in beta and 
size could be formed. The relation between average returns and Beta is based 
on intra-country and inter-country considerations. It is found that high Beta 
countries outperformed low Beta countries in addition to the expected rela­
tion between Beta and returns within countries. The size premium is largely 
due to intra-country differences in size.
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Appendix C: Paired Securities
Table 61: SEAQ securities paired w ith CAC securities
Abbey National 
Airtours 
Allied Domecq 
Allied Textile 
Antofagasta Holdings 
ASDA Group 
Assd. British Foods 
Barclays Bank 
Berkeley
Blue Circle Industries 
BPB
British Petroleum 
British Steel 
BTP 
BTR
Burmah Castrol 
Caledonia Investments 
Capita Group 
Carlisle
Carlton Communications
CGU
Cobham
Courtalds Textile 
Daejan Holdings 
Derwent Valley 
Dewhirst Group 
Dolphin Pack 
EIS
Electrocomponents 
Field Group
First Choice 
FKI
General Electric 
GKN
Great Portland Estates
Guardian Royal Exc.
Hambros
Hanson
HSBC
ICI
Independent Insurance Gr.
Kwik-Fit
Ladbroke Group
Laporte
Logica
Manganese Bronze 
Marks &; Spencer 
Mayflower 
Metalrax Group 
Misys
National Express
Next
Pearson
Peel
Pentland Group 
Pilkington 
Pillar Properties 
Powell Duflryn 
Provident Financial 
Prudential Corporation
Racal Electronic 
Readicut International 
Reckitt & Colman 
RMC Group 
Royal & Sun Alliance 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Royal Doulton 
Rutland Trust 
Safeway 
Schroders 
Scottish Media 
Shell Transport 
Smith & Nephew 
Smith Industries 
SmithKline Beecham 
South Stf. Water 
Standard Chartered 
Staveley Industries 
Tesco
Thames Water 
TI Group 
Trafford Park 
Unilever (UK)
Verity Group 
Whitbread 
Wolsley 
WPP Group 
Zeneca
The Table presents the securities listed on the London Stock Exchange, and whose 
trading takes place on SEAQ in the period under consideration, which are paired 
with securities listed on the Paris Bourse.
319
Table 62: CAC securities paired w ith SEAQ securities
Accor
AGF
Air Liquide
Alcatel Asthom
AXA
Bancaire
Bertrand Faure
BIC
BIS
BNP
Bouygues
Canal Plus
Cap Gemini
Carrefour
Casino Guichard
Castorama Dubois
CCF
Cerus
Cetelem
CGIP
Chargeurs
Club Mediterranee
Coflexip
CFF
Credit Locale France
Danone
DMC
Dynaction
Eaux (Gle Eaux)
Elf Aquitaine
Eridania Beghin Say
Essilor
Eurodisney
Eurotunnel
Finextel
GAN
Groupe Andre 
Groupe Zannier 
GTM 
Guilbert 
Havas
Havas Advertising 
Imetal
Immeubles de France 
Immob. Hoteliere 
Lafarge
Lagardere Groupe 
Lapeyre 
Lectra Systems 
Legrand
Legris Industries 
LVMH
Marine Wendel
Metaleurop
Michelin
Moulinex
Nord-Est
Paribas
Pechiney
Pechiney International
Pinault Printemps
Poliet
Primagaz
Promodes
Rexel
Rhone Poulenc “A”
Rochette
Saint Gobain
Sanofi
Schneider
Scor
Sefimeg
Sidel
Simco
Sligos
Societe Genereale 
Sodexho Alliance 
Sophia
Suez (Compagnie)
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 
Sylea
Synthelabo
Technip
TF1
Total
UAP
Usinor
Vallourec
The Table presents the securities listed on the Paris Bourse, and whose trading 
takes place on CAC in the period under consideration, which were paired with 
securities listed on the London Stock Exchange.___________________________
Table 63: IBIS and SEAQ securities paired
P a n e l  A. IBIS s e c u r i t i e s
IBIS FIRMS PAIRED IBIS FIRMS PAIRED
WITH SEAQ FIRMS WITH CAC FIRMS
Allianz Allianz
BASF BASF
BHW Bank Bayer
Bayerische Vereisbank BHW Bank
Commerzbank Bayerische Vereisbank
Continental Commerzbank
Degussa Continental
Deutsche Bank Daimler Benz
Deutsche Lufthansa Degussa
Dresdner Bank Deutsche Bank
Henkel Dresdner Bank
Hoechst Henkel
Karst adt Hoechst
Kaufhof Kaxstadt
Linde Kaufhof
MAN Linde
Mannesmann MAN
Metallgesellschaft Metallgesellschaft
Preussag SAP
SAP Schering
Schering Siemens
Siemens Thyssen
Thyssen Volkswagen
VEBA
VTAG
P a n e l  B. SEAQ f i r m s  p a i r e d  w i t h  IBIS f i r m s
Barclays Bank Court aids Rentokil
BBA Group Dixons Rolls-Royce
BOC Group General Electric Royal Bank of Scotlan<
Boots GKN Scottish Power
British Aerospace HSBC Standard Chartered
British Airways ICI Tomkins
British Steel National Power Zeneca
BTR Nat. West. Bank
Cookson Group Prudential
Appendix D: Permutation Tests
This Appendix provides the background for the Fisher permutation tests and 
the Achieved Significance Level technique. It draws heavily from Chapter 15 
of An Introduction to the Boostrap by Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
The main application of permutation tests is to the two-sample problem. 
In such as set-up there are two independent random samples z = { z \z 2, ...,zn) 
and y =  (2/1,2/2, • ••, Vn) drawn from different probability distributions F  and G. 
Having observed the values for 2 and y, the null hypothesis of no difference 
between F  and G is tested. If the null hypothesis is true, then there should 
be no difference between the probabilistic behaviour of random variable z  or 
random variable y.
The Achieved Significance Level (the “ASL”) of a test generates the prob­
ability of observing at least a that large a value when the null hypothesis is 
true:
A S L  =  P R O B Ho j<r > ?}
The smaller the value of ASL, the stronger the evidence against the null 
hypothesis. We first fix the quantity 6 at the observed value while the random 
variable 6* is assumed to have the null hypothesis distribution (i.e. the 
distribution of 6 if the null hypothesis were true).
The hypothesis test of the null hypothesis consists of computing ASL, 
then we have to take a view if it is acceptable (i.e. too small) according 
to established statistical thresholds. The main practical difficulty with this 
type of hypothesis test is given by the methodologies needed to calculate the 
ASL.
We have written P R O B ho { Q* > Q } as if the null hypothesis specifies a 
single distribution, from which we can calculate the probability of 6* > 0.
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In many cases, we do not have one distribution for the null hypothesis but 
rather a family of possible null hypothesis distributions (in the normal case, 
the null hypothesis family includes all normal distributions with expectation 
zero). In order to actually calculate the ASL, we had to either approximate 
the null hypothesis variance. As an alternative, one can use Student’s method 
which has the benefit of generating a simple solution for the problem but its 
application is confined only to the normal situation.
Fisher’s permutation test is one established way to calculate the ASL for 
the general null hypothesis F  = G. The description of such a permutation 
test is easy to provide. Let us assume that we have two sample of obser­
vations, where one sample consists of traders trading on Market A and the 
other sample consists of traders participating in Market B and we would like 
to test whether spreads are different across these two markets. If the null 
hypothesis is correct, any level of spread in Market A should be equal to 
that in Market B, and hence the spreads for any of the markets could have 
come equally well from either of these two markets being considered. So we 
combine all the m  +  n  observations from both markets together, then take a 
sample of size m  without replacement to represent the first group of traders 
trading in Market A. The remaining n  observations constitute the second 
group of traders on Market B. The difference between group means is calcu­
lated and then repeat this process a large number of times. If the original 
difference in sample means falls outside the middle 95% of the distribution 
of differences, the two-sided permutation test rejects the null hypothesis at 
a 5% level.
Following Efron and Tibshirani (1993), the permutation steps are under­
taken in the following fashion:
“Step 1. Choose B  independent vectors ...,g*(B), each con-
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sisting of n  z’s and m j/’s and each being randomly selected from the set of 
f  N  \all I I possible such vectors.n
Step 2. Evaluate the permutation replication of 9 corresponding to each 
permutation vector,
e-{b) =  S{g*{b),v)
Step 3. Approximate the ASLperm by the following:
A S L ^ rm =  #  {e'(b) > ?}  /B
The permutation ASL is close to the t-test ASL, even though there are no 
normality assumptions underlining A S L perrn” (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993)
An important question that must be addressed is the number of permuta­
tion replications we require in order to achieve a suitable level of appropriate 
testing. The following part will go through this central question by providing 
some background concepts that are useful in providing the necessary insight 
in this issue.
Let A  =  ASLperm and A  = A S L perm. Then B  • A  equals the number of 
0*(b) values exceeding the observed value 6, with E(A ) — A  and var(A) —
Mi-A)
B ’
The coefficient of variation is given by
(1 - A )  I  A ' 1/2
cvb (A) =
B
Suppose we require cvB(A) to be .10, meaning that Monte Carlo simu­
lations should not generate an error that affect the estimate of ASLperm by 
more than 10%. This means that for this level of significance, there is a 
need for something like 900 permutations. The number of permutations goes 
to 1901 and 3894 in case we require cvB(A) to be .05 and .025 respectively.
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Efron and Tibshirani (1993) provide more a whole range of permutations 
needed to obtain conventional confidence levels.
One of the most important advantages in using the permutation testing 
technology is the accuracy levels it achieves. If the null hypothesis F  — G is 
true, there is almost exactly a 5% chance that ASLperm will be less than 0.5. 
In general,
P R O B Ho {A SL perm  ^  Ck} OL
for any value of a  between 0 and 1.
325
Appendix E: Estimating the Adverse, Se­
lection Component
In this Appendix, we discuss in some detail our estimation procedures for 
microstructure-based measures of information asymmetry. The theoretical 
models reviewed in this Appendix are made operational in Chapter 3 through 
a trade-by-trade analysis. It is pertinent to ask whether this approach is likely 
to impact the results obtained from the methodology employed. George, 
Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) indicate that the differencing interval should 
not affect estimates of the order-processing cost and adverse selection com­
ponents of the quoted spread. They use daily closing price and quotes to 
calculate autocovariances of quote and transaction returns. GKN suggest 
that the “use of high frequency data is more appropriate” because of po­
tential small-sample bias. In Chapter 3 we make use of intraday quote and 
transaction returns to calculate autocovariances and estimate these models 
using daily time-series observations.
11.0.1 M ethod 1
11.0.2 George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991)
The George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (“GKN”) methodology decomposes the 
quoted spread into (a) the adverse selection component, and (b) the order 
processing component. The inventory cost component is assumed to be in­
significant and hence not modelled. The methodology proposed by GKN is 
based on an estimator that uses the time series properties of the difference 
between the bid price and the transaction price to eliminate this bias. The 
GKN technique assumes a probability of 0.5 of a trade reversal.
In their model, GKN provide evidence that positively autocorrelated 
time-varying expected returns result in substantial biases in the estimation of
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the spread and the components making up the spread and their objective is 
to correct these biases. GKN argue that covariance-based spread estimators 
that ignore the fact that expected returns exhibit positive autocorrelation 
are expected to be biased downwards.
In the first place, transaction prices can be represented as follows:
Pt =  Mt +  n(sq/2 )Q t 
Mt = Et + Mt~i + (1 — 7r)(sq/2)Qt + Ut
where Pt is the observed price of transaction t, Qt is the unobservable 
indicator for the bid-ask classification, M t is the unobservable true price that 
reflects all publicly available information immediately following transaction 
t, E t is the unobservable expected return for the period between transaction 
t  — 1 and t, Ut is the unobservable innovation in true prices due to the arrival 
of public information between transaction t — 1 and t, sq is the quoted spread 
of the market maker, 7r is the unobservable proportion of the quoted spread 
due to order processing costs, and (1 — 7r) is the unobservable proprtion of 
the quoted spread due to adverse selection.
The approach used measures the spread by considering the serial co- 
variance of the difference between transaction returns and returns calculated 
using bid prices leading to a metric which, according to GKN, does not suffer 
from positive autocorrelation due to time-varying expected returns.
The GKN spread component corrects the downward bias in estimated or­
der processing costs which axe induced by time variation in expected returns. 
The difference between trade-by-trade return, Rx,i and the subsequent quote 
(bid) return Rs,i is used to construct a spread measure
S t = 2 y /—Cov(RD i, R D i-i)
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11.0.3 M ethod 2
11.0.4 Booth, Lin and Sanger (1995)
Booth, Lin and Sanger (“BLS”) develop a regression method to estimate the 
proportion of the effective spread that can be attributed to adverse selection. 
BLS assume that the specialist’s inventory cost is zero.
The intuition behind the model is that changes in transaction prices will 
reflect order processing costs and the bid-ask bounce, while quote revisions 
will reflect the adverse selection component of the spread. This methodology 
allows for a persistence parameter that measures the probability of trade 
reversals.
In this model, the probability of order persistence is <5, and the probability 
of order reversal is 1 — 6. That is, starting with a market sell order, that 
is executed at the market maker’s bid price B t at time t, we have that the 
probability of next trade occurring at the bid B t+\ is 8 and 1 — 5 that it 
will occur at the market maker’s ask A t+i. With this structure, the market 
maker’s expected gross profit at time t +  1 is
$(Bt+ i — Bt) +  (1 — 5)(At+i — Bt) =  Et(Pt+1) — Pt
where E t(Pt+i) =  8Bt+i +  (1 — 8)At+1 is the expected market price con­
ditional on the trade at time t.
Quote revisions are assumed to take the following form:
Bt+i = B t + Xzt
and
At+i =  A t +  A zt
where zt is the signed half effective spread and 1 > A > 0 is the component 
of the spread due to adverse selection.
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Then the effective market maker profit, given a sell order, is the following:
E t(Pt+1) - P t = - ( l - X - d ) z t
where Q = 28 — 1 with 6 = 0.5 meaning that order types (buys or sells) 
arrive randomly on the market.
Given the equations above, the adverse selection and order persistence 
parameters are estimated from the following equations:
M t+1 — Mt = A Zt -t- et+i 
Zt+i — QZt +  rjt+1
where Pt is the transaction price at time t, Mt is the quote midpoint 
Zt = Pt — Mt, 6 = (9 + l ) /2  is the order persistence parameter and et+i and 
rjt+l axe random error terms.
11.0.5 M ethod 3
11.0.6 Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997)
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (“MRR”) develop a model that aims at 
understanding the effects generated by information flows on prices. As such, 
their model is related to other technologies which focus on the predictability 
of (very) short run returns, while controlling fully for market microstructure 
effects. The prices changes are assumed to be a linear function of contempo­
raneous and past order flows arriving on the market.
The MRR model is based on a methodology that relates price changes 
to the contemporaneous and past order flow. The MRR model allows for 
the estimated values to be affected by the surprise in the trade flow to the 
Exchange. Their model assumes that the updates in beliefs come from two 
sources: “(i) new public information announcements which are not associated
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with trading, and (ii) order flow, which may provide a noisy signal about fu­
ture asset values” (Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans, 1997).In addition, 
it provides an estimate of the conditional probability of a trade occurring 
within the quoted spread.
In the model, pt denotes the transaction price at time t while X t is the 
trade indicator to determine trade initiation (with the familiar X t — + 1  for 
a buy-initiated trade and —1 for a seller-initiated trade. Let 7  to denote the 
unconditional probability that a transaction takes place within the quoted 
spread. Allowing v t to represent the innovations in beliefs between successive 
trades (updates generated by new public information) and assuming that 
market makers want to defend themselves from traders who possess superior 
information, we would have a situation where a buy (sell) order will generate 
an upward (downward) revision in the market’s beliefs. The change in beliefs, 
arising from the order flow hitting the market, can be denoted as A(Xt — 
E[xt | ajf_i]), where the component (X t — E[xt | xt_i]) is the unexpected or 
unsystematic part of the order flow. In such a set-up, A > 0 is the amount 
of adverse selection in the market.
Let ipt be the post-trade (expected) value conditional upon (a) public 
information arriving on the market, and (b) the trade initiation. The updates 
in beliefs occurs in the following fashion:
Pt =  P t - 1 +  H x t ~  E[xt | x t- 1]) +  E t
Letting and pb as the bid price being the pre-trade ask quote at time 
t and allowing (j) > 0 as a compensation to market makers for incurring 
transaction costs, inventory costs, risk bearing, etc., we have an ask price of:
Pt =  'Pt- 1 +  ^(x t — E[xt | £t-i]) +.0 +  Et 
and a bid price of:
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Pt = <Pt-l -  H X t -  E[xt I Xi_i]) -  <t> +  Et 
The transaction price could then be expressed as:
Pt — <Pt +  4>Xt +  f f
where f  t is an independent and identically distributed random variable 
with mean zero.
Using the equations above MRR get:
Pt =  <pt - i  +  A (A 4 — E[xt | £ t - i ] )  — <pXt +  £t + f t
A general Markov process is assumed for the trade initiation variable.
In addition, we have:
Apt =  {<f> +  A )X t — (<J> +  pX) Xt~i +  £t
where X t is the trade indicator variable, <j> is the order processing com­
ponent, A is the adverse selection component, p is the autocorrelation of 
the order flow, and 7  is the probability a transaction takes place inside the 
spread.
The vector of price and quote parameters (<f), A, p, 7 ) is estimated using a 
GMM methodology to decide the parameter values for the above vector that 
minimise a criterion function based on the moment conditions.
The following moments implied by the model exactly identify the vector 
(0, A, p, 7 ) and a constant drift term a:
(  Q t Q t - 1 -  Q ] p  \
IQd -  (1 -  7)
E  u t — a  = 0
(•ut  -  a ) Q t
\  {^t & )Q t—1 /
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The first equation is the definition of the autocorrelation in trade initi­
ation. The second equation defines the crossing probability and the third 
equation defines the drift term.
The estimated implied bid-ask spread is equal to 2(0 + A) and the propor­
tion of the implied spread due to asymmetric information is equal to •
11.0.7 M ethod 4
11.0.8 Huang and Stoll (1997)
Huang and Stoll (1997) develop a trade indicator model that yields a two-way 
decomposition of the spread. The Huang and Stoll (1997) model encompasses 
a number of other models, namely the GKN and MRR methodologies. They 
further extend this basic model to allow for serial correlation in trade flows. 
This extended model yields separate inventory and adverse selection compo­
nents.
In this model, the unobserved fundamental value of the security, Vt, is 
modelled as:
Vt = Vt~ i +  a —Qt-1 +  St
where Qt is the trade indicator variable, a  is the component of the half­
spread directly attributable to adverse selection and et is the public informa­
tion shock.
In this model, the fundamental value is decomposed into two parts: (a) 
the private information observed from the last trade, a ^ Q t~i, and (b) the 
public information shock, et.
As usual, the fundamental value is unobserved and the mid price is taken 
to be a proxy for such a value. The model assumes that, under the condition 
that past trades are of a normal size of one, the mid price is related to the 
fundamental value in the following way:
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t - 1
Mt = Vt + & Y iQi
i = 1
where M t is the mid price, (3 is the component due to inventory costs 
Y?iZI Qi an(l 1S the total inventory from the market open till the last trade.
Hence we have
A M t — (a +  P )—Qt-1 +  Et
The model assumes the constant spread assumption in the following way:
§
Pt =  M t + —Qt +  ilt
with the error term r)t capturing the deviation of the observed half spread 
from the constant half spread.
Given the relationships above, the basic regression model is:
A  P t  =  — ( Q t  — Q t - i )  +  X — Q t - i  +  Et
where S  is the traded spread and A =  (a +  (3) is the sum of the adverse 
selection (a) and inventory holding (/?) components of the half-spread, (1 —A) 
is the proportion attributable to order processing. The model is estimated 
using GMM.
The approach then requires estimating the following two equations simul­
taneously:
A Mt =  (<* +  /?) ^ Q t -1 -  a ( l -  2 7 r ) ^ Q t_2 +  et
E { Q t - 1  | Q t - 2)  —  ( 1  — 2 7 r ) Q t _ 2
where n  is the probability of a trade reversal.
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A ppendix F: LSE D ata
The data was provided by the London Stock Exchange’s “Transaction Data 
Service” . The data set, covering the period from June 1998 to October 1998 
contains trades data (for all trades taking place on both the order book 
and on the dealership system) together with the quotes data containing the 
best ask and best bid prices obtained from the SETS system. Moreover, 
order history data (date and time when the order is submitted, order type, 
quantity and limit prices) for the orders submitted on SETS is also provided. 
Although the entire order book, at each point in time, is not provided by 
the LSE, there is sufficient information to construct the book through an 
algorithm that takes into consideration the date and time when an order was 
submitted and when it was executed. The algorithm was kindly provided by 
Stephen Wells.
Trades data from the SETS system contains the transaction date, transac­
tion time (to the nearest second), the trade price, trade size and trade direc­
tion. In addition, there is also a code for the trade counterparties (whether 
member firm or not).17 However, there is no information as to the final 
identity of the counterparty.
Trades data from the dealership system contains the same information as 
that extracted from the order book with trades time-stamped to the nearest 
second. The rules require that these “non order book trades” are reported 
within three minutes of the trade being executed, the only exception for 
order book securities are Worked Principal Agreements (WPA). The trade 
times for these trades come from the brokers systems. In most cases they are 
reported automatically from trading systems.
17 The LSE gives each counterparty a code for each particular security for each month 
with codes changing every month.
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The quotes data provide the best ask and best bid. quotes on the order 
book (there is no quotes data from the dealership system) time-stamped to 
the nearest second.
The trades data identifies the trader whose order has been executed (on 
both trading systems) as either a “Principal” (understood as a member firm 
registered with the LSE) or “Customer” (understood as a public trader) 
depending on the trader’s status. In terms of trade reporting, the Regulatory 
Guide states that when there are trades “(a) between a member firm acting 
as principal and a member firm acting as agent, the principal shall trade 
report; (b) between two member firms both acting as principals, the seller 
shall trade report; (c) between two member firms both acting as agents, the 
seller shall trade report” (London Stock Exchange, 1999).
The distinction between “Principal to Principal” trades and “Customer” 
trades (where there is a “Customer” at least on one side of the trade) is not 
difficult for trades on the dealership system. This distinction, however, be­
comes complex when trades on the order book are considered. This difficulty 
is due to the choice provided to traders when submitting orders to  the order 
book; traders can either submit orders directly to SETS or route them to an 
LSE member firm that will then submit the customer’s order to the order 
book.
In the latter case, the resulting trade through the order book will, possi­
bly, be registered with a flag of “P” , meaning a trade from a member firm. 
Hence, there is no formal way of distinguishing between trades logged in with 
a flag of “P” in which the member firm was acting as a “Principal” and those 
trades in which the member firm was acting on behalf of a “Customer” .
In our dataset, about 15.8% of all trades on the order book had a “Cus­
tomer” at least on one side of the trade. The remaining trades where formally
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logged in as “Principal to Principal” trades. Anecdotal evidence, gathered 
from the LSE, indicates that a very high proportion of these trades are ac­
tually coming from “Customers” that place their orders with member firms. 
The LSE’s “Secondary Market Fact Sheet” , appears to provide additional 
evidence consistent with this view.
For the sake of clarity and results’ robustness, Variance Ratios presented 
in Chapter 5 have been computed using two different methodologies: (a) one 
in which all trades on SETS up to 2 NMS are used; and (b) another where 
only SETS trades formally registered as originating from “Customers” are 
used.
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